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AUTHENTICATED 
US. GOVERNMENT 
INFORMATION ^ 


EXPLORING THE NATURE OF UIGHUR 
NATIONALISM: FREEDOM HGHTERS OR 
TERRORISTS? 


HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS, HUIilAN RIGHTS AND OAH]RSIGHT 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATRH]S 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 


JUNE 16, 2009 


Serial No. 111-30 


Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 



Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ 


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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 


HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 


GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 
Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 
BRAD SHERMAN, California 
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 
DIANE E. WATSON, California 
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York 
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 
GENE GREEN, Texas 
LYNN WOOLSEY, California 
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 
BARBARA LEE, California 
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 
JIM COSTA, California 
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 
RON KLEIN, Florida 


ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAI^, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 


Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director 
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director 


Subcommittee on International Organizations, 
Human Rights and Oversight 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts, Chairman 
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota RON PAUL, Texas 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey TED POE, Texas 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

Cliff Stammerman, Subcommittee Staff Director 
Paul Berkowitz, Republican Professional Staff Member 
Brian Forni, Staff Associate 


(II) 



CONTENTS 


Page 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Randall G. Schriver, Partner, Armitage International (former Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department 

of State) 9 

Sean R. Roberts, Ph.D., Director and Associate Professor, International Devel- 
opment Studies Program, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George 

Washington University 17 

Dru C. Gladney, Ph.D., President, Pacific Basin Institute, Pomona College 24 

Ms. Shirley Kan, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional 

Research Service 58 

Ms. Susan Baker Manning, Partner, Bingham McCutchen 64 

Bruce Fein, Esq., Principal, The Litchfield Group 75 

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Randall G. Schriver: Prepared statement 14 

Sean R. Roberts, Ph.D.: Prepared statement 20 

Dru C. Gladney, Ph.D.: Prepared statement 27 

Ms. Shirley Kan: Prepared statement 61 

Ms. Susan Baker Manning: Prepared statement 67 

Bruce Fein, Esq.: Prepared statement 77 

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice 124 

Hearing minutes 126 

The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from the 
State of California: Material submitted for the record 127 


(III) 




EXPLORING THE NATURE OF UIGHUR NA- 
TIONALISM: FREEDOM FIGHTERS OR TER- 
RORISTS? 


TUESDAY, JUNE 16, 2009 

House of Representatives, 

Subcommittee on International Organizations, 

Human Rights and Oversight, 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:17 a.m., in room 
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill Delahunt (chair- 
man of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. Delahunt. This hearing will come to order. I want to wel- 
come a very distinguished group of witnesses whom I will shortly 
introduce; and we will be joined by another witness, I understand, 
via video link from Kosovo. 

This is the second in a series of hearings we plan to hold which 
will explore the circumstances surrounding the detention of 22 
Uighurs, which is a Turkic Muslim minority from Northwest 
China, who were incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay. 

In our first hearing, our panel was again composed of distin- 
guished experts on Uighur history. It included the three-time Nobel 
Prize nominee and leader of the Uighur community worldwide, 
Mrs. Kadeer, who, along with the rest the panel, was unanimous 
in stating that Uighurs were and are an oppressed minority in 
China. Furthermore, all agreed that the Communist Chinese Gov- 
ernment has used the war on terror as a means to avoid criticism 
as they brutally persecuted and oppressed the Uighur minority. 

In fact, the House of Representatives, in a resolution numbered 
497, stated that the Chinese Communists had — and this is the lan- 
guage of that resolution; and both myself and the ranking member, 
Mr. Rohrabacher, were sponsors; again, I am quoting from the lan- 
guage of the resolution itself — “manipulated the strategic objectives 
of the international war on terror to increase their cultural and re- 
ligious oppression of the Muslim population residing in the Uighur 
autonomous region.” 

The regime in Beijing conflates peaceful civil disobedience and 
dissent with violent terrorist activity. In fact, when I asked our 
witnesses, that previous panel — and again, I am quoting from the 
transcript — if Speaker Gingrich — I was referring to Mr. Gingrich to 
suggest that they be returned to China — “Well, if Speaker Gingrich 
had his way and the 17 Uighurs were to be returned to China, 
what would their fate have been?” 

( 1 ) 



2 


Well, one witness, Mr. Nury Turkel, a Uighur lawyer and activ- 
ist, said unequivocally that would be equal to a one-way ticket to 
the death chamber; and the rest of the panel agreed a return to 
China would be certain torture and very well may lead to a sum- 
mary execution. 

Well, today, we turn our attention to the East Turkistan Islamic 
Movement or, as it is known by its acronym, ETIM. The charge 
that the Uighurs at Guantanamo were terrorists was predicated on 
an unsubstantiated claim that they were somehow affiliated with 
this group. Over time, the Uighurs have been cleared by both the 
Bush administration and our Federal courts. And, as we all know, 
the Obama administration has been making every effort to resettle 
these men in suitable countries. 

Four Uighurs have been currently resettled in Bermuda. I wish 
to publicly thank, and I am confident that my friend and colleague 
from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, joins in this, to thank the Ber- 
muda Government, Premier Brown, who displayed great courage 
and decency when giving these Uighurs a new home. The Premier 
will shortly be receiving a letter from myself and Mr. Rohrabacher 
to that effect. 

However, my question is: How did this accusation develop 
against 22 men when even the very existence of ETIM is subject 
to some debate, particularly in light of the fact that these men 
were not apprehended on the battlefield, either by Northern Alli- 
ance soldiers or by American military but, in my opinion, were the 
victims of a bounty system. As we have come to learn, the Uighurs 
were sold to American forces by unknown Afghani and Pakistani 
individuals for the sum of $5,000 each. 

During the Bush administration, ETIM was classified as a ter- 
rorist organization under an Executive Order numbered 13224. It 
is important to note that under this Executive Order it defines ter- 
rorism as actions that do not necessarily threaten the United 
States and its citizens. By contrast, a designation as a foreign ter- 
rorist organization — again, an acronym, an FTO — it is required 
that a group engage in terrorist activity and that this terrorist ac- 
tivity must threaten the security of the United States or its nation- 
als. 

I am unable to find, nor does any research appear, that at any 
time was ETIM considered for listing as an FTO. 

Now, although this may be a subtle bureaucratic distinction, it 
is an important fact. Why, if ETIM was a threat to our national 
security, was it not classified as an FTO like organizations such as 
Hamas, Hezbollah, and al-Qaeda? These groups, properly labeled 
FTOs, are considered a direct and dangerous threat to the United 
States’ national security. 

In any event, my primary concern is that, in making our own as- 
sessment as to the nature of this shadowy group, the ETIM, did we 
place or did we unduly rely on Chinese Communist intelligence, 
some may even call it propaganda, Chinese propaganda to suit 
their own strategic objectives or tactical objectives concerning the 
Uighur minority? 

It appears to me that we took substantial intelligence informa- 
tion from the Chinese Communist regime and then used that ques- 



3 


tionable evidence as our own as a significant factor in the deter- 
mination that ETIM was a terrorist organization. 

I am going to ask staff to hold up two poster hoards, one at a 
time. One includes a statement taken from a Chinese document en- 
titled: East Turkistan terrorist forces cannot get away with impu- 
nity. This is published by the Chinese Communist Information Of- 
fice in January 2002. In that document, the Chinese attribute over 
200 terrorist incidents resulting in 162 deaths and 400 injuries to 
undefined parties, simply labeled by the Chinese as East Turkistan 
terrorist forces. 

Now, examine the second poster; and this is a statement released 
from our Department of Treasury published in September 2002 in 
response to listing ETIM as a terrorist organization. In this state- 
ment, our Government takes the Chinese statistics of 200 terrorist 
incidents, 162 deaths, and 400 injuries, and now attributes them 
to a single group, the ETIM. 

Now, let me pose a rhetorical question. Why has the perpetrator 
of these acts suddenly changed from undefined groups to the 
ETIM? And why did our Government take the statistics of the 
Communist Chinese Government and utilize it in the classification 
of ETIM as a terrorist organization? That causes me profound con- 
cern. 

Now, regardless of where the 13 Uighurs currently detained in 
Guantanamo are resettled, whether it be in Bermuda, Palau — I un- 
derstand today that the prime minister of Italy, Berlusconi, has in- 
dicated that Italy will accept three of the Uighurs. Again, if that 
is accurate, let me say thank you to the Government of Italy. 

This question about reliance, and particularly in the case of the 
specific case of ETIM, must be answered, because it raises serious 
concerns as to whether American foreign policy can be manipulated 
by the Communist Chinese Government or, for that matter, anyone 
else. 

Professor Millward, who is a well-known scholar in this area, 
echoes my concern in an article — or maybe I am echoing his con- 
cern — in an article he wrote entitled, “Violent Separatism in the 
Uighur Autonomous Region: A Critical Assessment.” 

On September 2, 2001, the Communist Party Secretary of that 
region said that the situation there was better than ever in history. 
That is September 2, 2001. While mentioning separatism, the party 
secretary for the region stressed that society is stable and people 
are living and working in peace and contentment. The Communists 
even went on to say that the nightlife is terrific. It goes on to two 
or three in the morning. 

Two weeks later, not surprisingly, the official Chinese Com- 
munist line changed following the September 11 attacks on the 
United States. Official Chinese Communist pronouncements began 
to stress that the threat of terrorism in that region was significant. 

As China’s leadership maneuvered itself side by side — and, 
again, these are the words of Professor Millward — with the United 
States on the war on terror, according to him, this required a revi- 
sion of the official description of separatists in the region and what 
had generally been described as a handful of separatists was now 
a full-blown terrorist organization. Professor Millward hypothesizes 



4 


that this helped Beijing warm its somewhat at the time chilly rela- 
tionship with Washington. 

Well, hopefully, today this panel will cast some light on this 
issue. Because I believe that the case of the Uighurs is not simply 
about these 22 men from northwestern China. It is much more. It 
is about the very process we utilize in making far-reaching deci- 
sions about critical foreign policy issues and national security con- 
cerns. 

When we designate a group as a terrorist organization, are we 
relying on foreign intelligence, whether it be Chinese Communist 
intelligence, in such a way that the results are seriously flawed so 
that the consequences harm our national security interests? Let’s 
not forget that flawed intelligence played a key role in the decision 
to invade Iraq, and we learned subsequently that Saddam Hussein 
neither had links to al-Qaeda, nor had weapons of mass destruc- 
tion. 

So what I hope is that we can utilize the Uighurs, if you will, 
as a case study to examine the process so that we may mitigate its 
deficiency and help our Nation reach better decisions, acknowledge 
our mistakes, and, most importantly, do justice to the innocent. 

Now, let me turn to my friend and colleague, the ranking mem- 
ber, Mr. Rohrabacher, for his opening statement; and let me indi- 
cate, too, that I know he has other commitments today, and it is 
my intention to let him, after we introduce the witnesses, proceed 
with his questioning before I do. 

Dana. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. 

I do want to thank my good friend and chairman for not only 
holding this hearing but deciding that we should focus on this issue 
so the American people will understand the facts behind it and the 
relevance of this issue. 

I would also right off the bat like to express my deep apprecia- 
tion to the leader in Bermuda, Premier Brown, for his courage to 
do what is morally right in this situation. He has demonstrated, I 
think, the best of democracy. That is what leadership is all about, 
is being willing to take such tough stands. I am sorry that our own 
leadership here at home and even in my own party seems lacking 
at this moment. 

I will be equally grateful to the leadership in Palau if that island 
nation gives refuge to these falsely accused Uighurs. The people of 
Palau should stand behind their leaders and show that they, too, 
are a morally superior group of people. And this is one way that 
they will certainly be acknowledged for that by those of us who per- 
haps don’t know them now but will get to know them if they back 
up their leadership in this courageous decision. 

Chairman Delahunt is doing a great service to our country by 
educating the Congress about the plight of the Uighurs and edu- 
cating, hopefully, through the Congress and through these hear- 
ings, to the people of the United States, who need to understand 
what the occupation of East Turkistan is all about. I hope that this 
series of hearings helps clarify how the Uighurs who were sent to 
Guantanamo Bay prison, how and why that happened and how the 
Communist Chinese Government gained access to them while they 
were there and what the Chinese officials did to them while they 



5 


were there, and then also what the Chinese Government is doing 
to the people of East Turkistan and how that there can he perhaps 
some lessons learned. 

A Defense Intelligence Agency expert on Chinese counterintel- 
ligence operations once said that it is the mother’s milk of counter- 
intelligence to create phony political organizations. He stated that 
the Chinese are especially good at it and utilize this method in 
order to know who to watch and who eventually to eliminate. 
Phony or front organizations can he used to tarnish a good cause 
by blaming it for violence against innocent people when in fact gov- 
ernment agencies are often committing that very violence. 

We have good reason to believe this may be the case for some 
of the so-called Uighur organizations. Much to my dismay, some 
pundits in the Republican Party have fallen for this bait and are 
lumping the Uighurs in with Islamic extremists. 

The Bush administration did not help matters. It held Uighurs 
in Guantanamo as terrorists; and they did this, I believe, to ap- 
pease the Chinese Government in a pathetic attempt to gain its 
support at the beginning of the war against Iraq and also to assure 
China’s continued purchase of U.S. Treasuries. 

Many, if not all, of the negative allegations against the Uighurs 
can be traced back to Communist Chinese intelligence, whose pur- 
pose is to snuff out a legitimate independence movement that chal- 
lenges the Communist Party bosses in Beijing. 

No patriot, especially no Republican who considers himself a 
Reagan Republican, should fall for this manipulation, which has us 
do the bidding of a dictatorship in Beijing. 

In the Hall of Shame, of course, is our former Speaker, Newt 
Gingrich. His positioning on this should be of no surprise and is of 
no surprise to those of us who, during Newt’s leadership, were dis- 
mayed by his active support for Clinton-era trade policies with 
Communist China, policies that have now had a disastrous impact 
on our economy, while bolstering China’s economic and military 
powers. Most favored nation status, trading status, should never 
have been granted to such a vicious dictatorship. 

Newt and his big corporations as well as those leaders in the 
Clinton administration persuaded Members of Congress in the 
1980s and again in the ’90s to go along with an embracing of Com- 
munist China; and, as such, those people, whether they are Repub- 
licans like Newt or whether they are those people in the Clinton 
administration who were advocating this, did no favor to the people 
of the United States. 

Our current economic vulnerability to a dictatorship, to the 
world’s — actually, the world’s worst human rights abuser can be 
traced back to that morally flawed policy in the 1990s. 

Within the span of 20 years, we have gone from having a trade 
deficit with Communist China of $1.7 billion, to over $300 billion 
a year today. We are losing 650,000 jobs a month, and it is obvious 
or should be obvious to anyone who bothers to read the labels that 
just about every one of these jobs that we are losing are going to 
Communist China. 

The Chinese Communist Party has accumulated $2 trillion of 
sovereign wealth funds by producing and selling American brand 
products to Americans. Of course, it was the Americans who once 



6 


produced these very same products here on American soil. Moving 
derivatives, stocks, and bonds on paper from one side of a table to 
the other does not create wealth. Manufacturing jobs create wealth. 
And this basic fact has not been lost on Communist Party bosses 
in Beijing. Now our leaders have to beg the Chinese to buy our 
Treasuries. 

Well, thanks to the so-called leaders of the Republican and 
Democratic Party in the 1990s who set us up on this path to obliv- 
ion, we now are vulnerable to this Communist Chinese dictator- 
ship; and it is extending its power throughout the world based on 
the economic relationship that it established with us back in the 
’90s. 

Have we drifted so far away from our principles that we willingly 
accept leaders — and I say this was leadership in the Democratic 
Party during the Clinton years, and now we see a leader from that 
era in the Republican Party — doing the bidding of the Communist 
Chinese Party by attacking and, in this case, attacking people who 
are protesting Beijing’s repressive rule? And that is what the 
Uighurs are guilty of They are protesting and opposing a repres- 
sive rule by the Communist Party regime in Beijing. 

Newt should come right now before this committee and explain 
to us how occupied East Turkistan is any different from the 
present-day occupied Tibet or of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia 
during the Cold war. He should explain why he has been doing the 
bidding of Beijing and doing so at the expense of people who are 
seeking freedom and democracy for their own people. 

Many conservatives who are knowledgeable about these facts ac- 
tually have joined with us a long time ago, Mr. Chairman, and all 
along have been on the side of the Uighurs and tried to spread the 
word, the truth about this situation; and I will include for the 
record now a list of about 20 of them. Rather than read them all, 
let me just note there are many prominent Republican leaders who 
are opposed to these statements that are being made by former 
Speaker Gingrich. 

Mr. Delahunt. Without objection, the list will be submitted into 
the records of the committee. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. 

An ongoing attempt to appease Communist China has been be- 
hind the detention of the 17 Uighurs currently held in Guanta- 
namo. By detaining the Uighurs, the United States was and still 
is an accomplice to Chinese brutal occupation of East Turkistan 
and the discrimination against the Uighur people that they suffer 
that we heard so much about during the first hearing. Both Repub- 
lican and Democratic Parties need to recognize this and not cower 
before Beijing’s now powerful economic capabilities. 

It is my hope that this hearing will help dispel some of the seri- 
ous confusion and propaganda about the Uighurs, both the Uighurs 
who are at home who are struggling for their freedom and to live 
in a Democratic society and these 17 Uighurs who are courageous 
enough to try to learn the skills that would enable them to resist 
the dictatorship in Beijing. 

I am very proud to join my chairman, my good friend. Chairman 
Delahunt, in this effort. Now I am looking forward to hearing the 
testimony. 



7 


Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Congressman Rohrabacher. 

I want to acknowledge the presence of Eni Faleomavaega, my 
good friend who chairs the Subcommittee on Asia and the South 
Pacific, and invite him to make any statement he may wish. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Chairman, I don’t have an opening 
statement, but, again, I want to commend you and Ranking Mem- 
ber Mr. Rohrabacher for your initiative and leadership in calling 
this hearing and bringing to bear a better understanding of the 
Uighur people and exactly the issue that you are seeking here for 
the kind of policies that we have enunciated since the 1990s right 
up to this time. 

I do thank the gentleman from California for calling a spade a 
spade and for his very provocative thoughts. This is not a Demo- 
cratic or a Republican issue, partisan in any way, but to find out 
exactly what the truth is. 

I do want to commend our members of the panel for their ap- 
pearance this morning and look forward to hearing their testimony. 

Mr. Delahunt. And I thank the gentleman. 

I wanted to note that I have alluded to the fact that this is a se- 
ries of hearings. I anticipate we will have seven or eight. I intend 
to deploy our great staff to conduct interviews. I think it is time 
that the American people hear from those that have been detained. 

I am sure that many, at least on this panel, are aware, as Con- 
gressman Rohrabacher indicated, that Communist Chinese intel- 
ligence agents were provided access to the inmates — the Uighur in- 
mates in Guantanamo. That I find profoundly disturbing. Yet, at 
the same time, our request, myself and that of Mr. Rohrabacher, 
with the approval of counsel for those who were detained, to have 
access to hear them, to interview them, to discern as best we can 
the truth, because this is a search for the truth, we were denied 
access. 

However, I had a conversation last evening with Premier Brown 
of Bermuda and indicated to him that myself and Mr. Rohrabacher 
were interested in going to Bermuda and having a briefing, a hear- 
ing, whatever the appropriate term is, and invite these now-freed 
Uighurs to come before this subcommittee and maybe in conjunc- 
tion with other subcommittees of the Foreign Affairs Committee to 
listen to what they have to say. I think that is an important step. 
Whatever the results are, whatever the facts are, let’s put them out 
on the table. 

There seems to be a proclivity on the part of the Executive — and, 
again, I am not just referring to the Bush administration but as 
well the Obama administration — to classify, in my opinion, far too 
much information. This will provide us an opportunity for every 
single American citizen, and particularly those who are very much 
involved in scholarship and as students of the Uighurs, to hear 
from them firsthand, unfiltered, without pundits interpreting for 
members of the committee and for the American public as to what 
their experience was. 

With the approval of the ranking member, it is my intention in 
the very near future to go to Bermuda to determine the feasibility 
of actually doing that and then coming back and reporting to the 
committee and consulting with Mr. Rohrabacher about having that 
kind of an exercise in Bermuda, which hopefully would educate 



8 


members of the committee, the academic community, and all of us 
as to their reality in terms of how they saw it and welcome anyone 
who has any disagreement with their view to come before this com- 
mittee and testify. 

I would think it would be refreshing to have people like myself 
and Mr. Rohrabacher and Newt Gingrich and all those others who 
opined to maybe listen — what a refreshing change that would be — 
and ask relevant questions so that as we proceed forward we don’t 
make the mistakes that we have made in the past. 

Again, I say that not as a “large D” Democrat but as a “small 
d” democrat and as someone who is very concerned about American 
foreign policy being manipulated or influenced in a way that is 
against our interests and against the better instincts and the val- 
ues of the American people that we talk about. 

So, Dana, I will report back to you. And hopefully we will be 
making a trip to Bermuda; and you are welcome, too, Eni. 

Now let me introduce this panel. 

Our first witness, Randy Schriver. Randy is one of the five found- 
ing partners of Armitage International LLC, a consulting firm that 
specializes in international business development and strategies. 
Prior to his return to the private sector, he served as Deputy As- 
sistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs. Before 
joining the Asia Bureau, he served for 2 years as Chief of Staff and 
Senior Policy Advisor to Deputy Secretary of State Richard 
Armitage whom, by the way, I always found to be refreshingly can- 
did, a straight shooter. 

Mr. Schriver holds a bachelor’s degree in history from Williams 
College — not a bad school, not quite Middlebury, but not a bad 
school — and a master’s degree in public policy from Harvard Uni- 
versity. 

Our next witness — and I am sure he is listening — will be joining 
us via video hookup from Kosovo. That is Professor Sean Roberts. 
Professor Roberts is the Director of the International Development 
Studies Program and an Associate Professor in the practice of 
international affairs at George Washington University’s Elliot 
School for International Affairs. He is a legitimate expert on the re- 
gion of Central Asia, with a particular focus on the Uighur people. 
He has spent several years conducting research in Uighur commu- 
nities in both Central Asia and China and is the author of numer- 
ous articles and a documentary film on the Uighurs of the 
Kazikstan-China borderland. 

Professor Roberts earned his master’s degree in visual anthro- 
pology and his doctorate in social anthropology at USC. 

Professor, thank you for joining us from such a far distance. I 
hope you can hear that welcome. 

Next, let me welcome Professor Dru Gladney. He, too, is a legiti- 
mate, authentic expert in this area. He is a professor of anthro- 
pology at Ponoma College and currently serves as president of the 
Pacific Basin Institute in Claremont, California. He has published 
over 100 academic articles and numerous books. He has held fac- 
ulty positions and postdoctoral fellowships at Harvard, the Univer- 
sity of Southern California, King’s College at Cambridge, and the 
Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. Professor Gladney re- 
ceived his Ph.D. from the University of Washington in Seattle. 



9 


Following Professor Gladney will be Shirley Kan. Ms. Kan has 
worked at the Congressional Research Service since 1990 and 
writes policy analysis and provides other nonpartisan legislative 
support to Congress as a specialist in Asian Security Affairs. Dur- 
ing the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1995, 1996 she directly supported 
the defense attache at the Embassy in Beijing, for which she re- 
ceived a Defense Department Special Achievement Award. 

She graduated cum laude from the School of Foreign Service at 
Georgetown and from the University of Michigan in an Ann Arbor, 
where she received a master’s degree. 

Next joining us will be Susan Baker Manning. She is a partner 
at Bingham McCutchen, which is in Boston, or headquartered in 
Boston, where she focuses her practice on intellectual property 
matters, including patent, trademark, and copyright cases. This is 
quite a diversion, Susan. She also maintains a thriving pro bono 
practice, including the representation of numerous Uighur detain- 
ees at Guantanamo, including the four who recently resettled in 
Bermuda. 

She received her bachelor’s degree from Mount Holyoke and law 
degree from the University of Virginia. 

Ms. Manning, welcome back. We look forward to hearing from 
you. We will be seeking your assistance in terms of interviewing 
your clients and we would hope and welcome their written waiver 
and a consent for us to interview them. 

Finally, we will hear from my good friend Bruce Fein, a nation- 
ally and internationally renowned constitutional lawyer, scholar, 
and writer. He served as both Associate Deputy Attorney General 
for the Justice Department and General Counsel for the Federal 
Communications Commission under President Reagan. He later 
served as legal advisor to then Congressman Dick Cheney on the 
Joint Committee on Covert Arm Sales to Iran. 

I never knew that about you, Bruce. 

Mr. Fein is the founding partner of Bruce Fein and Associates 
and is currently writing a sequel to his recent book Constitutional 
Peril. 

So it is an honor to welcome the witnesses here. We all look for- 
ward to your testimony. 

Why don’t we begin as I introduced you, and we will begin with 
Secretary Schriver. 

STATEMENT OF MR. RANDALL G. SCHRIVER, PARTNER, 

ARMITAGE INTERNATIONAL (FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE) 

Mr. Schriver. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I would gladly add 
that is former secretary. I am very happy in the private sector in 
my new life enjoying time with my family. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for inviting me and for 
holding this important hearing. Congressman Rohrabacher, Con- 
gressman Faleomavaega, thank you also for your attendance and 
interest in this issue. 

Sadly, not enough Americans are aware of the plight of the 
Uighur community. This kind of hearing and the subsequent hear- 
ings you plan to hold are very valuable and very necessary, so I 



10 


commend you for this; and I commend your staff as well. It has 
been a pleasure to work with them in the preparations for this 
hearing. I look forward to working with them in the future as this 
process continues. 

We are all here to speak about the tragic circumstances that the 
Uighurs find themselves in in Xinjiang and elsewhere. I have been 
aware of this community and their plight for quite some time, but 
I became much more involved and interested during my tenure as 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia. Through that 
experience, I did grow to have a deep appreciation for the people, 
for the culture, for the history, and also, of course, developed deep 
concern for their tragic circumstances and the position they find 
themselves in in Xinjiang. 

As Deputy Assistant Secretary, I did have the great fortune to 
work with members of the Uighur Diaspora. I consider them 
friends and, in many cases, personal heroes of mine. I worked with 
the Uighur American Association. 

And I saw Mury Turkel here earlier today. He was a great col- 
league out of government as we worked side by side on important 
issues, including trying to secure the release of Rebiya Kadeer. And 
even though we were told many times by the Chinese 

Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Secretary, let me interrupt you, with due re- 
spect, but I also want to acknowledge the presence here of Mrs. 
Kadeer, who I described earlier as a Nobel Peace Prize nominee 
and as really the acknowledged leader of the Uighur community 
worldwide. 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope someday that 
is not just Nobel nominee; I hope that is Nobel Prize winner and 
laureate someday. 

Again, she is a personal hero of mine and deeply impacted my 
views about the situation in Xinjiang. She is a living example to 
me of why the Chinese policies in Xinjiang are so misguided. She 
is somebody of passion, or energy, of intellect, and capability. She 
is precisely the kind of person that could enrich Xinjiang and, lat- 
erally speaking, China. Instead, she is viewed as a threat to the 
central leadership. This is terribly misguided, in my view. 

Mr. Chairman, you and your staff asked me to talk about the 
issue of nationalism among the Uighur population. I think this is 
somewhat difficult when you talk about any community, because 
nationalism, of course, can manifest into quite admirable types of 
activities — pride in country, advocacy for one’s community, and a 
number of ways of positive expression, but of course there are also 
ways that nationalism can manifest in more negative ways. 

Unfortunately, I think the Uighur community is not immune to 
this uglier side of nationalism, although it is a very small minority 
within a minority. And I would add that two successive administra- 
tions — you have, of course, noted the Bush administration decision 
to designate ETIM in 2002; and, of course, the Obama administra- 
tion has designated at least an individual, Abdulhak, as a terrorist 
in an individual capacity, a Uighur-born gentleman. So two succes- 
sive administrations have noted that, even though it is a small mi- 
nority of people within a minority, that these are actions that must 
be addressed directly and head on. 



11 


You did ask me and your staff asked me to talk about the des- 
ignation of ETIM, a separatist group in northwest China in 
Xinjiang Province. This was a difficult issue for us serving in gov- 
ernment. I came to the Asia Bureau after the designation was 
made, but of course my boss at the time, Deputy Secretary 
Armitage, was very directly involved. 

We viewed the Uighur community as very understandably and 
rightly wanting to shed the oppression that they face and wanting 
to improve their lot and enjoy the freedoms that we are grateful 
to enjoy here. However, we felt it was important in the government 
to have a consistent standard internationally when we talk about 
terrorist activities, whether they be individuals or whether they be 
groups; and we looked very closely at the U.S. State Department 
along with members of the intelligence community about this par- 
ticular group. 

It was determined after a review that was based on U.S. infor- 
mation, I would add, as well as information provided by others, in- 
cluding third parties, that ETIM did meet the legal criteria under 
the Executive Order you mentioned. 

I might also add that the Chinese authorities came to us with 
requests to designate many other groups, including a group that 
went by the acronym SHAT, repeatedly, and provided reams and 
reams of information about this group. But we were well aware 
that information coming from the Chinese Government was likely 
unreliable and likely related to other political agendas; and, there- 
fore, we were unable to designate that group as well as other 
groups they brought to our attention. It was only the ETIM group 
that, in our view at the U.S. State Department at the time, met 
that criteria and therefore received that designation. 

I know there has been criticism about that decision. I think that 
is part of what this hearing is to address. I find some of the 
charges, quite frankly, difficult to accept and analytically unsound. 

The suggestion that this was done solely to ingratiate ourselves 
with the Chinese and to try to enlist their cooperation in the global 
war on terror, I think if you look at a more comprehensive way of 
our approach to Xinjiang, our very direct criticism in the State De- 
partment Human Rights Report about their oppression in Xinjiang; 
our vigorous pursuit of the release Rebiya Kadeer, despite being 
told by the authorities that in those circumstances would she be re- 
leased; our refusal to return the Guantanamo detainees to China 
despite a direct request from Hu Jintau to President Bush and 
Colin Powell, in my view, rightfully saying they would not be re- 
turned to China because there was no confidence they would be 
treated in a humane fashion, all of these things taken in a much 
more comprehensive light I would suggest doesn’t look like a policy, 
to me, to ingratiate ourselves with China. If anything, they were 
quite upset with our policies toward the Xinjiang region and the 
very active support for the human rights in that area. 

Mr. Chairman, you and your staff also asked me to speak briefly 
about Guantanamo Bay and the situation there. I would simply 
start by saying this was a tragic situation. These individuals who 
were eligible for release should not have been held for as long as 
they were held. 



12 


We found ourselves in very difficult circumstances in the Bush 
administration when Secretary Powell rightfully said they wouldn’t 
be returned to China, but the Department of Homeland Security 
and many Members of Congress were saying, no detainees, no mat- 
ter the country of origin, should be returned to the United States. 
That put us in a very difficult situation trying to find a third party 
and a third country to accept them. 

It is something that I worked on directly and found extremely 
frustrating. And I agree with you it was the morally courageous 
countries that have now stepped forward. We have some already 
returned to Albania, to Bermuda, and now working on others. I 
would certainly join you and the members of this committee in 
commending those that have already made this courageous deci- 
sion, those who will hopefully make it going forward. 

Going forward, the best possible future for the Uighur commu- 
nity is for the Chinese to end the oppression and move in the direc- 
tion of allowing greater freedoms, greater latitude in Xinjiang for 
this community of people to live their lives and pursue liberty as 
they see fit. However, in my view, we must also continue to deal 
with global terrorism. No matter the nomenclature — I know global 
war on terror is out of favor now — but I think there is a global phe- 
nomena that must be dealt with directly. 

If you look at a place like China and the terrorist incidents we 
know take have taken place, irrespective of the source of those inci- 
dents, we must note very sober-mindedly that we have 1.5-2 mil- 
lion visitors a year visiting China. We have events like the Olympic 
Games and the World’s Fair coming up. American citizens would 
not be immune were there to be a serious terrorist attack in a 
major memorial metropolitan area in China. This is something, 
again, I think we have to have a sober-minded view about. 

Let me close very quickly, Mr. Chairman, with some specific rec- 
ommendations for the Obama administration and for others in gov- 
ernment. I do believe the Obama administration should continue to 
make human rights and religious freedom a priority in our rela- 
tionship with China. Any policy that is conceptually based on the 
premise that we can downgrade these issues in the hopes of pur- 
suing higher priorities would be a policy, in my view, based upon 
false tradeoffs and potentially harmful policy. 

I think President Obama himself should use his platform and his 
very unique capabilities, his charisma, his personal history, to 
reach out to this community and to highlight the plight of the 
Uighur community. 

President Bush met with Ms. Kadeer, which I was delighted, 
while I served in government. I believe President Obama should do 
the same. I think the Obama administration should also endeavor, 
as I know they are, for the release of the remaining detainees, but 
also I think it is important that the administration and the Con- 
gress continue to take an interest in their well-being after their re- 
lease. This is, after all, our responsibility, even once they are reset- 
tled, to make sure they don’t face repercussions for having wrong- 
fully been in a place like Guantanamo for as long as they were. 

Fourth, I think more U.S. officials and Members of Congress 
should visit Xinjiang and visit with the Uighur communities di- 
rectly and highlight their experiences and advocate on behalf of 



13 


this community. I would hazard a guess not many Members of Con- 
gress have visited places in Xinjiang, and I think this would be a 
vital addition to the public dialog. 

Finally, I think the U.S. Government should support a policy 
similar to the policy we have in Tibet, where we could encourage 
a dialog between the Chinese Government and the legitimate rep- 
resentatives of the Uighur community to talk about their future, to 
talk about what genuine autonomy might mean, to talk about how 
to improve their lives, which, in my view, necessitates enhancing 
their basic freedoms, practice of their faith, freedom of speech, et 
cetera. And I think we should be actively promoting such a dialog 
for the benefit of the people there. 

Again, Mr. Chairman and other members, thank you very much 
for allowing me to testify today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schriver follows:] 



14 


Testimony of Randall G. Schriver 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 


Subcommittee on International OmcUiizations. Human Rights and Oversight 
Bill Delaliunt (D-MA), Cliaimian 
Dana Rohrabachcr (R-CA), Ranking Member 

Thank you Mr. Chairman and thanks to the subcommittee for inviting me to testify today on this 
extremely important topic. You are to be congratulated for dedicating time and energy to the issues 
associated with the Uighur minority in China. Sadly, not enough Americans are aware of their plight and 
their struggle for basic freedoms. Let me also express my sincere gratitude to your staff for all the hard 
work that they do. In die lead up to tills hearing, it was a pleasure to work witii your outstanding team. 

The subject of my testimony today concerns an ethnic minority in China, the Uighur population. Mostly- 
residing in the Xinjiang province of the People’s Republic of China, the Uighurs is a community- of 
Turkic peoples tliat have a tumultuous history with the government of the PRC. As Deputy Assistant 
Secretary- of State for East Asia from 2003 to 2005. 1 first became aware of the Uighur community. As a 
result of those experiences, I have come to develop a strong appreciation for the Uighur people and tlicir 
culture. 1 also developed deep concerns regarding their socio-political status within the People’s Republic 
of China. As documented in the State Department’s annual Human Rights Report, the Uighur community 
has experienced continual tragic oppression at the hand of tiic Chinese govcnimcnt. Further, there is little 
evidence the Chinese authorities will ease their pressure on the Uighur community any time soon without 
strong mtcmational pressure. 

I had tiic great fortune to enjoy personal interaction witli tlic Uighur Diaspora in the United States. As 
Deputy Assistant Secretary- of State for East Asia, I was part of aU.S. govemmentteam that worked for 
the release of then-political prisoner Rcbiya Kadccr alongside the Uighur American Association. I note 
that Ms. Kadeer testified before your committee last week - and let me add she is a personal hero of mine. 
She w as a prominent Uighur businessw oman and political activist who w as detained by Chinese 
autlioritics in 1999 on baseless treason charges. Ms. Kadccr was a prominent personality in Xmjiang and 
also a mother of 9. We worked closely w-ith with people like Nury- Turkel to secure her freedom even 
when told by Chinese authorities her release would be impossible. Eventually, on March 14"\ 2005, 
Kadeer w-as released on medical grounds into the custody of U.S. federal authorities. Shortly thereafter. I 
had the great honor to meet Ms. Kadccr and many of her elated children. Tliat experience is somctliing I 
will never forget. Getting to know- Ms. Kadeer has been a privilege and has also reinforced my firm 
belief that the Chinese approach to Xinjiaiig is misguided. Someone as talented, energetic, and passionate 
as Ms. Kadccr should be seen by tiic Chinese authorities as a great resource who w ill strive to enrich 
Xinjiang and China- rather than as someone threatening to the central leadership. 

Mr. Chaimian. as part of my testimony, you have asked me to address tiie topic of Uighur nationalism. In 
any society, analysis of a community’s nationalism can be a problematic endeavor. Nationalism 
characterized by love of country, pride in culture mid heritage, and activism to promote the community is 
to be admired and encouraged. Certainly, such aforementioned traits would describe the vast majority of 
the Uighurs in China, and all the Uighurs with whom 1 have had the pleasure to meet. But Nationalism 





15 


call also engender more problematic and even dangerous activities. Unfortunately, die Uigliur community 
does not appear to be immune to this type of nationalistic manifestation. Even if this represents a vety 
small minority widiin the minority, it would be wrong, in my judgment, to condone nationalistic 
sentiment that leads individuals or groups to commit acts of violence against innocent civilians. 

Your staff asked me to review the specific designation as a terrorist group applied to the "‘East Turkistan 
Islamic Movement'' (commonly referred to as ETIM), a separatist group operating in the Xinjimig region 
of the People's Republic of China. Though the Uighiir community as a whole understandably rejects 
Chinese authority (due to their historical track record of oppression), the United States has an obligation 
to the international community', and to her own citizens to apply a uniform standard with respect to 
terrorism. It is unacceptable and must be combated. Tn 2002 the United States, as part of this obligation, 
conducted an investigation of tlie activities of ETIM in the Xinjiang region, in the People's Republic of 
China, and outside China. It was deemed that the group met our legal criteria to be designated as a 
terrorist organization, under die authority of Executive Order 13224, issued on September 23, 2001 by 
former President George W. Bush. 

Let me add that the Chinese authorities vigorously pursued our designation of other groups alleged to be 
operating in Xinjiang. But we were well aware that the information provided by tlic Chinese govermnent 
about suspected terrorists groups was unreliable, and very likely tied to ulterior political motives. In all 
other cases, the United States was unable to make the lawfiil detennination concerning a terrorist status of 
the otlicr groups the Chinese asked us to designate. The only organization determined by US officials to 
be a legally recognized terrorist organization was the ETIM. In an age wEere China bustles with 
intemational visitors - including tw o and half million U.S. visitors a year - and hosts major international 
events such as the Olympics and the Shanghai World's Fair, the United States would be negligent and 
irresponsible if we did not take a candid and sober-minded view of groups and/or individuals who intend 
to commit acts of violence against innocent civilians in China to further their political agenda. 

Some critics suggest that there w-as a different U.S. government agenda tied to the designation; amove by 
the United States to enlist Chinese support in die Global War on Terror. I find diat linkage highly 
problematic. First, as mentioned, tlie United States w as very judicious in use of this designation, and did 
not designate other groups China w'as urging us to designate. If the goal was to ingratiate ourselves whdi 
the Chinese, government officials understood that we were falling well short of any standard Beijing's 
leaders may have set for us. Secondly, nobody serving in the U.S. government was naive to the counter- 
factual - that somehow China needed an outside authority to provide an imprimatur for dieir oppression. 
China's treatment of Uighurs was always poor, and Chinese suppression predates the designation of 
ETIM as a terrorist organization. Further, if die goal w as to w in Chinese favor, our many other actions 
supporting Uighur's in China - such as fighting for the release of Ms. Kadcer; documenting China's 
repression in our human rights report; speaking out and testity ing publicly about the Uighur's plight; 
refusing to return Uighur detainees to China publicly citing concern diat they would not be treated 
humanely; simply doe s not support the claims of aiding and abetting a Chinese crack down. 

Mr. Chaimian. you also asked if I would comment about the Uighur situation at the Guantanamo Bay 
Detention facility. Tlie situation of these detainees can be described nodiing short of “tragic”. Originally, 
there were twenty-four Uighur detainees at the Guantanamo Bay Detention facility. At a verv' early 
juncture - albeit “early” is a relative term that surely soiuids unsympadietic to those w rongly imprisoned 



16 


aiid their families - die deeision was made through the Combatant Status Review Tribiuial diat fifteen 
Uighurs were eligible for release. Tn 2003, Secretar\- of State Colin Powell rightfiilly detemiined and 
stated that the Uighur detainees held at die Guantanamo Bay Detention facility vvoidd not be deported 
back to the People's Republic of China. This decision, combined widi a Dcpaitmcnt of Homeland 
Security decision diat no detainees - regardless of country' of origin - would be permitted into die United 
States, forced US officials into die difficult position of where to relocate die Uighur detainees. Recently, 
the government of the island nation of Palau has offered asylum to some Uighur detainees. Four others 
have been released to Bermuda. We can only hope that dicsc sub-optimal outcomes pennit the former 
detainees to carry -on with their lives in freedom and ivith dignity. 1 would urge the Obama 
Administration to continue to work towards the fldl resettlement of the Uighur detainees who have been 
detennined eligible for release. 

Going forward, the best possible future for the Uighur community, the Xinjiang province and the People's 
Republic of China as a whole, depends on the allowance of greater freedom to the Uighur community. 

By ending its persecution of the Uighurs, the Chinese government would be better suited to handle to 
problem of insurgent activities in the long mn. And more importantly, a great people could enjoy the 
freedom to pursue life and liberty as tlicy sec fit. 

In my view, the United States must continue to concern itself w-ith global terrorism - no matter the 
nomenclature. Part of that effort should involve the designation of terrorist groups worldwide who meet 
our legal criteria. That being said, in the context of China w e must be vigilant against the possibility that 
the Chinese authorities might use "‘counter-terrorism” as a cover to excuse the Chinese-led oppression of 
the Uighur community. We should recognize that most of the Uighur population is peaceful and docs not 
resort to violence against innocent civilians, and that genuine aspirations for greater freedoms should be 
supported. 

Let me add my specific recommendations to the U.S. government going forward. 

1) The Obama Administration should continue to make human rights and religious freedom 
priorities in our interactions with China; any policy that is conceptually based on the premise that 
down-grading those issues in pursuit of other priorities should be disabused as a policy based on 
false trade-offs, and a potentially hannhil policy. 

2) President Obama himself should use his miiquc platform to higliliglit the plight of the Uighur 
community; President Bush met personally witli Ms. Kadccr, and 1 believe President Obama 
should do the same. 

3) TTie Obama Administration should endeavor to ensure all Uighur detainees eligible for release 
from Guantanamo Bay are resettled outside of China; fiirther, the United States should continue 
to take an active interest in tlieir well-being to ensure there are no repercussions down the line for 
having been wrongly imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay. 

4) More U.S. officials and members of Congress should travel to Xinjiang as part of the many- 
official delegations tiiat visit China; Officials and Members should publicly report their findings 
and advocate for greater freedoms for the Uighurs. 



17 


5) Similar to tlic U.S. government policy toward Tibet, the Obtuna Administration should promote a 
dialogue between the Chinese authorities and legitimate representatives of the Uighur community 
in Xinjiang to better define genuine autonomy for tlie Xinjiang Province, and to promote basic 
freedoms of tlie Uighur people. 

Again Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this veiy^ important hearing and for bestowing upon me the 
honor of testifying here today. 


Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I look forward to an 
exchange of views with you. 

Next, we will go to Sean Roberts via a video link. And hopefully 
it is working. 

STATEMENT OF SEAN R. ROBERTS, PH.D., DIRECTOR AND AS- 
SOCIATE PROFESSOR, INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

STUDIES PROGRAM, ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL 

AFFAIRS, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 

[The following testimony was delivered via video.] 

Mr. Roberts. Hello. 

Mr. Delahunt. We see you. 

Mr. Roberts. Thank you. Chairman Delahunt and other mem- 
bers of the subcommittee, for inviting me today to speak about this 
important issue. 

I have been asked specifically to speak about the Eastern 
Turkistan Islamic Movement, or ETIM. I agree very much with 
Chairman Delahunt that the designation of ETIM has had grave 
consequences for the Uighur people. It, of course, directly led to the 
imprisonment of 22 Uighurs, eventually cleared of all wrongdoing, 
in the Guantanamo detention facilities for between 5 and 7 years. 
Indirectly, it has allowed the Peoples Republic of China to evade 
international criticism over the last 8 years as it has stepped up 
its oppression of Uighurs’ human rights in the name of fighting ter- 
rorism. And despite these serious ramifications of the ETIM’s des- 
ignation as a terrorism group, we have never and still do not know 
much about this organization or its activities. 

Given the lack of reliable information about ETIM, I will not 
claim today to paint a comprehensive picture of the organization. 
Rather, by covering five major points from my longer written testi- 
mony, which I encourage you to read, I will raise some substantial 
doubt about the assumptions we have made in claiming that it is 
a dangerous terrorist group linked with international jihadi move- 
ments. 

First, we should assume that ETIM has never been a large, well- 
organized or capable group. While there were many Uighur polit- 
ical organizations outside of China in the late 1990s, ETIM was 
virtually unknown among these groups. For this reason, many 
scholars studying Uighurs have disputed the organization’s exist- 
ence and have suggested that ETIM’s designation as a terrorist 
group was merely a quid pro quo arrangement with the Peoples Re- 
public of China in exchange for the PRC’s support in the United 



18 


States-led global war on terror, which we have already heard 
about. 

An interview conducted by a Western Journalist with ETIM’s 
leader, Hahsan Mahsum, in 2002 appears to confirm that indeed 
the group did exist, but it also supports the assumption that it was 
a small organization with little to no outside support. Mahsum 
noted emphatically that ETIM had never received assistance from 
al-Qaeda and that it was not anti-American in its goals. 

In all likelihood, ETIM in 2002 was a small group of young reli- 
gious Uighur men from China organizing in Afghanistan to mount 
a challenge to the Chinese Government’s rule of their homeland in 
the Xinjiang province but lacking the capacity and resources to do 
so. 

Second, Mahsum’s assertion that the group has never received 
assistance from al-Qaeda is credible in my opinion. Given that 
China was one of the few major states to have diplomatic and com- 
mercial interactions with the Taliban government at the end of the 
1990s, it is reasonable to believe that the Taliban would have ac- 
tively discouraged any Uighur presence in al-Qaeda or other ter- 
rorist organizations inside Afghanistan. This is also corroborated 
by South Asian media reports from the late 1990s which suggest 
the Taliban actively prevented Uighurs from participating in such 
groups at the request of China. 

Third, I believe it is reasonable to assume that ETIM ceased to 
exist after the Pakistani Army killed Hasan Mahsum as an enemy 
combatant in 2002. If little was heard of ETIM before September 
11th, virtually nothing was heard from or about the group after 
Mahsum’s death. The only exceptions have been official Chinese 
sources, which greatly exaggerate the group’s reach and capacities. 
While Chinese authorities have continued to arrest Uighur nation- 
alists inside China over the last 8 years, claiming they are 

Mr. Delahunt. We will pause for technical difficulties. I am just 
hoping that someone out there knows what they are doing, because 
I certainly do not. 

I would like to welcome to the panel the gentleman from Min- 
nesota, Mr. Keith Ellison. If the gentleman would like to make a 
statement we have got, it looks like, a couple of minutes. The gen- 
tleman declines. That is probably a good decision. 

Mr. Roberts. Hello. 

Mr. Delahunt. Hello, we are back up. Professor. Thank you. 

You were on your third point. You were talking about after the 
death of Mahsum in 2002, to paraphrase, it would appear that we 
have not heard anything about or from ETIM, if I am fairly charac- 
terizing your testimony. That is where you were when the screen 
went blank. 

Mr. Roberts. Okay. Well, thank you. Let’s hope we get through 
the rest of it without it going blank again. 

I just wanted to say that in terms of that, the only exceptions 
were Chinese, official Chinese sources which greatly exaggerate the 
group’s reach and capacities. While Chinese authorities continued 
to arrest Uighur nationalists inside China over the last 8 years, 
claiming that they are members of ETIM, these arrests have gen- 
erally not been in response to acts of violence but are related most 
often to political dissent. Eurthermore there is not credible evi- 



19 


dence I have seen that those arrested in China have any connec- 
tions with militant groups, real or imaginary, in Afghanistan or 
Pakistan. 

My fourth point is it is highly unlikely that the violence or the 
alleged planned terrorist attacks in Xinjiang during the Olympic 
Games last summer were perpetrated by the ETIM or any other or- 
ganized terrorist groups with ties to international jihadi groups. 
That were no sophisticated explosives used or found on those ar- 
rested. And the most publicized attack, which involved two Uighur 
men allegedly driving a truck into a line of Chinese soldiers and 
then attacking them with knives in the city of Kashgar, looked 
more like an act of desperation by frustrated individuals than a 
well-planned act of terrorism. 

Finally, fifth and most importantly, there is no conclusive evi- 
dence that ETIM or any Uighur organization for that matter has 
ever perpetrated a sophisticated and coordinated terrorist attack 
inside or outside of China. While the Chinese Government has 
claimed that various acts of violence in Xinjiang in Central Asia 
over the last decade were the work of ETIM, this has never been 
proven and the acts of violence themselves may not have even been 
acts of terrorism. No Uighur group has ever been tied to well- 
known methods of terrorism such as car bombings or suicide bomb- 
ings which might confirm links to transnational groups. Instead 
they have been accused of organizing disturbances and assassina- 
tions which could be alternatively explained by a variety of other 
motives from popular political dissatisfaction to personal vendetta 
and even crime-related violence. 

Now, given the lack of evidence that ETIM is an active terrorist 
group or even an active organization anymore, it is particularly dis- 
turbing that the United States’ decision to recognize it as a ter- 
rorist group has caused substantial suffering to the Uighur people. 

So the question that I would like members of the subcommittee 
to ponder is what led us to recognize this group as terrorists. Was 
it merely a quid pro quo arrangement with the Chinese in order 
to obtain their support in the global War on Terror; or, as Chair- 
man Delahunt suggested, does this reflect a serious defect in how 
we have gathered intelligence about terrorist groups over the last 
8 years. 

I would be very interested to hear — and it is likely still classi- 
fied — ^but I would like to hear from Assistant Secretary Schriver 
what kind of U.S. intelligence do we really have about this group. 
I think either of these answers to the question are unacceptable 
and have critical ramifications for how we continue to fight ter- 
rorism around the world. 

Thank you very much, and thank you for bearing with technical 
difficulties. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Roberts follows:] 



20 


Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight 

Sean R. Roberts, PhD 
Associate Professor of Practice 
Elliott School of International Affairs 
George Washington University 
June 16, 2009 

Chairman Berman, Representative Delahimt, and other members of the Subcommittee on 
international Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, I would like to thank you for inviting 
me to speak today about the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Clarifying what we 
do and do not know about this relatively obscure organization should be an issue of significant 
importance to the govcmmcnl of tire United States. Despite the lack of reliable mfomiation on 
the ETIM, the U.S. State Department recognized this group as a terrorist organization with links 
to A1 Qaeda in 2002, resulting in grave consequences for many Uyghurs. Recognizing ETIM as a 
terrorist group directly led to the imprisonment of twenty-two Uyghurs in the Guantanamo 
detention facilities for between five and seven years despite the eventual acknowledgement that 
they had not been guilty of any wrong-doing. Less directly, ETIM's terrorism designation 
contributed to an increase in the violation of Uyghurs' rights inside China as the People’s 
Republic largely evaded international criticism over the last eight years while using tlie tlireat of 
Uyghur terrorism as a pretext for hundreds of politically motivated arrests and numerous 
executions as well as for the establishment of stricter limitations on the Uyghurs' freedoms of 
speech, movement, and religious observation. 

Despite these serious ramifications of the ETIM’s designation as a terrorist group, we still loiow 
very little about this organization, and dicrc remain many unanswered questions about the group’s 
goals, its actual membership, and its capacity to perpetrate violence. Given the lack of reliable 
infonnation about the organization, I will not claim to answer all of these questions today. I will, 
however, raise some substantial doubts about the assumptions we have made about the ETIM in 
claiming that it is a dangerous terrorist group linked with international Jikadi movements. 

When the United States recognized ETIM as a terrorist group with ties to A1 Qaeda in 2002, few 
scholars studying lire Uyghur people had ever heard of Uiis group. I, for example, spent much of 
the second half of the 1990s living among Uyghur communities in Kazalchstan, but I had not 
heard of tire group prior to its classification as a terrorist organization by tire United States. This 
was particularly puzzling to me since I had become personally acquainted with most of the major 
Uyghur diaspora political groups in the course of my research, participating as an observer at 
many of the meetings organized by transnational Uyghur political organizations in the second 
half of the 1 990s. Given how little was known of this organization in 2002, many" scholars even 
questioned whether ETIM existed at all and whether the group's recognition by the United Slates 
was entirely motivated by a desire to gain China’s support for the American-led Global War on 
Terror. 

It appears, how'cvcr, that the ETIM, or at least an organization known as die Eastern Turkistan 
Islamic Party (ETIP), did exist in 2002 since at least one westeni journalist was able to inten iew 
its leader, Hasan Mahsimi, in Pakistan shortly after ETIM was designated by die United States as 
a terrorist organization. At that time, Mahsum asserted that ETIM, or ETIP, had not received 
assistance from A1 Qaeda and had no intention of targeting die United States or Americans. 
Rather, he painted a picture of a small group of religious Uyghur men who had lofty goals of 



21 


challenging Chinese rale in their homeland but little capacit;' or resources to do so. 

This portrait of the organization is consistent with my understanding of the Uyghurs who lived in 
Afghanistan during the 1990s. While it has been documented that a small niunber ofUyghurs 
had made their way to Afghanistan in the later 1990s, most of them had gone to the country with 
the intent of making their way to points further w'cstward where they hoped to obtain political 
refugee status. It is likely that some of the Uyghurs coming through Afghanistan at this time did 
find tlic Jihadi ideals of local groups attractive, but there is also evidence that tlic Taliban regime 
was not welcoming ofUyghurs who sought assistance for militant endeavors after 1999. In that 
year, the People's Republic of China had sent a diplomatic delegation to meet with the Taliban, 
and this delegation had reportedly made a deal with its Afghan counterparts, where China w ould 
provide the pariah government of Afghanistan with a variety of assistance, including updated 
weaponry', in exchange for the Taliban's pledge to not harbor Uyghur militants. Although it has 
not been substantiated, there were also rumors that China established similar agreements wdth Bin 
Laden and A1 Qaeda. Whether or not the rumors concerning A1 Qaeda bear any trutli, China did 
enter into negotiations with the Taliban, and following those negotiations, stories spread in the 
South Asian media tlial the small niunber of Uygliurs thought to be in militant training camps 
inside Afghanistan were arrested, executed, or forced to leave the country. 

Furthermore, there is little evidence that there was a substantial Uyghur presence in militant 
training camps prior to 1 999. Unlike the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which several times 
in the later 1990s had attempted to bring militants into Central Asia from Afghanistan, tliere are 
no reliable accounts that Uyghurs based in Afghanistan during this time w'crc able to enter China 
and carry out attacks. When the U.S. entered Afghanistan, therefore, ETIM was in all likelihood 
a small and isolated band of religious nationalists who had neither strong ties with the Uyghur 
communities in Central Asia and China nor the assistance and support of tlic Taliban and A1 
Qaeda, This also explains why the apparent leader of the organization, Hasan Mahsum, would 
have given an interview to a western joimialist in 2002 in which he sought to deliberately 
distance himself from A1 Qaeda and its Jihad. Despite his claims in the interview that he was 
neither associated with A1 Qaeda nor involved in anti-American activities, Malismn was 
reportedly killed by the Pakistani military that same year as a suspected enemy combatant. 

What we know about ETlM's activities after 2002 has primarily been supplied by Chinese 
authorities, who greatly exaggerate the organization’s reach and capacity'. Regmiarly, Chinese 
government sources have suggested that every violent disturbance created by Uyghurs in China 
over the last twenty' years has been perpetrated by ETIM and that the entire Uyghur nationalist 
movement outside of China is wiiliin ETIM's lerronsl network. While Chinese aulliorilies have 
continued to arrest Uyghur nationalists inside China over the last eight years, claiming that they 
arc part of ETIM's terrorist network, these arrests have generally not been in response to acts of 
violence, but instead are related to political dissent. Furthermore, there is not credible evidence I 
have seen that those arrested have any connections W'ith militant groups, real or imaginary , in 
Afghanistan or Pakistan. Probably the most egregious of these arrests was China's successful 
request to have Uzbekistan extradite a Uyghur activist and Canadian citizen in 2006 w'hile he was 
visiting relatives in Uzbekistan imder the pretext that he was a member of ETIM. He is presently 
serv ing a fifteen year prison sentence in China. 

It w'as my assumption, and I believe still a valid one, that ETIM ostensibly ceased to exist after 
Malismn was killed in 2002, if not earlier. This was substantiated by tlic fact tliat iiotliiiig w'as 
heard of the organization after this time outside of Chinese government sources, which had vested 
interests in exaggerating Ihc Uircal of Uyghiu terrorism, hi tlic run-up lo Iasi simimcr’s Beijing 
Olympics, however, ETIM was once again receiving international attention. Beginning in the 


2 



22 


Spring of 2008, stories began to emerge from China that ETI M cells had been discovered inside 
Xinjiang. In addition, Chinese authorities claimed to have thwarted an attempted attack on a 
passenger airplane perpetrated by a Uyghur woman in possession of a flammable liquid and to 
have suffered an attack on Chinese soldiers in Kashgar perpetrated by two Uyghur men during 
the early days of the games. The Chinese authorities, of course, claimed that these acts were the 
work of ETI M . Unfortunately, given the lack of transparency in the Chinese justice system, it is 
difficult to substantiate or refute these claims. Even if one takes these claims at face value, 
however, tlicy hardly lend credibility to the accusations drat these incidents were the work of a 
sophisticated international terrorist network associated with A1 Qaeda. No sophisticated 
explosive devices w'crc fotmd on those arrested, and the attack in Kashgar, which involved tw'o 
men allegedly driving a truck into a line of soldiers and then attacking them with knives, looked 
more like an act of desperation by frustrated individuals than a well planned act of terrorism. 

The claims that these were acts of terrorism, however, w'as bolstered by the posting of several 
videos on YouTube by a group calling itself Ihc Tmkistan Islamic Party (TIP), which the 
community of "so-called” terrorism experts suggests, without any particular justification, is 
merely a new alias for ETIM. These videos showed masked men with automatic rifles speaking 
in the Uyghur language and threatening to disrupt the Olympics while standing in front of an 
Islamic banner. Just as the attacks that took place around the Olympics in Xinjiang did not utilize 
methods loiown in international terrorist networks, such as suicide bombs or car bombs, these 
videos lacked the cohesion of terrorist messages that come from sophisticated groups. The group, 
for example, claimed credit for a bus bombing in Yuiman before die Olympics, but tlie Chinese 
authorities said the attack had nothing to do with Uyghurs. Furthermore, the videos threatened to 
conduct bombings throughout China, but later the group only took credit for the unsophisticated 
disturbances mentioned earlier that took place in Xinjiang, none of which used explosive devices. 
Thus, while the videos looked similar to those created by established terrorist groups, tliosc who 
made them seemed to be entirely disconnected from events taking place m China, In other words, 
they were created by people with capacities to make videos for posting to tire intemet, but without 
the capacity to organize sophisticated terronst attacks mside China or perhaps anywhere. 

In all likelihood, the people who made these videos had a vested interest in exaggerating the 
Uyghur terrorist threat and are not related at all to those originally part of ETIM. Many Uyghurs 
suggest that they were created by people in the Chinese state structure, whctlrcr on tlic national or 
provincial level, a claim that cannot be discounted given that these videos further justify China's 
crackdown on Uyghurs as terrorists. It is also possible, however, that lliey were the creation of 
some isolated group of Uyghur nationalists outside China who wanted to scare the Chinese state 
during the Oly mpics. One final possibility is tliat tliey were tire products of transnational 
Jihadists, such as a segment of A1 Qaeda, who want to recruit Uyghurs and/or create the 
perception that their movement has a wider reach than it docs. This final theory may be 
substantiated by recent reports from the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor that the 
Turkistan Islamic Party has begun publishing a journal, which is modeled on publications of other 
more established Jihadisl groups and is posted on forums frequented by such groups. 

In conclusion, it is difficult to justify the allegations that the ETIM is a sophisticated and 
dangerous terrorist organization with links to A1 Qaeda, and it is perfectly reasonable to assume 
that the organization no longer exists at all. While there w'crc likely at some point a handful of 
Uyghurs in Afghanistan who viewed themselves as members of this group, it never appears to 
have been a threat to China, let alone to the United States. The most convincing support for this 
argument is that there is no conclusive evidence that this group, or any Uyghur organization, has 
ever perpetrated an actual coordinated terrorist attack. While lire Chinese govcnuncnt has claimed 
that various acts of violence in Xinjiang and Central Asia over the last decade were the work of 


3 



23 


ETIM, this has never been proven and the acts of violence themselves may not even have been 
acts of terrorism. No Uyghur group has ever been tied to well-known metliods of terrorism such 
as car-bombings or suicide bombings, which might confirm links to sophisticated transnational 
organizations such as Al-Qaeda. Instead, they have been accused of organizing disturbances and 
assassinations, which could be alternatively explained by a variety' of other motives from popular 
political dissatisfaction to personal vendetta and crimc-rclated violence. 

Given the lack of evidence Uiat ETIM is an active terrorist group, or even an active organization 
anymore, it is particularly disturbing that the United States’ decision to recognize this group as a 
dangerous terrorist organization has caused suhstantial sufferhig to the Uyghur people. So, the 
question that I would like the members of the subcommittee to ponder is what led us to recognize 
this group as terrorists? Was it merely a quid pro quo arrangement witlr tire Chmese in order to 
obtain their support in the Global War on Terror, or does this reflect a serious defect in the 
manner we have gathered intelligence about terrorist groups over the last eight years? While 1 am 
siue that our intelligence agencies’ colleagues in China, Central Asia, and even Pakistan can 
provide us with evidence that ETIM is a dangerous terrorist organization, they also have vested 
reasons to do so. China’s interests are obvious. The People's Republic does not tolerate Uyghur 
political dissent, and international recognition of a Uyghur terrorist threat gives their security' 
organs a freer hand in cracking down on internal political dissent in Xinjiang. The Central Asian 
states and Pakistan likewise have reason to exaggerate the Uyghur terrorist threat in order to win 
favor with China. Furtliermorc, for tlte Central Asian slates, a local tlircat ofUyghur terrorism 
provides a way to engage the United States on the Global War on Terror without implicating their 
own people, and for Pakistan, it is yet another means of deflecting attention away from Uiat 
country’s own indigenous terrorism problem. In this context, 1 question the reliability of the 
intelligence we may be receiving from these countries, which we w'ould not likely trust without 
reservation in otlier matters of international importance. Let's hope we are not using it to 
dotennine who is and is not our enemy in the Global War on Terror. 


Thank you very' much for your attention. 


4 



24 


Mr. Delahunt. Thank you. And please stay with us, Professor 
Roberts. 

And our next witness is Dr. Gladney from Pomona, via Hawaii. 

STATEMENT OF DRU C. GLADNEY, PH.D., PRESIDENT, PACIFIC 
BASIN INSTITUTE, POMONA COLLEGE 

Mr. Gladney. Before I start, I should acknowledge my great 
pride and joy to see Sean Roberts, who I had the honor of serving 
very temporarily as his professor at USC, and I see that he is still 
prospering and doing great work. Great to see you, Sean. 

Honorable Chairman, distinguished members of the Sub- 
committee on International Organization Human Rights and Over- 
sight, it is my privilege to testify to you today in the case of the 
Uighur people. It is my firm belief — and this is based on over 25 
years of personal field research, mostly in the region of Western 
China and including Xinjiang — that there is very little evidence to 
support the claim that the people in question, either the detainees 
in Guantanamo Bay or the Uighur people in general, are terrorists. 
Many of them could not either be accurately described as freedom 
fighters. 

The vast majority of the nearly 10 million people known as the 
Uighurs — and in my longer testimony I provide up-to-date popu- 
lation figures and maps and things like that for those who need a 
general background information — living primarily in the province 
of Western China known as the Xinjiang Uighur autonomous re- 
gion, which most Uighur and all pre-1940 maps of the area refer 
to as Eastern Turkistan, and you can still find those maps in book- 
stores today. They are upstanding citizens of the People’s Republic 
of China, primarily agriculturalists and urban city developers in 
the largest cities and oases across that great region, one-sixth the 
size of all of China, the largest province in China. They are still 
the largest population group in the region, and, as an official mi- 
nority nationality, receive certain special privileges along with cer- 
tain other minorities, many of them also Muslims, including 
Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, et cetera. But they are now being sur- 
passed in population by a growing number of Han Chinese settlers 
from the interior of China. 

And, Honorable Chairman, I would submit that this is the pri- 
mary reason for the civil unrest and violence that we see in the re- 
gion. Very little to do with terrorism; has much more to do with 
policies of development and integration of that province. 

In a report below, I will argue that the incidents of violence that 
have occurred in the region are best understood as incidents of civil 
unrest. And the state of China last year admitted publicly in print, 
the government, that there were over 100,000 separate incidents of 
civil unrest in China across the country. 

So the few that we do see in Xinjiang are just as likely civil un- 
rest rather than terrorist acts. And these incidents can rarely be 
described as terrorism in the traditional sense of the term, which 
I take to mean random acts of violence against civilian populations. 

The struggles for the independence of the Uighur people from the 
Chinese nation-state that have taken place since its incorporation 
in 1949 are best understood in the context of efforts to attain sov- 
ereignty. Coming from many, many years in the great State of Ha- 



25 


waii, we also know of other sovereignty movements that are not la- 
beled as terrorists. And it is not a religiously or Islamic-inspired 
campaign, except for the fact that the Uighur or Muslim people, 
their concerns and issues resemble that of Tibet. And the occa- 
sional violence that takes place in the Tibetan autonomous region 
in China and protests against Chinese rule are rarely, if ever, de- 
scribed as terrorists. 

As will be demonstrated below, the characterization of the Guan- 
tanamo Uighurs as ETIM terrorists by Speaker Gingrich is a mis- 
nomer at best, and, at worst, a calculated mischaracterization of a 
group of people whom the Bush administration and the Depart- 
ment of Defense determined comprise no threat to the United 
States, and the majority of whom are noncombatants. 

At the same time, this testimony will show that the region of 
Xinjiang has been extremely peaceful since the late 1990s, and 
rather than a site of terrorist independence it has been caught up 
in an economic boom that would be the envy of any of its sur- 
rounding Central Asian states. This testimony will not support an 
independent Uighuristan or a separate state, lest it fall into the 
same turmoil as its Central Asian neighbors, but, rather, encourage 
direct autonomy, direct engagement of the Chinese with the 
Uighurs, to better understand their concerns and complaints, a dia- 
logue that was also suggested by Randy Schriver in his final re- 
marks, a dialogue that to this date has never taken place, despite 
the fact that there have been many dialogues, meetings and high- 
level encounters between official representatives of the Chinese 
Government and the Tibetan exile — government in exile. Nothing 
like this at any level has happened with the Uighurs. 

And also the need for the U.S. to not contribute support, even if 
inadvertently, to any separatist or Islamic sentiments that might 
be brewing in the region. Indeed, I should comment that — and I 
mentioned this in my report — that unfortunately, I think partly as 
a direct result of U.S. policy toward these Uighurs, a growing anti- 
U.S. sentiment has been experienced in the region. 

Speaking from over 25 years of travel and research, learning the 
local languages, I can account for the fact that now it is not the 
same as it was 20 years ago when Americans were regarded widely 
in this part of the world, 20 million Muslims, as a supporter, as 
a potential haven, and as a strong advocate of human rights and 
religious freedom. Today when those of us do travel to China, we 
are just as likely to expect to not be welcomed into mosques and 
Muslim homes in China as we are. And this is a real sea change 
over the last several years. 

Indeed China itself should be congratulated for the enormous 
economic and social transformation of the region over the past two 
decades, but at the same time should be encouraged to find ways 
to preserve and promote the vibrant and extraordinary Central 
Asian civilization that Uighur culture represents. 

I won’t go through the rest of my testimony. As I mentioned, 
there are many maps and charts and population figures to docu- 
ment the tremendous transportation of this region over 20 years. 
It is really a booming economy, a magnet for migration. 

But I will mention that on the subject of ETIM, along with my 
colleague Sean Roberts, I do detail a large number of other organi- 



26 


zations, that were as equally active as ETIM in the late 1990s, that 
claimed responsibility for direct acts of violence that never received 
any attention. Particularly on pages 23 and 24 there are charts 
that list, and even an anthropological graph of groups that I 
thought were much more violent, or at least claim to be more vio- 
lent than ETIM. So it is always a surprise for those of us who 
study this issue that ETIM itself was singled out. 

I will just mention, of course, that many of these groups go by 
names and labels that have eastern Turkistan in the title, and this 
is generally in about five different languages, not only Chinese, 
Uighur, but also the other Turkic languages, if it is in Central Asia 
and Uzbek. But we are also dealing with the Pakistani languages, 
Urdu, Pashtun, so it is not surprising that some of these groups 
could be easily conflated. But to suggest that all of them, all these 
incidents of violence were coordinated by any one single group, 
struck many of us as rather unbelievable at the time. And at the 
time many of us raised this objection, but we were quickly swept 
away as not really knowing what was happening in the country. 

So I will conclude that the history of Chinese Muslim relations 
in Xinjiang, as Jim Millward’s most recent book documents ex- 
tremely well, have been relatively peaceful and quiet, broken by 
enormous social and political disruptions fostered by both internal 
and external crises. Indeed, as those of us who study this issue 
have documented, since about 1998 there were no reported inci- 
dents of violence up until, really, until the Olympics. 

The chairman, party chairman of Xinjiang reported, as you 
quoted in your report in 2001, this was at a trade bazaar and he 
was trying to encourage tourism and investment in the region, and 
this is why he was so sanguine about the peacefulness of the region 
at the time, 2 weeks prior to 9/11. 

The relative quiet of this last decade does not indicate that the 
ongoing problems of the region have been resolved or opposition 
dissolved. This is in response to many travel reporters who will go 
to the region and say, “Oh, there are no problems here, people are 
happy, booming economy, migration is up.” That actually masks a 
lot of what is going on underneath the surface. 

Those of us who speak the language, who have traveled the re- 
gion over the last couple of decades, have seen that the surface 
does not always tell the whole truth. The opposition to Chinese 
rule in Xinjiang has not reached a level of a Czechnia or an 
Intifada, but similar to the Baath separatists or the ETA in Spain 
or former IRA in Ireland and England, it is one that may erupt in 
limited violent moments of terror and resistance. 

And just as these oppositional movements have not been resolved 
in Europe, in Latin America, or in even the United States, we have 
our own problems with domestic terrorism. The Uighur problem in 
Xinjiang does not appear to be one that will readily be resolved. 
The admitted problem of Uighur terrorism and dissent, even in the 
diaspora, is as problematic for a government that wants to encour- 
age integration and development in a region where the majority 
are not only ethnically different but also devoutly Muslim. 

How does a government integrate a strongly religious minority, 
be it Muslim, Tibetan, Christian or Buddhist, into what I call a 
Marxist capitalist system. China’s policy of intolerance toward dis- 



27 


sent and economic stimulus has not seemed to have resolved this 
issue. As a responsible stakeholder, China should find ways to open 
dialogue with representative Uighur individuals and groups to bet- 
ter cooperate in finding solutions to this ongoing problem. There 
has been much progress and relatively peaceful development in 
this important region. Surely a dialogue can be opened up in order 
to help ensure a more prosperous and peaceful future for both 
Uighur and Han Chinese alike. 

Thank you sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gladney follows:] 


FREEDOM FIGHTERS OR TERRORISTS? 
EXPLORING THE CASE OF THE UIGHUR PEOPLE 


By Professor Dru C. Gladney, Ph.D. 
Pomona College 


Testimony to the United States Congress 
Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight 
Washington, DC 
June 16, 2009 


Written document for testimony only, not for distribution. For further infomiiition, please contact: 

Dm C. Gladney 
2284 Jasmine Avenue 
Upland, CA 91784 
Tel: 909-267-5821 
Email: dni@pomona.edu 



28 


TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

2. INTRODUCTION 

3. CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 

4. CHINESE NATIONALITIES POLICY, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE UIGHUR 

5. UIGHUR RESPONSE: STRUGGLES TO SUSTAIN CULTURAL SURVIVAL 

6. INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS 

7. CYBER-SEPARATISM AND ETCVI 

8. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 

9. BIBLIOGRAPHY 



29 


1. EXECUTIVE summary' 

Honorable Cliciimum, distinguished members of the subcommittee on Intenuitiomil Organizations, 
Human Riglils, and Oversight, it is my privilege to testify to you today on the case of the Uighur people. It is 
my firm belief tliat there is ver}- little evidence to support the claim tliat tlie people in question, either the 
detainees in Giiantciiuimo Bay, or tlie Uighur people in general, are terrorists. Miiny of tliem could not either be 
accurately described as 'Trccdom fighters.” Tlie vast majority of the nearly 10 million people known as the 
Uighur (pronounced Oy-gur), living primarily in the province of Western China known as the "Xinjiang Uighur 
Autonomous Region", wliich most Uyghur and pre-1940 maps of tlie area refer to as "Eastern Turkestan," are 
iipstcUiding citizens of tlie People's Republic of China, primarily agriculturalists and urban-dwellers in the 
largest cities and oases across the region. Tliey arc still the largest population group in the region, and as an 
official “minorit}' nationality'.” receive certain special privileges along with several other minorities, many of 
them also Muslim (including Kazalchs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, etc.), but are now being surpassed in population by a 
grow ing number of Han Chinese settlers from the interior of China. 

In the report below. I will argue that the incidents of violence that have occurred in tlie region are best 
understood as incidents of civil unrest and rarely can be described as “terrorism” in tlie traditional sense of the 
tenus (which I lake to mean random acts of violence against civilian populations). The stmgglcs for 
independence of the Uighur people from the Chinese nation-state that liave taken place since its incorporation in 
1949 are best understood in the context of efforts to attain sovereignty, not as a religious or Islam-mspired 
campaign. Except for the fact lhal the Uighur arc a Muslim people, their concerns and issues resemble that of 
Tibet, and the occasional violence that takes place in the Tibetan Autonomous Region in China and protests 
against Cliinese rule, are nuely if ever described as "terrorist.” As will be demonstrated below', tlie 
cliaracteriziition of the Giiantaniuno Uigliurs as "ETIM terrorists” is a misnomer at best, and at worst a 
calculated mischaraclcri/ation of a group of people whom the Bush administration and the Department of 
Defense determined comprise no tlireat to die US. At the same time, this testimony will show' that die region of 
Xinjiang (pronounced Sheen-Jeealmg), hits been extremely peaceful since the late 1990s, and ratlier tlitui a site 
of tcrrorisl independence, it has been caught up in an economic boom lhal would be the envy of any of its 
surrounding Central Asian states. Tliis testimony will not support an independent Uighuristan or separate state, 
lest it fall into the same turmoil as its Central Asitm neighbors (see Figure 1), but ratlier encourage greater 
autonomy, direct engagement of the Chinese with the Uighurs to better understand their complaints, and the 
need for the US to not contribute support (even if inadvertently) to any separatist or Islamist scniimcnis tliat 
might be brewing in die region. Indeed, China should be congratulated for die enormous economic and social 
transformation of the region over the past two decades, but at tlie same time should be encouraged to find w'ays 
to preserve and promote the vibraui and extraordinary Central Asian civili/niion lhal Uighur culture represents. 


‘ Dm C. Gladney is a cidtural andiropologist. Professor of Anthropology at Pomona College, and currendy 
sen iiig as President of die Pacific Basin Institute in Claremont, CA. Fiirdier background nuiteriid and aiuilysis 
relevant to the subject of the current paper can be found in the author's Dislocating China: Muslims, Minorities, 
and other Sub-AItern Subjects (Cliicago Univ. Press, 2004). In additioa Dr. Gladney lias published over 100 
academic articles and die following books: Ethnic Identity in China (Fort Wordi: Harcourt-Brace. 1998). 
Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia. Fiji, Turkey, and the United 
Slates (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1998, editor), and Muslim Chinese: F.thnic Nalionalism in the 
People 's Republic of China, 2 ed. (Cambridge MA: Han-ard Unh-ersity' Press, 1996). 



30 



Figure I : Countries Bordering Xinjiang 


2 


2. INTRODUCTION 

In 1997, bombs exploded in a ci^- park in Beijing on 13 May (killing one) and on tw^o buses on 7 March (killing 
2), as well as in the northwestern border cit>' of Unimqi, the capital of Xinjiang Uighiir Autonomous Region, on 
25 February (killing 9), with over 30 other bombings in 1998. and 6 in Tibet that year as well, Most of these 
are thought to liave been related to demands by MusUm and Tibetan separatists. Nimierous members of the 
Uigluir Muslim minority’ luiv'e been executed since those events of the late 1990s, with hundreds arrested on 
suspicion of taking pan in ethnic riots and engaging in separatist activities. Though sporadically reported since 
the early 1980s, such incidents were rather frequent in the late 1990s. and harsh treatment by suspects involved 
in those incidents was documented in a scatliing report of Cliinese go\ ermiient policy in the region by Anuiesty 
Intemiitioiiiil.^ The Wall Street Journal reported the arrest on 11 August 1999 ofRcbiya Kadir. a well known 
Uigluir businessw'oman once sent to represent the Xinjiang region to Uie International Women’s Conference in 
Beijing, during a visit by the United States Congressioniil Research Serv’ice delegation to the region, indicated 
China’s strong response to these tensions.^ Ainncsly International labeled Rcbiya a "prisoner of conscience" as 
her only tangible offense w as an unsuccessful attempt to meet with the USCRS. ^ Her release to the US in 2005. 
and her active role in promoting a “World Uighur Congress” has led to her assuming a prominent position 
among llic Uighur exile commuiiily botli in the US and abroad. 

It is important to note tliat these arrests and Uighur protests liave rarely been connected to freedom of religion 
issues, but rather a riuige of "indigenous rights" issues, of w hich religion is only one concern. Clhnese officials 
argue thal "splillcsls" violate the law and that full rrccdom of religion is allowed under Article 36 of the 
constitution. ■ An earlier Wliite Paper on nationalities policy' in Cliina published just prior to the 50^' 


■ Amncslv International. Peoples Republic of China: Gross Vio/alions of Human Ri^his in the Xinjiang l/ighiir 
Autonomous Region (London. 21 April 1999) 

' Wall Sireel Journal. Ian Johnson. "China Arrests Noted Businesswoman in Crackdown in Muslim Region”. 18 
August 1999 

Amnesty' International. 10 March 2000. "Cliina: Uighur businesswoman Rebiya Kadeer sentenced to eight 
years' after secret trial" News Sendee 47/00, AI INDEX: ASA 17/10/00. Cited by il^ellvig^mmiesW . ortz . X- 
MIMETrack: Scriali/.cby Router on ro.x/I.S./AmncsIy lnlcmalional(Rclcasc 5.0.2b (lntl)|16 
December 1999) at 10/03/2000 05:32:56 PM. 

’ Freedom of Religion law, Article 36 of the PRC Constitution: "Cili/ens of the People’s Republic of China 
enjoy freedom of religious belief No state organ, public or ganizati on or individual may compel citizens to 
believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they- discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not 




31 


Amiiversan- of the PRC in October 1999, argued that religious freedom was guaranteed for all minorities, but 
acknowledged conlinuing problems in minority regions, especially vasl economic incquilics.^ The White Paper 
sun ey ed minority' problems and accomplislunents and concluded: 

China has been a united, multi-ethnic counliy- since ancient times.... Although there were short-tenn 
separations and local division in Cliinese history', unity lias always been the mainstream in Cliinese 
lustory' . , . . In Cliina, aU nomiiil rehgious acti\ities... are protected by hnv..,, The state liad offered 16.8 
billion yuan [2.2 billion USDJ of subsidies to minority areas by 1998,.., The Chinese government is 
well aware of the fact that, due to the restrictions and influence of historical, phy sical geographical and 
otlier factors, central and western China where most minority people live, lags far behind tlie eastern 
coastal areas m development. ’ 

Despite on-going tensions and frequent reports of isolated terrorist acts, there lias been no evidence that any of 
these actions liave been aimed at disrupting the economic development of the region. Not a single mcident luis 
been dircclcd at infra-slructurc (railways, bridges, power stations, airports), which one would expect if there 
were a w ell-organized terrorist or separatist conspiracy'. Most confirmed incidents liave been directed against 
Han Chinese security forces, recent Han Chinese emigres to the region, and even Uighur Muslims perceived to 
be too closely collaborating with the Chinese Govermnent. Most analysts agree that Cliina is not vuhierable to 
the same ethnic separatism that split the former Soviet Union. But few doubt that should China fall apart, it 
would divide, like the USSR, along centuries old ethnic, linguistic, regional, and cultural fault lines.* If Cliina 
did break apart, Xinjiang would split in a way that would resemble tlie tumult experienced in neighboring 
regions like modem Kashmir, or the mid- 1990$ violent civil war of Tajikistan. 

Tlie liistorical discussion of the Uighur in Section 3 of this paper will attempt to suggest why there liiive been 
on-going tensions in the area and wlijit the implications are for future international relations and possible 
refugee flows. The ethnic and cultural divisions showed themselves at the end of China’s last empire, when it 
was divided for over 20 years by regional warlords with local and etluiic bases in tJie nortli and the south, and 
by Muslim w'arlords in tlie west. Etluiicizalion hits meant lliiil the current cultiinil fault lines of Chiiiii mid 
CcTilral Asia increasingly follow official designations of national identity. Hence, for Central Asia, the break-up 
of tlie USSR did not lead to tlie creation of a greater “Turkistan” or a pan-Islamic collection of states, despite 
the predomiiiiuitly Turkic and Muslim population of the region. Riither. the USSR dissolved along etluiic mid 
national lines Ihal had been created by the Soviet Slate itself. China clearly is not about to fall apart anytime 
soon. Yet it also has conlinuing cilmic and religious conflicts and it must solve ihcm for other more pressing 
reasons. 


3. CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 

Chinese histories iiolwilhslaiidiiig, every Uighur finiily believes that their ancestors were the indigenous people 
of the Tarim basin, wdiich did not become known in Chinese as “Xinjiang" (“new' dominion") until the 
eighteeiitli centuiy. Nevertlieless. the identity of tlie present people known as Uighur is a ratlier recent 
phenomenon related to Great Game rivjilries. Sino-Soviet geopoliticiil inaiieiiverings, and Cliinese nation- 
building. Wliilc a collection of nomadic steppe peoples kiMiwn as the "'Uighur” have existed since before llic 
eightli century', this identity was lost from the fifteentJi to die twentieth century'. 

It was not until the fall of the Turkish Khanalc (552-744 C.E.) to a people reported by the Chinese historians as 
Hui-he or Hiii-hu diat we find the begimiings of die Uighur Empire. At this dme the Uighur were only a 


believe in, any religion. The state protects nomuil religious activ'ities. No one may make use of religion to 
engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of cili/ens or inlcrfcrc with the educational 
system of the state. Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination” 4 

December 1982: 32. 

Cluna State Council, "Natiomil Minorities Policy and its Practice in Chiiiii", Beijing, Information Office of the 
State CjDuncil of the People’s Republic of China. September 1999. 

' Ibid.. 1999: pp. 2. 3. 13-14. 34, 50. 

* Dru C. Gladney, "Cliina’s Ethnic Reawakening”, Asia Pacific Issues, No. 1 8 (1995), pp. 1 -8 




32 


4 


collection of nine noimidic tribes, who, initialfy in confederation with otlier Basinil and lOirhikh noniiids, 
defeated the Second Turkish Khanate and then dominated the federation under the leadership of Koli Bcilc in 
742.^ Gradual sedentarization of tlie Uighur. and their defeat of tlie Turkish Klianate, occurred precisely as 
trade with tlie unified Cliinese Tang stiite became especially luciative. Sedentiirization and interaction with tlie 
Chinese stale was accompanied bv socio-religious cliange: the traditional shamanistic Turkic-speaking Uighur 
came increasingly under the influence of Persian ManichaeanisnL Buddliisni and eventually. Nestorian 
CluistitUiity. Extensive trade and militaiy- alliances along the old Silk Road with the Chinese state developed to 
the extent that the Uighur graduallv adopted cultural, dress and even agricultural practices from the Chinese. 
Tlie conquest of the Uighur capital of Karabalgliasun in Mongolia by the nomadic Kyrgy/ in 840, without 
rescue from the Tang who may- by tlien have become intimidated by the wealthy Uighur empire, led to further 
sedentarization and ciy'stiiUiziition of Uighur identity. One branch that ended up in w luit is now Turpan, took 
advantage of the unique socio-ecology- of the glacier fed oases surrounding the Taklamakan and were able to 
presen-e their merchant and limited agrarian practices, gradually establishing Khocho or Gaochang. the great 
Uigluir city -state based in Turpan for four centuries (850-1250). With the fall of tlie Mongol empire, the decline 
of the overland trade routes, and the expansion of trade relationships with the Ming. Turfan gradually turned 
toward the Islamic Moghuls, and. perhaps in opposition to the growling Chinese empire, adopted Islam by the 
mid-fifteenth century'. 

Tlie Islainicizalion of the Uighur from the tenth to as late as the scvcnlccnlh century , while displacing their 
Buddliist religion, did little to bridge their oases-based loyalties. From tliat time on, tlie people of "Uighuristan” 
centred in Turpan, who resisted Islamic com ersion until tlie seventeenth century', ivere tlie last to be knoivn as 
Uighur. The others were known only by their oasis or by the generic tenn of "Turki”, They speak a "Turkic” 
language, tliat is closely related to modern Uzbek (though unlike the cyrillic Uzbek script borrowed from 
Russian, tliey use a modified Arabic script thiit was revived in the 1970s). Witli tlie arrival of Ishuii, tlie 
etluionymi ''Uighur” fades from the historiciil record. Indeed, the late Joseph Fletcher concluded tliiit 
conlcmporaiy Uighur idciUity was just a much a product of modent notions of nationalism as fonner Soviet and 
Chinese Communist policies which did much to ''invent" nationalities, perhaps in order to "divide and rule" 
them as to recognize and incorporate them into their new mition-states. Joseph Fletcher concluded: 

...The Uighur empire (ca. 760-840) once stretched as far as Kashgaria. But tlie idea tliat the 
lOisligarians and tlie inhiibitants of Uighuristan were one and tlie same iiittionality’-let tiloiie tliat tliey 
were all Uiglmrs-is an innovation siciinning largely from the needs of iwcniicih-ccnluiy nalionalism,^'^ 

The Uighur culture and its people’s genetic make-up. reflect the fact tliat they migrated from Mongolia to tlie 
region now known as Xirijumg or Eastern Turkisiaii The region ivas itlways been at the center of a 
"civili/aiional cross-roads”, involving inillcimia travel and inlcr-mixing by speakers of Iranian, Indian, Chinese, 
Tibetan. Turkic. Mongolian, and even European tongues. Until their rather belated conversion to Islam 
(compared to the ratlier rapid conversion of other Central Asian peoples), the Uyghurs were slicinicUiists, 
Buddhists, Manichacans. and even Nestorian Christians. The Uyghur-dotninalcd oases of the region, due to 
tlieir superior agricultural and mercantile economies, were frequently over-run by nomadic powers from the 
steppes of Mongolia and Central Asia, and even iiitennittently. Cliinese dynasties who showed interest m 
controUmg the lucrative trade routes across Eurasia. According to Morris Rossabi, it was not until 1760, mid 
after their defeat of the Mongolian Zungars. that the Manclui Qing dynasty exerted full and fonnal control over 
tlie region, establisliing it as their “new dominions” {XinjiangX an administration tliat had lasted barely 100 
years, when it fell to the Yakub Beg rebellion (1864-1877) and expanding Russian influence.'’ Until nuijor 
migrations of Han Chinese was encouraged in the mid-ninclccnth ccnluiy', the Qing were mainly interested in 
pacift ing tlie region by setting up military' outposts which supported a vassal-state relationsliip. Colonization 
liad begun w itli the migrations of the Han in the mid-nineteenth century, but was cut short by the Yiilcub Beg 
rebellion, the fall of lire Qing empire in 1910, and tlic ensuing w arlord era wliich dismembered the region until 
its incorporation as part of the People’s Republic in 1949. Competition for the loy alties of the peoples of the 


For an excellent liistorical oveix’iew' of this period, see Herbert Franke and Denis Tw itchett. Cambridge 
History of China: Volume 6: Alien Regimes and Border Slates (907-1368) (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994) 

10 Joseph Fletcher, ''China and Central Asia, 1368-1884.” In Tlie Cliinese World Order . Jolui King Faitbanlc, 
cd. Caiiibiidgc, Ma: Harvard University' Press. 1968: 364, nt. 96. 

” Morris Rossabi, "Muslim and Central Asian Revolts” in Jonallian D. Spence and John E. Wills Jr. (cds ), 
From Ming to Ch 'ing (New Haven: Yale Unh-ersity' Press, 1979) 



33 


oases in the Great Game played between China, Russia and Britain further contributed to divisions among the 
Uiglmr according to polilical religious, and mililan- lines. Tlic peoples of the oases, uiilil (lie challenge of 
nation-state incorporatioa lacked any coherent sense of identity. 

Tims. Ihc incorporation of Xinjiang for the first lime into a nation-state required unprcccdenled delineation of 
tlie so-called nations involved. The re-emergence of the label "Uighur”. tliough arguably inappropriate as it was 
last used 500 years previously to describe the largely Buddhist population of the Tuifan Basin, stuck as the 
appellation for the settled Turkish-speaking Muslim oasis dwellers. It has never been disputed by the people 
themselves or the stales involved. Tliere is too much at slake for (he people labeled as such to wish to challenge 
tliat identification. For Uighur nationalists today, the direct lineal descent from tlie Uighur Kingdom in seventh 
century Mongolia is accepted as fact, despite overwhelmil :^5 historical and archeologiciil evidence to the 
contrary. 

Tlie end of the Qing dynasty and the rise of Great Game rivalries between Cliirui, Russia, and Britiiin saw the 
region tom by competing loyalties and marked by two short-lived and drastically dirferent attempts at 
independence: the proclamations of an “East Turkestan Republic" in Kashgar in 1933 and another in Yining 
(Ghulje) in 1944.^’’ As Linda Benson has extensh-ety documented, '■* these rebellions and attempts at self-rule 
did little to bridge competing political, religious, and legioiuil differences within the Turkic Muslim people who 
became officially known as the Uighur in 1934 under successive Chinese Kuominlang (KMT) warlord 
administrations. Andrew Forbes describes, in exhaustive detail, the great ethnic, religious, and political 
cleavages during the period from 1911 to 1949 Ihiil pitted Muslim agiiinst Cliinese, Muslim against Muslim, 
Uighur against Uighur. Hui against Uighur, Uighur against Ka/ak. warlord against commoner, and Nationalist 
against Conuminist. There was short-lived independent Uighur rule dimng two important periods, wliich 
Uighur today claim provide indisputable evidence of self-governance mid even secular-inspired democratic rule. 
Uyghiirs, Uzbeks, and other Central Asian Tuikic peoples formed an "Eastern Turkestiin Republic” (ETR) in 
Kashgar for less than a year in 1933. that was oflcii inspired by religious. Islamic ideals. A decade later, the 
Soviet Union supported anotlier attempt at independent Uighur rule, establisliing a more seailar nationalist state, 
anotlier “Eastern Tiirkestim Republic" in the nortliem part of Xinjiimg. now the town laiowii as Yining (where 
there was a Russian consulate in recognition of this newly fonned nation-state). During 1944-45, the ETR 
fought against the Chinese Nationalists (KMT) who were holding southern Xinjiang. Due to a wartime ailiance 
between tlie KMT and the Soviets, tlie Russian eveiiliuilly pressured tlie ETR to cooperate with the Chinese, and 
they fonned an uneasy alliance, until the Chinese coininunisis defeated the KMT and occupied the region in 
1949, in what they described as a "peaceful liberation” (due to Sino-Sovicl cooperation at that lime), Uyghur 
nationalists at tliat time liad hoped to achie\-e a seiui-independent Republic along the Soviet lines of Uzbekistan 
and Kazaklistmi, but they luid to settle for recognition as a Cliinese "minority' iiiitionitlity” with an Autonomous 
Region of Xinjiang (with much less juridical authority llwn the Soviet Republics). The c-xlraordinaiy 
factionalism and civil disunion dimiig tliis period vvliich caused large scale depletion of lives and resources in 
tlie region, still lives in the minds of tlie population. Indeed, it is tliis memory' tliiit many argue keeps the region 
together, a dccp-scaicd fear of w idespread social disorder. 


The best "Uighur nationalist” retelling of (his unbroken descent from Karakhorum is in the document "Brief 
History of the Uyghers", originating from the Eastern Turkestaiii Union in Europe, and available electronically 
at <w'ww'.geocites.com/CapitoIHill/1730/buh.html> Fora review' and critique, including historical evidence for 
the nuilli-clhnic background of the contcinporaiy' Uighur, sec Dm C. Gladney, "Elhnogcncsis and Ethnic 
Identity' in China; Considering tlie Uygurs and Kazakhs" in Victor Mair (ed.). The Bronze Age and Early Iron 
Age People of Eastern Central Asia: Volume II (Washington DC; Institute for the Study of Man, 1998), pp. 
812-34. For a discussion of the recent archeological evidence derived from DNA dating of the dcssicalcd 
corpses of Xinjiang, see Victor Mair. "Introduction” in Victor Mair (ed). pp. 1-40 

The best discussion of the politics and importance of Xinjiang during this period is that of an eyewitness and 
participant. Owen Lattimore, in liis Ph’ot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia. 
(Boston: Little, Browa 1950) 

Linda Benson. 'The Hi Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge lo Chinese Auihorily in Xinjiang, 1944-1949 (New' 
York: M.E. Sharpe. 1990) 

Andrew Forbes. Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press. 
1986) 

Janies Millward's history' is the best ov'erview of this tumultuous period, see Eurasian Crossroads: A Histon' 
of Xiniiana . New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. 



34 


6 


Today, dcspilc conliiuicd regional differences among three, and perhaps four macro-regions, including llic 
northwestern Zungaria plateau, tlie southern Tarim basin, tlie soutliw est Pamir region, and tlie eastern Kimiul- 
Turpan-Hiuni corridor, there are nearly 8 million people spread tliroughout tliis vast region tliat regard 
themselves as Uighur, among a lolal population of 16 million.*' Many of them dream of, and some agitate for, 
an independent "Uighuristan". The "nationality" policy mider the KMT identified five peoples of Cliina. with 
the Han in the miijority. The Uighur w^ere included at tliat time under the general rubric of “Hui Muslims'', 
which included all Muslim groups in China at that time. Tliis policy was continued under the Communists, 
cvculually recognizing 56 nationalities, the Uighur and 8 other MusHtti groups split out from the general 
categoA' “Hui" (which was confined to mainly Cliinese-speaking Muslims. 

A profoundly practical people, Uighur and regional leaders actually invited the People's Liberation Anny (PLA) 
into the region after the defeat of the Nationalists in 1949. The “peaceful liberation" by tlie Cliinese 
Conuminists of Xirijumg in October 1949, and their subsequent establislmient of the Xinjimig Uighur 
Autonomous Region on 1 October 1955, perpetuated the Nationalist policy of recognizing the Uighur as a 
minority nationality' under Chinese rule. The on-going political uncertainties and social unrest led to large 
migrations of Uighur and Kazak from Xinjiang to Central Asia between 1953 and 1963. culminating in a 
Central Asiiui Uighur population of approximately 300,000. Tliis migration stopped ivitli the Sino-Soviet split 
in 1962 and the border was closed in 1963, reopening 25 years later in the late 19805,^*^ 

Tlie separate iiiitiomility' desigiiiition awarded the Uighurs in Cliina continued to niaslc very considerable 
regional and linguistic diversity, with the designation also applied to many “non-UighuT’ groups such as the 
Loplyk and Dolans, that had vet)' little to do with the oasis-based Turkic Muslims tliat became known as the 
Uighur, At the same time, contemporan' Uighur septnatists look back to tlie brief periods of independent self- 
rule under Yakub Beg and the Eastern Turkestan Republics, in addition to tlie earlier glories of the Uighur 
kingdoms in Turpan and Karabalghasan. as evidence of their rightful claims to the region. Conlcinporaty 
Uighur separatist organizations based in Istanbul. Ankara. Almaty'. Mimicli. Amsterdam. Melbourne, and 
Washington nuiy differ in tlieir political goals and strategies for the region, but they all sliare a common vision 
of a continuous Uighur claim on the region, disrupted by Chinese and Soviet iniciveution. The independence of 
tlie former Soviet Central Asian Republics in 1991 has done much to encourage these Uighur organizations in 
their hopes for an independent “Uighurislan". despite tlie fact tliat the new, miiinly Muslim, Central Asimi 
governments all signed protocols with China in Shanghai in (he Spring of 1996 that they would not haihour or 
support separatists groups. These pnaiocols were reaffinned in the 25 August 1999 mccling bclvvccti Boris 
Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin, committing tlie “Shanghai Five" nations (Cliina. Russia. Kazakstan. Kyrgj'zstaa 
Tajildstan) to respecting border security- and suppressing terrorism, drug smuggling, and separatism (see Figure 
2).*^ The policy was enforced on 15 June 1999, when three alleged Uighur separatists (Hammii Muhammed, 
Ilyaii ZurdiiL Kliasim Makpur) were deported from Kazakstan to China, with se\reral others in Kyrg\'zstaii and 
Kaziil^staii aw'aiting extradition. The Shanghai Cooperation Oi^anization (SCO) lias evolved from wliiit w'as 
originally a trade and border scltlcmcnl alliance to become an increasingly powerful umlli-lalcral organi/aliou 
witli a strong focus on anti-terrorism seairity' cooperation. 


* Justin Jon Rudclson. Oasis Idenliiies: (Jighur Nationalism along China’s Silk Road (New York: Columbia 
University' Press, 1998), p. 8. For Uighur ethnogenesis, see also Jack Chen. The Sinkiang Story (New' York: 
Macmillan. 1977). p. 57. and Dm C. Gladney'. “The Ethnogenesis of the Uighur", Central Asian Survey. Vol. 9. 
No. 1 (1990), pp. 1-28 

’^Tlie best account of tlie Uigliur diaspora in Central Asia, their memories of migration, and longing for a 
separate Uighur homeland is contained in the video documentary by Scan R, Roberts, Wailing for (Jighurslan 
(Los Angeles: University- of Soutlierii California, Center for Visual Antliropology. 1996) 

CNN New s Serv'ice, Rym Braliimi, "Russia, Cliina, and Central Asicin Leaders Pledge to Fight Terrorism, 
Drug Smuggling'', 25 August 1999 (electronic fonnat <www.uygur.oig/cnorg/\vumi99/990825c.html>) 

Eastern Tiirldstiin Infomiation Center, “Knsakistan Govemment Deport Political Refugees to Cliina", Munich, 
15 June 1999 (electronic fonnat: <www.uygur.org/cnorg/rcpoi1s99/99()615.html>) 




35 


7 



Figure 2; Overview of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 


Tlial Islam became an imporiatU, bul noi exclusive, ciillural marker of Uiglmr idcTilily is nol surprising given llic 
socio-political oppositions with wliich tlte Uighur were confronted. In terms of religion, the Uighurs are Sumii 
Muslims, practising Isliunic traditions sintilar to tlieir co-religionists in the region, In addition, many of tliem are 
Sufi, adhering lo branches of Naqshhimilhya Ccnlral Asian Sufism. Uiglmr’s arc powerfully allachcd lo their 
musical traditions, colorfiU dress, and patronage of saintly tomb complexes {mazar) Tliese practices are 
anatlieniii to the strict Wiililiiibi-inspired IsUimist codes of the Taliban and iil-Qaida, with niiuiy Sufi’s and foUt 
artists severely pcrscculcdby llicni, 

However, it is also important to note that Islam was only one of several unify ing markers for Uighur identity', 
depending on those w'ith whom they were in co-operation at the time. This suggests tliat Islamic fundiimenttilist 
groups such as the Taliban in Afghanistan will have only limited appeal among the Uighur. For example, to the 
Hui Muslim Cliiiiese in Xinjiang, nmiibering o\ er 600.000. the Uighur distinguish themselves as the legitimate 
autochthonous minority', since both sliare a belief in Sumii Ishuii. In contrast to the formerly nomtidic Muslim 
peoples, such as the Ka/ak. numbering more than one million, the Uiglmr might stress their ailachmcni to the 
land and oasis of origin. Most profoundly, modern Uighurs, especially those living in larger towns and urban 
areas, are imirked by tlieir reaction to Chinese influence and incorporation. It is often Islamic traditions tliiit 
become the focal poiiil for Uiglmr efforls to presene their culture and liislory . One such popular iradilioii dial 
has resurfaced in recent years is that of tlic Mashrap, where generally young Uighurs gather lo recite pocliy and 
sing songs (often of folk or religious content), dance, and share traditional foods. These evening events liave 
often become foci for Uighur resistmice to Chinese rale in past yeare. How'ever, altliough within the region 
many portray the Uiglmr as united around separatist or Islamist causes. Uighur continue lo be divided from 
witliin by religious conflicts, in tliis case competing Sufi and non-Sufi factions, territorial loyalties (whether 
they be oases or places of origin), linguistic discrepancies, commoner-elite aliemition, and competing political 
loyalties. These divided loyalties were evidenced by lltc attack in May 1996 on the Imam of the Idgah Mosque 
in Kashgar by other Uighurs. as well as the assassination of at least six Uighur officials in September 1 997. It is 
tills contested understanding of liistory that continues to influence much of the current debate over separatist 
and Chinese cUiims to the region. 

4. CHINESE NATIONALITIES POLICY AND THE UIGHUR 


See the important article by a Uyghiir fenuile ethnohistoiian on Uyghur tomb complexes and grave veneration 
with beautiful color photographs by Raliilc Dawul, “Shrine Pilgrimage among the Uighurs” The Silk Road 
Jounial 2009 WitUcr/Spring (6) 2: 56-67. 

(httpV/www silkroadfQimdation.org/newsletter/vol6niim2/srjounial v6n2.pdf ) 


36 


8 


Tlic Uighur arc an official minority nalionalily of China, identified as the second largest of ten Muslim peoples 
in Cliina. primarily inliabiting tlie Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (see Table 1 ). 

Table 1 

Population of Muslim Minorities in China and Xinjiang'^ 


Minority 

Location 

Language 

2000 Census 

Percent in 

Ethnonym 


Family 

Population 

Xinjiang 

Hui 

All China, esp. Ningxia, Gansu. 
Heiiiui, Xinjiang, Qingliiii, 
Yunnan. Hebei. Shandong* 

Sino-Tibetan 

9,816,805 

7.9% 

Uighur 

Xinjiang 

Altaic (Turkic) 

8,399,393 

99.8% 

Kazak 

Xinjiang, Gansu, Qinghai 

Altaic (Turkic) 

1,250,458 

~ 

Dongxiang 

Gansu. Qinghai 

Altaic (Turkic) 

513,805 

- 

Kyrgyz 

Xinjiang, Heilongjiang 

Altaic (Turkic) 

160,823 

~ 

Salar 

Qingliai. Gansu 

Altaic (Turkic) 

104,503 

~ 

Tajik 

Xinjiang 

Indo-European 

41,028 

-- 

Uzbek 

Xinjiang 

Altaic (Turkic) 

16,505 

~ 

Baonan 

Gansu 

Altaic (Mongolian) 

14,502 

- 

Tatar 

Xinjiang 

Altaic (Turkic) 

4,890 

- 


^Listed ill order of size. Source; Yang Shengmin iind Ding Hong, Editors. 2002. An Ethnoiiraphv of Cliina 
(ZhonnLmo Minzu zliil . Beijing; Central Nationjilities Piiblisliing House 

Many Uighur with whom I have spoken in Turfan and Kashgar argue persuasively tliat tliey are the 
autochthonous people of this region. The fact tliiit over 99.8 per cent of the Uighur popuUition are located m 
Xinjiang, whereas other Muslim peoples of China have significant populations in other provinces (e.g. the Hui) 
and outside the couniiy' (e.g. tlie Kazak), contributes to this important sense of belonging to tlie land. The 
Uighur continue to conceive of their micestors as originating in >Giijiaiig. claiming to outsiders tluit ‘‘it is our 
land, our territory”, despite the fact that the early Uighur kingdom was based in what is now Outer Mongolia 
and the present region of Xinjiang is under the control of the Chinese Stale. 

Unprecedented socio-political integration of Xinjiang into the Cliinese nation-state lias taken place in the hist 40 
years, While Xinjiang has been under Chinese political domination since the defeat of the Zungar in 1 754, until 
tlie middle of the twentieth century it was but loosely incorporated into Cliina proper. The extent of the 
incorporation of tlie Xinjiang Region into Chimi is indicated by Cliinese policies encouraging Han migration, 
communication, education, and occupational shifts since the 1940s. Han migration into Xinjiang increased their 
local population a massive 2.500 per cent between 1940 and 1982 compared with tlie 1940 level (see Table 2). 
representing an average amiual growtli of 8. 1 per cent Indeed many conclude tliat Cliina's primar\' progranune 
for assimilating its border regions is a policy' of integration tlirough immigration. This was certainly the case 
for Inner Mongolia, where Mongol population now stands at 14 percent, and given the following figures may 
well be the case for Xinjiang. 


TABLE 2 

Muslim and Han Population Growth in Xinjiang, 1940 - 1990^'’ 


~ Renmin Ribao [Beijing], "Guanyu 1990 nian renkoupucha zhuyao de gongbao [Report regarding the 1990 
population census priniiuy' statistics]'', 14 November 1991, p. 3; Dru C. Gladney, A/ms/Zw Chinese, p. 21 

For China’s minority integration program, sec Colin Mackerras, China's Minorities: Iniegralion and 
Modernizalion in ihe 'I'wenlielh Century (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. 1 994) 

Table based on the following sources; Forbes, Warlords and Muslims, p 7; Juditli Banister. China's 
Changing Population (Stanford; Stanford Uim-ersity Press. 1987), pp 322-3; Minzu Tuanjie [Beijing], No. 2 
(1984), p 38; Peoples Republic of Chiiui, National Population Census Office, Major Figures of the Fourth 
National Population Census: Vol. 4 (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 1991), pp. 17-25 



37 


9 


Ethnic group 

1940 - 1941 

1982 

Uighur 

2,941.(HH) 

5,95(),()()() 

Ka/ak 

319.000 

904,000 

Hui 

92,000 

571,000 

Kvrgvz 

65,000 

113.000 

Tajik 

9,000 

26.000 

Uzbek 

5,000 

12,000 

Tatar 

6,900 

4,100 

Han 

202,000 

5,287.000 

Total Population 

4,874,000 

13,082,01)0 



% population 

% population 


increase 

increase 

1990 

1940-1982 

1982-1990 

7,194,675 

102.31 

20.92 

1.106,000 

183.38 

22.35 

681,527 

520.65 

19.36 

139,781 

73.85 

23.70 

33,512 

188.89 

28.89 

14,456 

140.00 

20.47 

4,821 

-40.58 

17.58 

5,695,626 

2.517.33 

7.73 

15,155,778 

168.40 

15.85 


Note: Mililan figures arc tiol given, estimated at 275,()()() and 500 ,()()() military construction corps in 1 985, 
MinoriN’ population growth rates during the 1980s are particularly high in part due to reclassification and 
reregistration of ethnic groups. 

The increase of the Han population has been accompanied by ll>c growth and delineation of other Muslim 
groups in addition to the Uighur. Accompanying tlie remarkable rise in the Han population, a dramatic increase 
in tlie Hui (Dungaa or mainly Chinese-spe;iking Muslim) population can also be seen. Wliile the Hiii 
population in Xiujiatig increased by over 520 percent between 1940 and 1982 (averaging an annual growth of 
4.4 per cent), tlie Uighur population lias followed a more natural biological growth of 1.7 per cent. This 
dranuitic increase in tlie Hui population hits also led to significiuil tensions between tlie Hui and Uighur 
Muslims in the region, and many Uighur recall the nuissticre of the Uighur residents in Kashgar by tlie Hui 
Muslim warlord Ma Zhongying and his Hui soldiers during the early part of this ccnluiy.*^ These tensions arc 
exacerbated by widespread beliefs held among the e.xile Uighur conuiiuiiity and international Muslims tliat the 
Muslim populations of Chimi are vastly underreported by the Cliinese autliorities. Some Uighur groups claim 
that there are upwards of 20 million Uighur in China, and nearly 50 million Muslims, with little evidence to 
support those figures. 

Chinese incorporation of Xinjiang has led to a further development of ethnic socio economic niches. Whereas 
earlier travellers reported little disiinciioii in labour and education among Muslims, other than that between 
settled and nomadic, tlie 1982 census revealed \-ast differences in socio-economic structure (see Table 3). 


TABLE 3 

Occupational Structui*c of Muslim Minorities in China 
in percent, 1982^' 


Occupiition 

Hui 

Lligliui' 

Knzak 

Dong 

Xiang 

Kyrgjx 

Sal.n' 

Tajik 

lizbek 

Bao 

All 

Tatar 

AU 

F.tlinic 

Groups 

Scientific Staff 

5.75 

4.25 

11.25 

1 .00 

7.00 

3.25 

5.75 

17.25 

1.50 

23.50 

4.00 

Acimiiiislralioii 

1.75 

0.75 

2.00 

0.25 

1.50 

0.75 

2.75 

3.75 

2.25 

4.50 

1.00 


Forbes, pp. 56-90 

See the discussion of population numbers in Eastern Turkistan Information Center, "Population of Eastern 
Turkistaii; The Population in Local Records", Munich, n.d. (electronic format; 
<w\vw.iiygur,org/enorg/tiirkistan/nopiis.html>). A useful guide ivitli tables and brealcdowns is found in 
Inlcmalional Taklaniakan Human Rights Association (ITHRA). "How Has the Population Distribution Changed 
in Eastern Turkestan since 1949". N.d. (electronic format <www.taklamakan.org/uigliur-L/et_faq_pl.litnil>. 
where it is reported tliat the Xinjiang Uighur population declined from 75 per cent in 1949 to 48 per cent in 
1990. The problem with these statistics is tliat the first reliable total population count in the region did not take 
place until 1982, w ith all earlier estimates highly suspect according to the authoritative study by Judith Banister 
(Banister, China ’s Changing Population) 

" Gladney, Muslim Chinese, p, 32; tiible adopted from People’s Republic of Chiiiii, National Population Census 
Office, Poputalion Atlas of China (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. 1987), pp.w, 28 



38 


10 


Office & related 1.75 
workers 

Commercial workers 3.50 

Serv'icc workers 4.00 

Farming, forestry, 

fishing 

& animal husbandry' fiO.75 

Production & transport 22.25 

Olliers 0.25 


1 .00 

1.50 

1.50 


H4.00 

7.00 


2.00 

1.25 

1.50 


74.50 

7.50 


0.25 

0.25 

0.25 


96.75 

1.25 


1.75 

0.75 
1 .00 


84.00 

4.00 


0.75 

0.75 

0.75 


90.50 

3.25 


2.00 

0.50 

0.75 


85.75 

2.50 


3.25 

10.75 

6.50 


31.50 

27.00 


0.75 

0.50 

0.50 


92.25 

2.25 


4.25 

5.25 
4.50 


3K.5() 

19.25 

0.25 


1.00 

1.25 

1.25 


K4.00 

7.50 


Differences in occupational slmclure between the U/bek and Talar on the one hand, and the Uiglmr and Hui. on 
tlie otlier. suggest important class differences, witli the primarily urban Uzbek and Tatar groups occupying a 
much higher socioeconomic niche. Tliis is also reflected in reports on education among Muslim minorities in 
China (sec Table 4). 


TABLE 4 

Educational Level of Muslim Minorities in China in per cent, 1991)'^ 


Educational Level 

Hui 

Uighur 

Kazak 

Dong 

Xiang 

Kyrgyz 

Salar 

lajik 

Uzbek 

Bao 

An 

Tiitflr 

All 

China 

University Graduate 

0.6 

0.5 

0.5 

0.05 

0.3 

0.3 

0.2 

2.6 

0.2 

3.6 

0.5 

Uudergi’aduate 

0.9 

0.4 

0.7 

O.OS 

0.5 

0.3 

0.3 

1,9 

0,1 

2.5 

2.4 

Technical School 

1.6 

1,6 

2.6 

0.30 

2.4 

0.9 

2,1 

4.7 

1.0 

5.8 

17.6 

Senior Middle School 

6.2 

3.5 

5.5 

0.60 

3.4 

1.6 

2.5 

10.8 

2.9 

11.0 

6.4 

Junior Middle School 

19.9 

11.9 

16.4 

2.80 

10.2 

6.3 

9.3 

20.3 

7.2 

22.0 

23.3 

Primary School 

29.1 

43.9 

43.9 

12.00 

43.4 

18.8 

40.4 

33.7 

16.2 

32.7 

37.2 

'■Semi-literate or 

3.3.1 

26.6 

12.3 

82.60 

24.9 

68.7 

.33.5 

8.3 

68.8 

4.9 

22,2 


Illiterate 

'■Population age 6 and above who cannot read or can read very little 

The Uighur are about av-erage in terms of iuii\ersit\- graduates (0.5 per cent) and illiteracy (26.6 per cent) as 
compared with till otlier etlinic groups in Cliina (0.5 and 22.2 per cent respectively). The Tatar achieve the 
highcsl rcprcscniaiion of univcrsily graduates among Muslims (3.6 per cent) as well as the lowest percentage of 
illiteracy (4,9 per cent), far below the average of all China (22.2 per cent). The main drawback of these figures 
is that they reflect only wliat is reginded by tlie stale as education, namely, trainhig in Cliinese language and tlie 
sciences. However, among the elderly elite, there conliimcs to be a high standard of traditional expertise in 
Persian, Arabic, Cliagatay, and the Islamic sciences, wltich is not considered part of Cliinese “culture” and 
education. Altliough elementary' and secondary- education is offered in Uighur. Mandarin has become tlie 
language of upward mobility in Xirijiang. as well as in the rest of China. Many Uighur liave been trained m the 
thirteen Nationalities Colleges scattered throiiglioiil China since they were established in the 195()s. It is these 
seailar intellectuals trained in Cliinese scltools who are asserting political leadersliip in Xinjiang, as opposed to 
traditioiicil religious elites. Many Uighurs in Unimqi point to the establishment of the Uighur Traditioiicil 
Medicine Hospital and Madrassah complex in 1987 as a beginning counterbalance to this emphasis on Hau 
education. However, most Uighur I Ime spoken with feel tliat tlieir history' and traditional ctilture continues to 


^ People's Republic of Cliina. Department of Population Stetistics of State Statistical Bureau and Economic 
Department of State Nationalities Affairs Coimnission, Population of China 's’ Nationality (Data of 1990 
Population Census) f/honggito Minzu Renkou '/Aliao {1990 nian Renkou Pucha Shuju}] (Beijing: China 
Statistical Publishing House. 1994). pp. 70-3, 76. See also Dm C. Gladney, “Making Muslims in Cliina; 
Education, IsUunicization, and Representation” in Gerard A. Postighone (ed.), China ’.s National Minority^ 
education: Culture, State Schooling’ and Development (New York: Garland Press. 1999) 

The late Uighur liistoriaii Professor Ibraliim Muti’i in an unpublished 1989 paper provides an excellent 
liistorical sy'iiopsis of the role of tlie Central Asian Islamic Madrassah in traditional Uighur education. Professor 
Muti’i argues tliiit it was the Madrassah, more than religious or ciiltUKil continuities, tluit most tied the Uighur 
into Central Asian tradilions. Ibrahim Muli'i, personal communication. May 1 989, 



39 


11 


be down-played in the state schools and must be privately re-empliiisized to their clhldren. It is tliroiigh the 
clcTTicnlaTy schools that Uighur children first participate fonnally in the Chinese nation-state, dominated by Han 
liistory and language, and most fully enter into the Chinese world. As such, the predominant educational 
practice of teaching a centralized, mainly Han, subject content, despite the widespread use of minority- 
languages, continues to drive a wedge between the Uighur and (heir traditions, indueling them further into the 
Han Cliinese milieu. 

Tlie increased incorporation of Xinjiang into the political sphere of China has led not only to the further 
migration of Han and Hui into the region, but opened China to an unprecedented extent for the Uighur, Uighur 
men are heavily involved in long-distance trade througliout China. They go to Tianjin and Slianghai for 
iniiniifactured clothes mid textiles, Hangzhou and Suzhou for silk, and Gumigzhoii and Haniiin for electronic 
goods and motorcycles brought in from Hong Kong. In cvciy place, and especially Beijing, due to the large 
foreign population, they trade local currency' {renminbi) for US dollars. Appearing more hke foreigners than the 
local Han, tliey are often less suspect. “We use the hiird currency to go on the Hajf , one young Uighur in the 
central market square of Kunming, Yunnan Province, once told me. “Allah will protect you if you exchange 
money with me“. Wliile some may save for the Hajj, most purcliase imported or luxury' goods with their hard 
currency' and take tliem back to Xinjiang, selling or trading tliem for a profit - a practice tliat keeps tliem away 
from home six months out of the year. As Uigliur continue to travel throughout Clhna they return to Xinjimig 
with a Tinner sense of their own pan-Uighur identity vis-a-vis ll»c Han and the other minorities they encounter 
on their travels. 

Inlcmalional travel has also resumed for the Uighur. An important development in the last decade was the 
opening of a rail line between China and Kazakstan through die Hi corridor to Almaty, and the opening of 
several official gateways widi the surrounding five mitions on its borders. With the resumption of nomiiil Sino- 
Central Asimi relations in 1991, trade and persomil contacts liave expanded enormously, Tliis expansion lias led 
many Uighur to sec themselves as imporiaui players in the improved Sino-Central Asian exchanges, On a 1988 
trip from Moscow' to Beijing duougli the Hi corridor, I was surprised to find that many' of the imported Hong 
Kong-nuide electronic goods purcltased by Uighur w ith hiird currency' in Ciinton iind Shenzlien found their way 
into the market place and hands of relatives across the border iu Almaty - who arc also identified by the 
Kazakstan state as Uightu. Howev er, since the late 1990s. Uighur trav’el abroad has been more restricted due to 
seairity' concerns, and it is nearly impossible for most average Uighur citizens to obtain a passport. 


6. UIGHUR RESPONSE: STRUGGLES TO SUSTAIN CULTURAL SURVIVAL 

Increasing integration with China has not been smooth. Many Uighur rcscni the threats to their cultural 
surv'ival and have resorted to violence. After deiiy'ing them for decades and stressing instead Cliina's “national 
unity’”, official reports luive detiiiled Tibetan and Muslim conflict activities in the border regions of Tibet, 
Yiinnan, Xinjuing, Ningxiii, and Iimer Mongolhi. With the March 1997 bus bombmgs m Beijing, widely 
attributed (though this has never been verified) to Uigliur separatists, coupled with the Urumqi bus bombings on 
the day' of Deng Xiaoping's 1997 memorial on 25 February', Beijing can no longer keep them secret. The 
Yining uprising on 7 February 1997. wliich left at least nine dead and hundreds injured, witli seven Uighur 
suspects arrested and most probably shited for execution, was heavily covered by the world’s media. Tliis 
distinguishes the last few events from on-going problems in the region in the mid-198()s that met with little 
media coverage. 

In 1996, the Xinjian}^ Daily reported five serious incidents since Fcbmary 1996, with a crackdown that rounded 
up 2.773 terrorist suspects. 6.000 lbs of explosives, and 31,000 rounds of anmiimition. Qv'erseas Uighur groups 
liave claimed tliat over 10.000 were arrested in the round-up, with over 1,000 Idlled. The largest protest from 2 
to 8 February 1996, w as spiuked by a Chinese raid on an evening Mashrap ciiltuml meeting. Protests against 
the arrests made during the mccliiig led to 120 dcallis and over 2.500 arrests. On 2 March 1996 the pro- 
govermnent mullah of Kashgar's Idgah mosque and his son were stabbed by knife-wielding Uighur militants, 
on 27 May there w as another attack on a senior government official, and in September of the same year six 
Uighur govcnimcnl officials were killed by other Uighurs in Ycchciig. 

Tlie govermnent responded severely in tlie late 1990s with a widespread arrests and new pohey amioiincements. 
In Spring 1998, the National Peoples Congress passed a New Criminal Law tliat redefined "countcr- 
rcvolulioaary" crimes to be “crimes against the stale”, liable to severe prison terms and even execution. 
Included in “crimes agamst the stiite” w'ere ai^' actions considered to involve “etlmic discrimination” or 
"slirriiig up anti-cllmic sentiment”. Many human rights activists have argued that this is a ihiiily veiled attempt 



40 


to crimiiiiilize ''politicar' actions and to nmke them appear as illegal iis traffic violations, supporting Cliiiicf s 
claims that it holds "no political prisoners”. Since any minority activity could be regarded as stirring "anti- 
etlmic feeling”, many etlmic activists are concerned that the New Criminal Law will be easily turned against 
them. 

On 12 June 1998 iixQ Xinjiang Daily lepomd “rampant activities by splittists inside and outside China”, that had 
contributed to the closure of 10 “uniiutliorized” places of worsliip, tlie punishment of mullahs who Irad preached 
illegally outside their mosques, and the execution of 1.3 people on 29 May in Aksu county (an area that is 99 per 
cent Uighur) supposedly for murder, robbery, rape, and other violent crimes. Troop niovcmculs to the area have 
reportedly been the largest since the suppression of die Baren township insurrection in April 1990 . perhaps 
related to the luitionwide “Strike Hiud” ciimpiiign. Tliis campaign, laiinclied in Beijing in April 1997 was 
originally intended to clamp down on crime and cormplion. but lias now been turned against "splittists” in 
Xinjiang, calling for tlie building of a “great wall of steef' against them. The Xinjiang Daily on 16 December 
1996 contciined the following decUiration by Wang Lequtm. tlie Region's First Part}- Secretiiry-: “We must 
oppose separatism and illegal religious activities in a clear and comprehensive manner, striking hard and 
effectively against our enemies”. These campaigns, according to an April 1999 Anmesty International report, 
led to 210 capital sentences and 190 executions of Uighur since 1997 .^ 

Chinese authorities are correct that increasing inleniational alleniion to the plight of indigenous border peoples 
liav^e put pressure on the regions. Notably, the formely elected chair of tlie Unrepresented Nations and People's 
Organization (UNPO) based in the Hague is the Uighur, Erkin Alptekia son of the Uighur Nationalist leader, 
Isa Yusuf Alptekin. who died in Istanbul in December 1995 where tlicrc is now a park dedicated to his memory'. 
There are numerous international organizations working for the independence of Xinjiang [under the name of 
Eiistem Turi^estmil, based in Amsterdam. Munich. Istanbul. Melbourne, and New York. An organization tliiit 
seeks to coordinate tliese disparate mo\’ements is the World Uyghur Congress, wliich met receitly in 
Washington. DC, from May 21-25, and elected Madam Rcbiya Kadir as President 
t http://www.uvghurcongress.orgl . Clearly, with Xinjiang representing tlie last Muslim region under 
communism, Clhnese autliorities liave more to be concerned about thiin Just interruitioiiiil support for Tibetmi 
independence. 

Tlie real question is, w'hy call such attention to these Tibetan and Muslim activities and extenuil organizations? 
From 1998 to 2008, there was a decade without a single report of Uighur-rclaicd violence. The Istanbul-based 
groups have existed since the 1950s. and the Dalai Lama has been active since his exile in 1959. Separatist 
actions liave taken place on a small but regular basis since the expansion of market and trade policies in Cliina. 
and with the opening of overhmd gtiteways to Xinjiang in addition to the trans-Eurasian railway since 1991, 
there seems to be no chance of closing up shop. In his 1994 visit to the newly independent nations of Central 
Asia, Li Peng called for the opening of a “new Silk Road". Tliis was a clear attempt to calm fears in the newly 
estiibhshed Central Asian states over Chinese expansionism as was the April 1996 Sliiuigluii communique tliiit 
solidified the existing Sino-Cciitral Asian borders. This was perhaps the clearest example of Chinese 
govermiient efforts to finally solidify' and fully map its domestic territories. 

Practically spetil^ing, Chirui is not tltreatened by internal dismembennent. Such as they are, Chiiiif s separatists 
arc small in number, poorly equipped, loosely linked, and vastly out-gunned by the People's Liberation Anny 
and People's Police. Local support for separatist activities, particularly in Xinjiang, is ambivalent and 
ambiguous at best, given the economic disparity- between these regions and their foreign neighbours, wliich are 
generally much poorer and in some cases, such as Tajikistan, riven by civil war. Memories in the region arc 
strong of mass starv^ation and widespread destruction during the Sino- Japanese and civil war in tlie first lialf of 
this century , not to mention tlie cliiiotic horrors of the Cultural Revolution. Intematioruil support for Tibetiin 
causes lias done little to sliakc Beijing's grip on the rcgioa Many local activists arc calling not for complete 
separatism or real indcpcndcucc, but more often express concerns over environmental degradation, anti-uuclcar 
testing, religious freedom over-taxation, and imposed limi ts on cliild-bearing. Many ethnic leaders are simply 
calling for “teal” autonomy according to Chinese law for the five Autonomous Regions tlnit are each led by 
First Party Secretaries who arc all Han Chinese conlrollcdby Beijing. Extending the "Strike Hard” campaign to 
Xinjiang. Wang Leqtian, tlie Party' Secretary' for Xinjiang , has declared “there will be no compromise between 
us cUid the sepciratists''. Documented sep«mitist <md xriolent incidents in Xinjiang Inive dropped off dramiitically 


y> 


Amnesty International, Peoples Republic of China: Gross Violations of Human Rights 



41 


13 


since the late 1990s. Philip Pan reported in a Juty 14, 2002 Washington Post interv iew tliiit local Xiiijuing 
sccuril) olTicials were only able lo cite three relatively small occurrences."’^ 

Beijing's official publication of the separatist issue may have more to do witli domestic politics tliiin any reiil 
internal or external thrcat. Recent moves such as evidenced in (he 2008 Oly mpics suggest efrorls lo promote 
Chinese nationalism as a "unifying ideology" that will prove more attractive than communism and more 
miiiuigeable tliiui capitiilism, By Ihghlighting sepiuatist threats mid external interv'ention, Cliiiui cmi divert 
attention away from its own domestic instabilities of naluial disaster (especially the 2008 Sichuan earthquake), 
economic crises (such as the Asian economic downturn’s drag on China’s currency), rising inflation, increased 
income disparity, displaced “floating populations", Hong Kong reunification, and the many otlier internal and 
extenuil problems facing Jiang Zemin’s government. Perhaps nationalism will be tlie only “unifying ideology " 
left lo a Chinese nation that has begun lo distance itself from Communism, as it has from Confucianism, 
Buddliism, and Daoism in tlie past. Tliis is perhaps wlty religiously-based nationalisms, like Islamic 
fundamentalism and Tibetan Buddliism, are tiugeted by Beijing, vvlhle tlie rise of shamanism and popular 
religion goes unchecked. At the same time, a firm lid on Muslim activism in China sends a message to foreign 
Muslim mihtant organizations to stay out of China s internal affairs, and the Taliban to stay w ell within tlieir 
Afghan borders. Although it is liard to gauge the extent of support for Uighur separatism among the broader 
population, it is clear tluit cultural survival is a critical concern for amny. and a significmit attempt to presen e 
Uighur culture is taking place, assisted to some extent by inicmaiional tourism and the state’s allempls lo 
demonstrate its goodwill toward its restive Muslim population. 


6. INTERNATIO^AL DIMENSIONS 

Hie People’s Republic of Cliiiiii, as one of five pennanent voting members of the UN security council, and as a 
significant exporter of military hardware lo the Middle East, has become a rccogni/cd player in Middle Eastern 
affairs. Witli tlie decline in trade with most Western nations after the Tianamiien massacre in tlie early 1990s. 
the importiince of Cliina’s Middle Eastern trading partners (all of them Muslim, since Cliiiui did not liave 
relations with Israel until 1993), rose considerably. Tliis may account for the fact llial China established 
diplomatic relations witli Saudi Arabia in August 1990. with the first direct Sino-Saudi exclianges taking place 
since 1949 (Saudi Arabia cancelled its long-standing diplonuitic relationsliip with Tawaii and withdrew' its 
ambassador, despite a lucrative trade hisloiy). In the face of a long-icnn friendship with Iraq, China went along 
wilh mosl of Ihc UN resolutions in the war against Iraq. Although it abstained from Resolution 678 on 
supporting the ground-w'ar, making it milikely that Cliiiiese workere will be welcomed back into Kuw'ait, China 
enjoys a fairly solid reputation in die Middle East as an untarnished source of low-grade weaponry' and clieap 
reliable labour. Frequent press accounts have noted an increase in China’s c.xporiaiion of miliiaiy hardware to 
die Middle East since the Ciulf War. perhaps due to a need to balance its grow ing imports of Gulf oil required to 
fuel its overheated economy.^" 

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. China has also become an important competitor for influence in 
Central Asia and is expected to serv'e as a counterweight to Russia. Calling for a new' interregional “Silk Route”. 
Clnna is already constructing such a hnk with mils and pipelines. The etlmicization of several Central Asimi 
peoples and their rise lo prominence as the leading members of the new Central Asian stales, will mean that 
economic development and cross-border ties will be strongly influenced by ancient ethnic relations and 
geopolitical ties. 

Since die early 1990s. Cliina lias been a net oil importer.^' It also has 20 million Muslims. Mishandling of its 
Muslim problems will aheiiiite trading partners in the Middle East, who are primarily Muslims. Already, after 
the cdmic riot in February 1997 in the norlhwcslcm Xinjiang city of Yining, wiiich led lo the death of at least 
nine Uighur Muslims and the arrest of several hundred, Turkey’s then Defence Minister. Turban Tayan, 
officially condenuied Cliina' s handling of die issue, and Cliina responded by telling Turkey to not interfere in 
Clnna’s interruil affairs. Since Hurt time, possibly due to China’s rising economic influence, there lias been 


Philip Pan “In Cliina's West. Etluiic Strife Becomes "Terrorism”’ Washington Post July 14. 2002: A4. 

James P. Dorian, Brett Wigdoru, Dm Gladney, “Central Asia and Xinjiang, Cliina: Emerging Energy, 
Economic, and Ethnic Relations”, Central Asian Survey^ Vol. 16, No. 4 (1997), p. 469 

Ibid., pp. 461-86 



42 


14 


almost no official condemnation from Muslim populated nations over Chiiiif s treatment of tlie Uighiir or other 
domestic Muslim problems. 

Muslim luitions on Clhna's borders, including the new Central Asian stiites, Pakistmi, and Afgliiuhstiia thoiigli 
officially unsupporlivc of Uighur separatists, may be critical of harsh treatment extended to fellow Turkic 
and/or Mushm co-religionists in Cliina on a popular le\'el. However, officially their govermnents rarely 
inten ene in Clhiiif s domestic affairs. The April 1996 signing of border agreements between Clhiiii imd the five 
neighboring Central Asian aalions revealed that there would be no hope for Uighur separatists that they would 
receive any official support from their Central Asian sympathizers. The text of the Mutual Declaration of the 
representatives of Kazakstan and the People's Republic of Cliina signed on 5 July 1996 specifically prex-ents 
Kaziiltstan from assistmg separatists in Chirut. It also indicates Unit tlie Uighiirs xvitlhn Kaziilcstan w ill receive 
lilllc support from their government, and a number of suspected Uighur separatists have in fact been returned to 
China from Kazakstan and Kyrgystan. As stated above, tlie iniporraiice of trade between Central Asia and China 
is tlie primiiiy- reason. In addition, none of the countries in tlie region wishes to luive border problems w itli 
China. At a popular level, however, the Uighurs receive much sympathy from their Central Asian co-religionists, 
and there is a continuing flow of funds and materials tlirongli China's sporadically porous borders. 

Doriiin, Wigdortz, and Gladney liave documented the growling interdependence of the region since the mid- 
199()s.^'^ Trade between Xinjiang and the Central Asian republics has continued to grow, and the number of 
Chinese-Kazak joint ventures continues to rise, now^ approacliing several hundred. Xinjiang exports a variety^ of 
products to Kazaklistan, as well as to Uzbekistan. Kyrgy'zsUm. Russia, and Ulcraine. Increased economic co- 
operation with China is providing Central Asia with additional options for markets, trade routes, and technical 
assistance. 

As noted in the discussion of the Uighur people above, cross-border ethnic ties and interetlmic relations wdthin 
Xinjiang continue to have tremendous consequences for dcvclopincnl in the region. Muslims comprise nearly 
60 per cent of Xinjiang's population, and most of them are Uighur. Being Tiukic, tlie Uighurs share a coimnon 
Islamic, linguistic, and pastoralist heritage ivitli the peoples of the Central Asian stiites (Table 5). 

The Uighurs and other Ttirkic groups in the region are also closer culturally and hnguistically to tlieir Central 
Asiiui neighbours tliiin tliey are to the Han Cliiiiese. Tliis closeness was demonstrated most draiiuitically 
following the Sino-Sovicl 1960 breakdown in polilical rclalions. (hat in pad lead lo an Hi rebellion in 1962 
which conlribulcd to nearly 200, 0(K) Uighurs and Kazaks fleeing across the border lo Ihc Soviet Kazak 
Republic. The majority of the 160,000 Uighurs in Kazakstan today stem from tliat original migrant population. 
Most sclioUus feel, how^ever, tliiit given the companitively stronger economy in Chiiiii and the numerous border 
agreemetus signed bctwccti ihc Central Asian states under (he aegis of ihc Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
a similar uprising now- w ould not lead to such a large cross-border migration. Not only is the border much more 
seaire on the Cltiiiese side tlm in 1962. but the other Central Asian shites would most hkely refuse to accept 
them. 


TABLE 5 

Ethnic populations of Central Asia, Xinjiang (thousands)'^ 



Kiizakstan 

Kyrgyzstan 

Tajikistan 

Turkmenista 

n 

Uzbekistan 

Xinjiang 

(China) 

Kazaks 

6.535 

37 

11 

88 

808 

1,710.00 

Kyrgyz 

14 

2.230 

64 

1 

175 

139.80 

Tajiks 

25 

34 

3,172 

3 

934 

33.51 

Tu rkmen 

4 

1 

20 

2.537 

122 

- 

Uzbeks 

332 

550 

1,198 

317 

14.142 

14.46 

Russians 

6,228 

917 

388 

334 

1,653 

8.10 


'''/6/W.,p. 480 

The best documentation of this period and the flood of Kazaks and Uighurs to the USSR from Xinjiang is to 
be fotmd in George Moseley. The Party cmd the National Question in China (Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 1966) 

Dorian. Wigdortz, Gladney, p. 465 



43 


15 


Ukrainians 

896 

108 

41 

36 

153 

- 

Byelorussians 

183 

9 

7 

9 

29 

-- 

Germans 

958 

101 

33 

4 

40 

- 

Tatars 

328 

70 

72 

39 

657 

4.82 

Karakalpaks 

- 

~ 

- 

- 

412 

- 

Koreans 

103 

18 

13 

- 

183 

1.00 

Uighurs 

185 

37 

~ 

- 

36 

7,195.00 

Han 

na 

na 

na 

na 

na 

5,696.00 

Hui 

na 

na 

na 

na 

na 

682.00 

IVIongolian 

na 

na 

na 

na 

na 

138.00 

Dongxiang 

na 

na 

na 

na 

na 

56.40 


Opportunities in Xinjiang's energ}' sector attract immy migrants from otlier parts of Cliina. Chiiui’s rapidly 
growing economy has the country anxiously developing domestic energy sources and looking abroad for new 
sources. In 1993. witli domestic oil consumption rising faster than pioduction. Cliina abandoned its energy' self- 
sufficiency goal and became a net importer of oil for the first time. During 1996. Cliina's cmde oil production 
reached a record liigh of 156.5 million tons, while imports of crude were up 37,5 per cent over 1995, to 22 
million tons. China is expected to import as much as 30 per cent of its oil by the year 2()()(). As China develops 
into a modern economy, it should see a rise in demand comparable to tliat experienced in Japan, where demand 
for ruitural gas and other energy needs lias quadrupled in tlie past 30 years, Tliis is particularly why Cliimi lias 
begun to look elsewhere for meeting its energy needs, and Li Peng signed a contract in September 1997 for 
exclusive rights to Kazakstan's second largest oil field. It also indicates declining expectations for China's own 
energy resources in the Tarim Basin, Estiniiiled 10 years ago to contain 482 billion barrels, today, even the 
president of Cliimi Natioinil Petroleum Corporation admits tliat tliere are knoivn resen-es of only 1.5 billion 
barrels. 

Cliina hopes to mtilce up for its dependence on Kaziikshm oil by increasing trade. Cliimi’s two-way trade witli 
Cculral Asia has increased dramatically since (he Chinese govcnuncnl opened Xinjiang to the region following 
tlie collapse of tlie Soviet Union in 1991. By ilte end of 1992. formal trade had Jumped by 130 per cent; total 
border trade, including barter, is estiimited to liave quadnipled since tlie early 1990s, Etlniic ties luive facilitated 
this trading surge: those with family relations bciicfil from relaxed visa and travel restrictions. Large iminbcrs of 
‘tourists” from Ka/akstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgy /sian make frequent shopping trips into Xinjiang and return 
home to sell tlieir goods at small village markets. Xinjiang lias already become dependent on Central Asian 
business, with the five republics accounting for more tlian hiilf of its international trade in 1993, 

Most Cliiiia-Central Asia trade is between Xinjiang and Kazakstan (Xinjiang's largest trading partner by far). 
From 1990 to 1992, Kaziilcstan's imports from Cliina rose from just under 4 per cent to 44 per cent of its total. 
About lialf the Cliiiui-Kazak trade is on a b«u1er basis. Tliroiigli 1995, Cliina was Ktiziiltstan’s fifth largest trade 
parlncr, behind Russia. Holland. Gcnnany, and Swil/erland. China’s trade with Kyrgy/slan has also increased 
rapidly. Through 1995. Kyrgy'zstan was Xinjiang’s third largest trading partner, after Kazakstan and Hong 
Kong. As early as 1992. China ranked as Uzbekistan’s leading non-CIS trading partner. Since then, bilateral 
trade liiis increased by as much as 127 per cent per year, making Uzbekistan Chimi’s second largest Central 
Asian irading parlucr, This may be one of Ihc most promising economic relationships developing in Central 
Asia. The large and relatively affluent Uzbek population will eagerly purcliase Cliinese goods once remaining 
border restrictions are relaxed and better transportation is built. Bilateral trade with Tajikistan increased nearly 
ninefold from 1992 to 1995. However, with much ofTtyikislan in tumioil in the tnid-199()s and the couiUiy 
suffering from a deteriorating standard of living, trade dropped by half in 1996. Trade between China and 
Turkmenistan lias also risen rapidly. Cliina is already importing Turkmen gas to satisfy tlie growing energ}' 
requirements in the northwest comer of the country. The sale of iiiitural gas accounts for 60.3 per cent of the 
total volinnc ofTiirkmcn exports. 

Wliile the increasing trade between Central Asia and China is noteworthy, it essentially is a reflection of 
China’s rapidly growing trade with the entire world: trade with Central Asia increased by 25 per cent from 1 992 
to 1994: during the same period total Cliinese trade increased almost twice as fast. In fact, during 1995, only 
0.28 per cent of Cliina’s US$ 280.8 billion overseas trade im-'oh-ed tlie five Central Asian republics, about the 
same as the trade with Austria or Dcmiiark. Despite the small trade volumes, Cliina is clearly a giant in the 
region and will play a major role in Central Asia’s foreign economic relations. For example. Cliina's two-way 
trade witli Kaziilcstan is greater tliiin Turkey's combined trade with all five Central Asian republics. Tliis is so 
even though prcdoTuinantly Muslim Central Asia is of a much higher priority for Turkey than for China. 



44 


16 


Multinalional corporations arc beginning to play a lai^cr role in the dcvelopmenl of the region, In Ka/akstan, 
for instance, foreign firms are estimated to control more tliaii 60 per cent of electric power output. A proposed 
Turkmenistan-Cliinii-Japan natural gas pipeline, pitrt of the envisaged ''Energy Sillc Route'' wliich would 
conned Central Asia's rich gas fields with northeast Asian users, deinonslrales the potential for co-operation 
among countries. But it also higliliglits the growing importance of international companies - in this case 
Mitsubislh mid Exxon - in financing and influencing the course of oil mid gas development in the region. With a 
potential price tag of USS 22.6 billion, this pipeline - as well as many smaller and less cosily ones - would not 
be possible without foreign participation. Hence, the “new Great Game” between China and Central Asia 
involves niaity more play^ers than tlie largely three-way Great Game of the nineteenth cenmr\\ Yet these new' 
inteniiitional corporate forces do not supersede load ethnic ties and comiectioiis tliat extend back for centuries. 

There is a risk that unrest in tlie Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region could lead to a decline in outside oil 
investment and revenues, with such interests already' operating at a loss. Exxon once reported that its two wells 
struck in the supposedly oil-rich Tarim basin of southern Xinjiang came up dr\ . with the entire region yielding 
only 3.15 million metric tons of crude oil. only a small fraction of Cliina's overall output of 156 milhon tons. 
The World Bmik lends over US$ 3 billion a year to China, investing over US$ 780.5 million in 15 projects in 
the Xinjiang Region alone, with some of that money allegedly going to the Xirijiang Production and 
Construction Corps (XPCC). which human rights activist Harry' Wu lias claimed employs prison lao^ai labour. 

It is clear tliat etluiic separatism or Muslim compUiints regarding Clhnese policy' will Inive iinportmit 
consequences for China’s economic development of the region. Tourists and foreign businessmen will certainly 
avoid areas witli ethnic strife and terrorist activities. Cliina will continue to use its economic leverage witli its 
Central Asian neigliboiirs and Russia to prevent such disruptions. Cliimi's security measures and development 
investment luive insured a decade of peace in tlie region since tlie troubles of tlie 1990s, and tliis luis 
dramatically assisted trade and invcstincni in the region. The question then becomes, if China’s dcvclopmctu 
policies liave been so successful, why are the Uighurs still restive? 

Landlocked Central Asia and Xinjiang lack the road, rail, and pipeline infrastructure needed to increase 
economic co-operation and foreign investment in tlie region. Oil and gas pipelines still pass tlirough Russia, and 
road and rail linlcs to otlier points are iii<idequale. A new highway is planned between Kashgiu, Xinjiang, to Osh, 
Kyrgy/slan, to facilitate trade in the area. At the same lime. China is planning a new rail link between Urumqi 
and Kashgar, New links from Central Asia could follow several routes west through Tran and Turkey, or 
Georgia and Azerbaijan, to tlie Black Sea or the Mediterranean: south through Iran to the Persian Gulf or 
through Afghiinistan and Pitl^istmi to the Arabian Sat; or east tlirough Cliiiui to the Pacific. All the routes pass 
through vast, remote, aud perhaps politically unstable regions, and those involving Iran face difficullics in 
gaining Western financing, 

China’s iTilcnialional relations with its neighbours and with internal regions such as Xinjiang and Tibcl have 
become increasingly important not only for the econoiuic reasons discussed above, but also for China's desire 
to participate in international organizations such as the World Trade Organization and the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Council. Though Tibet is no longer of any real strategic or siibstiuiticil economic value to Cluiui, it is 
politically imporlanl to China’s current leadership to indicate that (hey will not submit to foreign pressure and 
withdraw from Tibet. Uighurs have begun to work closely with Tibetans internationally to put political pressure 
on China in international fora. In a 7 April 1997 interv'ievv in Istanbul w itli Alunet Tiirkoz. vice-director of the 
Eiistem Turkestan Foimdatioa wliich works for an independent Uighur homeland, he noted tliiit since 1981, 
meetings had been taking place between tlie Dalai Lama and Uighur leaders, initialed by the deceased Uighur 
nationalist Isa Yusup AJptekin. As previously mentioned tlie elected leader of UNPO (tlie Unrepresented 
Nations and People's Organization based in The Hague), an organization originally built aroimd Tibetan issues, 
is Erldn Alpteldn, the son of tlie kite Isa Alplekin. These intematioiuil fora camiot force Cluiia to cliange its 
policy, any more than the fonucr annual debate in the U.S. over the renewal of China’s Most-Favoured Nation 
status. Nevertheless, tliey continue to influence C hina 's ability to co-operate internationally. As a result, China 
lias sought to respond rapidly, mid often mililariN, to domestic etluiic affairs tliiit might luive intenuitioiicil 
implications. 

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Chinese goveimiieiit feared that the new' independence of the 
neighbouring Central Asian Repubhes miglil inspire separatist goals in Xinjiang, ll also worried dial promoling 
regional economic development could fuel ethnic separatism by resurrecting old alliances. China, however, was 
reassured by an agreement reached in April 1996 with Russia. Kazakstaa Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to avoid 
militan' conflict on conmion borders. It is also resting easier after assertions from Mushni states tliat they w ould 



45 


17 


not become involved in Cliina's internal affairs. Thus, China’s polic>' of encouraging economic development 
while keeping a tighl lid on political activism seems to have the support of neighbouring governments, despite 
not satisfying the many demands of local and cross-border ethnic groups. 

Despite increasing investment and mam new jobs in Xinjiang, the Uigluirs and other ethnic groups complain 
tliat they' are not benefiting as much as recent Han immigrants to the region. As noted above, this is a major 
factor in Uighiir compUiints about cultural preserv-atioa A front page article in The New York Times luis 
documented the "urban renewal" projects in Kashgar that liavc decimated the cultural heritage of the city, what 
many Uyghurs feel is at the heartland of their ancient civili/ation."' They insist that the growing number of Han 
Chinese not only take the jobs and eventually- the profits back home with tliem. but that they also dilute tlie 
natives’ traditional w ay of life and letive them with little voice in their own tiffiiirs. 


7. CYBER-SEPARATISM AND ETIM 

Though generally silenced witliin Cliina. Uyghur voices can still be heard virtually, on the internet. Perliaps 
due to Cliinese restrictions on public protest and a stiile-coiitrolled media, or the deleterious effect of a witr on 
domestic terrorism tliiit this testimony hits documented begim in the late 1990s, very few Uyghur protests can be 
heard today in the region, at least not public ones. International campaigns for Uyghur rights and possible 
independence have become increasingly vocal and well organized, bul only outside of China and on the inlemel. 
Supporting primarily an audience of approxinuitely over 300.000 expatriate Uyghurs (yet few Uyghurs in 
Central Asia and Chinii luive access to these internet sites), there are at perltaps as niiuty as 30 intenuitiomil 
organizations and w^eb sites working for the independence of "Eastern Turkestan.” and based in Amsterdana 
Munich. Istanbul, Melbourne. Washington, DC and New York. Esiimates differ widely on the number of 
Uyghurs living outside of Cliina in die diaspora. As Sean Roberts lias noted. Uyghurs in Central Asia are not 
always well-represented in the State censuses, particularly since 1991. Sliichor estimates approximately 
500, ()()() living abroad, about 5-6% of (he total world Uyghur population.^ Uyghur websites differ dramatically 
on the officiiil Uyghur population numbers, from up to 23 million Uyghur inside Xinjiang, to up to 10 million in 
the diaspora. 

Although the United Nations and (he United Slates govcmincni have agreed with China that at least one 
inteniiitional orgiuiiziition, ETIM. is a Uyghiir-sponsored terrorist organization, the vast majorify of the Eastern 
Turkestan independence and information organizations disckiim violence. Supported largely by Uyghur 
Emigre’s who left China prior to the Communist takeover in 1949. these organi/aiions maintain a plethora of 
websites and activities tluit tiilce a primarily negative view of Cliinese policies in the region. Although not all 
organizations advocate independence or separatism, the vast majority’ of them do press for radical change in the 
region, reporting not only human rights violations, but eiwiroiunental degradation, economic imbalances and 
alternative histories of the region. In general, these websites can be divided roughly into those that arc mainly 
information-based and others tliiit are pohticiilly active advocacy sites. Nevertheless, whether infomiiitiomil or 
advocacy’, nearly all of them are critical of Cliinese policies in Xinjiang. 

Key infomiiitioniil websites tliiit niiiinly provide Uyghur and Xinjiang reUited news and aiiiilyses, include the 
Turkestan Newsletter (Tiukistan-N) maintained by Melmiet Tutimcu of SOTA. 

www curoncl.nl/uscrs/sola/Turkcslari.htinl . the Open Society Institute’s www.crasiancl.ora . The Uyghur 
Infonnation Agency ’s w w w . uv ghurinfo.com. and the virtual library- of the Australian National University 
based '’Eastern Turkestan WWW VL” w'ww.ccs.uk\’.edu/~rakliim/et.html . An increasing number of scholars 
are building websites tliat feature their own work on Xiiyiang and provide links to other sites and organizations 
engaged in research and educational activities rclalcd to the region. One of the best sites in this genre is that by 


See Michael Wines. The New’ York Times. May 27. 2009, “Urban renewal liits Silk Road Cltiiia will 
demolisli site in Kashgar, iiistoric town inhabited by Uighurs'p. A i. 

Sec Yitzhak Shichor. '"Virtual Traiisnalionalism: Uygur Communities in Europe and the Quest for Eastcni 
Turkestan Independence." Unpubhshed paper, 2002. 

Sec. for example. wvvw.Uvghur.ora . the site supported by Anwar Yusuf. President of the Eastern Turkestan 
National Freedom Center in Washington. D.C. who has suggested there arc up to 25 million Uyghurs 
worldw ide. Shichor (ibid .) based on infonnation from Enver Can in Munich, estimates there are about 500 
Uyghurs in Gcnnany (mostly in Munich). 500 in Belgium (mostly from Central Asia), 200 in Sweden (mostly 
from Kazakhstan). 40 in England, 35 in Sw-il/orland, 30 in Holland and 10 in Norway . In addition, there arc an 
estimated 1(),000 Uyghurs in Turkey. 1.000 in the United Stales, 500 in Canada, and 200 in Australia (mostly in 
Melbourne). 



46 


18 


Dr. Nalhan Light of the Uiiivcrsily of Toledo, which not only includes niosl of his disscrlalion and useful 
articles on Uyghiir liistory, music, iuid culture, but also directs readers to other linlcs to the region: 
http://w^\^v-Utoledo-edii/~nlitzht - Wliile there are a plethora of internet sites and web-hnlcs to Xmjiang mid 
Uyghur human rights issues, there is as yei no central site tliat is regularly updated. Information on Uyghur 
organi/alions and internet sites can be found at vvvvvv.uvahuraincrican.ore , An interactive qucslion-and-answcr 
site with a ''Special Report: Uighur Muslim Separatists” can be found at the Virtual Informiition Center, mi 
open-source organization funded by USCINCPAC, w'w^\vdc-info.orti . 

Tlicrc arc a growing nuniber of Central Asia-related sites that increasingly contain information and discussion 
of events in Xinjiang, even tliough Xinjiang is often normally not considered a part of Central Asian Studies, 
and due to its rule by China, often falls under Chinese studies or Inner Asian studies. Sec for example, 
Harvard’s Forum for Central Asian Studies, wwvv.fas.harvard.edu/-ccnlasia . which run by Dr. John 
Schoeberleia niiiiiitmnst the Central Asian Studies World Wide site, httD://wvvw.fas.harv^ard.edu/-casww/. mid 
tlie list-serve. CentralAsia-L: http://\vwvv fas harv-ard.edu/-<rasww/CASWW CentralAsia-L.html tliat frequently 
reports on Xinjiaug-rclatcd issues. An iufonnational website for "For Democracy. Human Rights. Peace and 
Freedom for U/bekistau and Central Asia.” with links to Uyghur and East Turkistan sites is 
httD://w^vw.uzbekistanerk.oni/ . In addition, "Silk Road” sites, increasingly focus on the Uyghur issue. For 
example. The Silk Road Foundation, is a general information site for Central Asia, with sections on Xinjiang 
and a linlcs page to other Uyghur issues: http://silk-road.coiii/toc/index.html . Interestingly, a NOVA/PBS 
website reports on the Tiilclaniakan Mununies. an issue often used to establish cUiiins of territorial liistoiy by 
China and the Uyghurs, particular page is a report research dev-elopments concerning the tracing of the 
mummies ethnicity: hllp://www.pbs.ora/vvgblt/Tiova/chinamuni/lak]ainakan,hlml . 


While most of these sites do not claim to take a position on ilic Uyghur independence issues related to Xinjiang, 
most of tliem tend to report information tliat is more supportive of Uyghur claims against tlie Cliinese State. An 
example is the GcoNalivc "infonnalional site” uu\v.gcocilics.coin/alhcns/9479/uieluir,hlml maintained by the 
Basque activist, Luislxo Fcniandc/, wlio seeks to report "objectively” on minority peoples less represented in 
the world press. Yet his site, wliich does provide a useful cliart on Englisli/Uighiir/Chiiiese transliterated 
placenames. after providing a basic smnmaiy' of tlie region, contains the statement: “Cliinese colonization by 
Han people is a threat to native peoples.” Abdulrnkl>iin Aitbavev’s Paac is another so-called itifonnatioTial 
Website coTUaitiing current reports of Chinese police action in various areas of Xinjiang, as well as links to 
other sites and mlicles tluit tire generally critical of China: http://wvvw.ccs. ukv^edu/-raldlim/et■html ■ 

An important addition to “infomiiitional” websites is tlie site maintiiined by the Uyghur service of Radio Free 
Asia, as part of its regular broadcast to Xinjiang and surrounding regions, reportedly beamed from transmitters 
in Tajikistan and Kyrgy'zstan (see littp:/Avww.rfa.org/service/index.html?seAdce=uyg). According to tlieir site. 
Radio Free Asia (RFA) broadcasts news and infonnalion to Asian listeners who lack regular access to “full and 
balanced reporting” in their domestic media. Tlirough its broadcasts and call-in programs, RFA aims to fill wliiit 
is regarded as a “critical gap” in the news reporting for people in certain regions of Asia. Created by Congress 
in 1994 mid incorporated in 1996, RFA currently broadcasts in Burmese. Cantonese, Klimer, Koreaa Lao. 
Maiidariu. the Wu dialect. Vietnamese. Tibetan (Ukc, Aindo. and Kliam). and Uyghur. Although the service 
claims to adhere to tlie liighest standards of journalism and aims to exemplify accuracy', balance, mid fairness in 
its editorial coiilciit, local govcmmcnls liavc often complained of bias iti favor of groups critical to the regimes 
in power. The Uyghur sen ice has been regularly blocked and critici/cd by the Chinese govcnimcnt, and has 
been cited in the past for carrying stories supportive of so-called separatists, especially the case of Rebiya 
Kadeer. but despite the cooperation of the U.S. and China on tlie war on terrorisnu the site has continued its 
regular broadcasting. When I asked the Uyghur director of the scr\-icc. Dr, Dolkuti Kambcri. if the increased 
Sino-U.S. cooperation on terrorism and the labeling of ETIM as an international Uyghur terrorist group had 
lead to any restriction on their funding or broadcast content, he said that there liad been no changes in funding 
level or content. 


See w'ww.eeocitles.cQni/atliens/9479/mghiir.hf.mL “The entire paragraph reads: Area: 1.6 million sq. km. 
Population: 14 million (1990 census). Uyghurs: 7.2 million (official). 14-30 million (estimates by the Uyghur 
organizations abroad). Capital: Unimclii. The Sinkiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region in China (Xiiijiang Uygur 
Zizhiqu in Cliinese) is also known under tlie names Eastern Turkestan or Cliinese Turkestmi. Uyghur people 
prefer Uyghuristan. It is inhabited by the Uyghurs also known under names Uiglmr. Uigur. Uygur, Wciwucr. 
Salt, Tjiranclii, lOishgarlilc, Tlie other native peoples are Kazak. Uzbek. Kvruhvz. Taiilc. Tatcir . Cliinese 
colonization by Han people is a tlireat for the nathrc peoples.” 



47 


19 


Funding for ihc infonnational sites arc generally traceable to academic organi/alions. advertising, and 
subscription. It is much liarder to estiibhsh funding sources for tire advocacy sites. Wliile most sites are 
supported primarily by subscribers, advertising, and small donations from Uyghurs and otlier Muslims outside 
of China s>uiipathetic to tlie Uyghur cause, there is no e\ddence that the organizations and tlie sites they sponsor 
have ever received official government sponsorship. Other tlian the Radio Free Asia Uyghur service, which is 
supported by the U.S. govenmient, there is no other government tluit officially supports dissemiiuition of 
information related to Uyghur himum rights issues. However, many Uyghur organizations in the past liave 
claimed sympatliy and tacit support from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Australia. Gerniaity. France, Holland, and 
CcUicidci. 

Advocacy sites openly promote international support for Uyghur- and Xinjiang-related causes. Tlicsc sites and 
organi/alions they often represent lake an strong and critical stance against Chinese rule in Xinjiang, giving 
voice they say to a ''silent majority” of Uyghur in Xiirjiangand abroad who advocate radiciil political reform, if 
not outright independence, in the region. These sites include the International Taklamakan Human Rights 
Association, which contains links to several articles and Websites conccniing East Turkistan, Uyghurs, and 
Uyghurislan; httD://www. taklamakan. ora/ : the Uvahur American Association, that contains links to articles and 
websites concerning issues of hiimiin rights and territorial freedom among Uyghurs in Xinjiang, as well as 
listing 22 other organi/ntions around the world that do not liavc Websites: httD:/Avww.uvehuramcrican.ora/: the 
Etist Turkistan Natioiuil Conaress, led by Enver Ciin in Munich httD://wvvw.easttiirkistan.com/ . 

An interesting U.S. based site includes the Citizens Against Communist Chinese Propaganda (with one page 
entitled “Free East Turkistan!”! . which bills itself as a counter-propaganda site (using the fight fire with fire 
approach), based in Florida and led by Jack Churchward who started the organization, Free Etistem Turkestan. 
tltat originally made its name for itself tltrough a series of protests against a Cliinese owned and operated theme 
park. “Splendid Cliina”, located in Kissinunee. Florida that tliey found denigrating to especially Uyghurs and 
Tibetans (with its mini-rcplicas of mosques and the Potala Palace): IUtD://www.caccp.ore/ . The Uvahur 
Human Rights Coaltition is a website reporting human rights abuses of Uyghurs in Cliina and containing links 
to articles and other sites. http://ww'w.uvahurs.org/ . KJVILCIM is an East Turkistan Information Website 
advocating independence, but in Uyghur language: hltp://www'.kivilcim.ore/ along with 
http://wwvv.doaiiturkistan.net/ . Otlier adv-ocacy sights include the East Turkestan Infomitition Center 
www.uvgur.Qrg . tlie Eastern Turkestan National Freedom Center wvwv. uvghur.org . The Uyghur Human Rights 
Coalition wvvvvMivghurs.org which publishes personal testimonies of human rights abuses, and otlier more 
popular sites ineluding www.taklainakaii.org . www.iigvur.iict . www. turpan.com. www. afn.org. 
www.eastTurkesUm.com . As most of these sites are cross-linked, tliey often repeat and pass along infonmition 
contained on other sites. 

Tliere are a number of publicly known Uyghur advocacy orgiuiiziitions, wliich grew to nearly 20 in the late 
1990s, but seemed to liav-e declined in membersliip and activities since September 2001."" In tlie United States, 
one of ihc most active infonnation and advocacy groups in the Washington. D.C. area is the Uyghur American 
Association w ho's cluiimien luive been Alim Seytoff and Turdi Ha.iji."^ Founded like nuiny advocacy groups in 
the latel990s, it supports various public lectures and demonstrations to further raise public awareness regarding 
Uyghur and Xinjiang issues. Tlie Uyghur Human Rights Coalition ( www . uv ghurs . org) . and located near the 
GcoTgclowTi University campus, tracks human rights issues and has organized several demonstrations and 
conferences in the Wasliingtoa DC metro area, originally ven- active in pushing for the release of Rebiya 
Kadir. One of the earliest Uyghur advocacy organizations established in the U.S. in 1996 was the 


For a comparative study of the role of theme parks in ethnic identity- construction in China and the U. S.. see 
Dm Gladney, In Press. “Tlieme Parks and Path Dependency: Comparing the Polynesian Cultural Center and 
the China Ethnic Cullural Park” in “Chinese Ethnology’: Practice and Theory ” Taipei: Academia Sinica. 

"" A list of some of tlie international Uyghur and East Turkistan organization can be foimd on 
http://uvghuramerican.oru/Uvuhiiroruaniz.html and littp://wwvv.uvuur.oru/adre5/iivuiir oruanization.htm . 

See tlieir website introduction: littp://uyglttiramerican.org/ "The Uyghur American Association w as 
estcibhshed on Miiy 23, 1998 in Wasliington D.C. at the First Uyghur American Congress. Tlie grow ing Uyghur 
comnuinily in the United Stales created a need for a unified Uyghur organization to scrv c the needs of the 
coimnimity- here and to represent the collecth-e voice of the Uyghurs in East Turkistan. '' 

"" See llicir organizalional slalcmcnl www uvghurs.org “The Uyghur Human Rights Coalilion (UHRC) is a 
501 (c)(3) nonprofit dedicated to educating Americans, particularly university students, about the Chinese 
govermiient's human riglits violations against the Uyghur people of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
of Cluiiii (Icnow n to tlie Uyghurs as East Turkistan). Through its ediicatioruil efforts, the UHRC strives to build 




48 


20 


InlcmalioTial Taklamakan Human Rights Associalion (ITHRA. vvvvw laklamakanorgk whose prcsidcnl is 
Ablajan Layli Namen Barat, maintains the active list-sen'e, UIGHUR-L, as well as list-sen- covering events in 
Inner (Southern) Mongoliii, SMONGOL-L. In Europe, most the Uyghiir organizations are concentrated in 
Munich where there are tlie largest number of Uyghur emigres, including tlie Eastern Turkestan (Uyghuristan) 
National Congress (www.casdurkislan.com) whose prcsidcnl is Enver Cam the East Turkslan Union in Europe 
led by Asgar Can, the Eastern Turkestan Inforrmition Center (www.iivuiir.oru) led by Abdiiljelil Karakash 
wliich publishes the on-line joiirruil, The World Uvuhur Network News: and the World Uyghur Youth Congress 
( WWW .uv ghurinfo . com) cliaired by Dolqim Isa: in Holland, there is the Uyghur Netherlands Democratic Union 
(UNDU) led by Bahtiyar Semsiddin and tlie Uyghur House cliaired by Shahelil; tlie Uyghur Yoiitli Union in 
Belgium chaired by SeduUam and the Belgiimi Uyghur Association cliaired by Sultan Elunet: in Stockholm 
Sweden the East Turkestan Association chaired by Faruk Sadikov: in London there is the Uygur Youth Union 
UK chaired by Enver Bugda; in Moscow Ihc Uyghur Associalion chaired by Scrip Hajc: in Turkey 
organizations mclude the EiistTiirkestan Foundation led by Melimet Riza Bekin in Istmibul, the East Turkestiin 
Solidarity- Foundation led by Sayit Taranci in Istanbul, and tlie East Turkestan Culture and Solidarity 
Association led by Abubekir Turksoy in Kayseri; in Canada is tlie Canadian Uyghur Association based in 
Toronto and chaired by Mchmctjan Tohli; in Australia is Ihc Australian Turkestan Associalion in Melbourne 
cliaired by Ahmet Igamberdi: in Kazaklistan there are several organizations based in AhnaN' listed on tlie 
inlcmcl, but they arc difficult to contact in the region having incl with recent govcmmcnl sanctions, including 
No/ugum Foundation, the Kazakhstan Regional Uyghur (hiipak) Organization chaired by Khahriman 
Gojamberdie, the Uyghuristan Freedom assocuition cliaired by Sabit Abdiiralunaa the Kiiziilthstan Uyghur 
Unity (Ittipaki Association chaired by Slieripjan Nadirov. and the Uyghur Youtli Union in Kazakhstan cliaired 
by Abdurexit Turdeyev; and in Kyrgyzstan one finds in Bislikck the Kyrygzslan Uyghur Unity tlttipakl 
Associalion chaired by Ro/imchmcl Abdulnbakicv, Uic Bisltkck Human Rights Commiltcc chaired by Tursun 
Islam. Wiile these are the main organizations listed on the internet, numy of them are no longer accessible and 
tliere are several other smaller organizations that are not readily listed. 


It is difficult to assess who the audicttcc is for iltcsc websites and organi/aiioiis, as they are all blocked in China, 
and mostly inaccessible in Central Asui due to eitlier imideqiiate internet access or tlie liigh costs of getting on 
tlie net. h^y Uygliurs I have talked witli in Cliina and in Central Asia have iievrer heard of most of tliese sites. 
Interestingly, govermnent officials in Xinjiang interested in the information proi-ided on tliese sites also liave 
said they do not have access. It is clear iliai Uygliurs in the Western diaspora, particularly in Europe. Turkey, 
the United States, Cmiiida, and Australia are frequent readers and contributors to these sites, In addition, events 
in the region since September 1 1 Iiavc led an increasing lunnbcr of jounialists and interested obscr\'crs of the 
region to begin visiting the sites more regularly. In temis of content, it is interesting to note tliat a cursory’ 
monitoring of tliese sites reveals very little that can be associiited with militant or radical Islam, and iilmost no 
calls for an Islamic “Jiliad" against the Cliinese state. Most of Uie issues as noted above involve documenting 
the plight and history of the Uygliurs under Chinese nilc in Xinjiang as opposed to their glorious, independent 
past and long history- in the region. It is iilso importtmt to note tluit few Cliinese inside or outside of Cliina liave 
visited these sites so tluit they are quite uiuiware of these altemativ'e liistories. Although there are several sites 
av-ailable in Turkish and Uyghur. there is not one in Cliinese. As suck like all internet groups, it is a self- 
selecled audience and rarely reaches beyond those who already support and are interested in the agenda 
supported by the site. 


Financial support for these organizations and websites come mostly from private individuals, foundations, and 
subscriptions (though these arc rare). While it lias been reported that wealthy Uyghur patrons in Saudi Arabia 
and Turkey, who became successful miming businesses after migrating to these countries in the 1940s, liave 
strongly supported these organizations financially in the past, there is no publicly available iiifomiiition on these 
sources. Mar^’ Uyghur who migrated to Saudi Arabia and Turkey in the 1930s and 1940s. became successful in 
construction and restaurant businesses, mid were thus in a much better position to support Uyghur causes tliiui 
tlie more recent Uyghur emigres."'^ Uyghurs in Central Asia and in the West who luive been able to migrate 
from Xinjiang in increasing nimibers in tlie last 20 years or so liave generally been much poorer off than the 


a broad base of support for the Uyghur people’s slmgglc to obtain democratic freedoms and sclf-dctcnninalion 
and to protect their culture and environment.” 

Recent discussions on Ihc inlcmcl regarding Turkey’s lack of support for the Uyghur cause liave begun to 
proliferate, sec Dcmcl Tezean. "Dogu Tiirkislan yinc yok inu sayilacak?” Turkistan Newsletter Mon. 20 Jan 
2003 19;15;51, Turkistan Bulteni ISSN:1386-6265. 




49 


21 


earlier emigres in ihc Middle East. Tliis is starting lo cliangc, however, as they and their children become more 
well-estciblished intlie U.S., Camida, Europe, iuid Australia. 


Although most of these w ebsites liave limited funding and circulation, tliey should not be dismissed as forming 
only a "virtual coimminity without any substantial impact on ev'ents witliin Xinjiang. Not only liav-e these 
websites served as an iTuportant source of infonnation not available in the official Chinese media, but some 
scholars have begun to argue that internet sites often help to sway public opinion by virtue of their widespread 
av-ailability' and alternative reporting of important e\-enls."'‘' Wliile analysts are divided about the potency' of the 
internet for swaying public opinion or influencing domestic events, there is an emerging consensus that it has 
clearly altered tlie way infomiiition is circulated and opinions are formed. Perliaps more importantly, schoUirs 
liave concluded tliat the ''virtual communities'"' formed by- internet websites establish linlcs and connections tluit 
can lead to broad social interactions and coalitions which liave impacted political and socio-economic events. 
For example, it has been shown that social inovcnicnls in East Timor. Aceh. Chechnya, and Bosnia have been 
given strong support through tliese internet conmiunities. providing not only increased information but Uirge 
finiincial transfers as well. Miile “cyber-separalism” would never be able on its own to unseat a local 
government, it is clear that it docs link like-minded individuals and raise consciousness about issues that were 
often iiiiiccessible to tlie general piibhc. For an isolated region such as Xirijiang, and the widely dispersed 
Uyghur diaspora, the internet lias dramatically altered the way' the world sees the region and tlie Cliinese state 
must respond to issues within it. 


Il is clear lhal there arc more than just inlcmel organi/ntions involved in separatist activities in and around 
Xinjiang. As noted above, the East Turkestan Isliimic Movement (ETIM) was recognized by tlie United 
Nations in October 2002 as an inteniiitioniil terrorist organiziitioii responsible for domestic and intenuitioiiiil 
tcrrorisl acts, which China claimed included a bombing of the Chinese consulate in Istanbul, assassinations of 
Cliinese officials in Bislikek. imd Uigliur officials in Kiishgar thought to collaborate wdth Cliinese officialdom.'*^ 
Tliis desigiuition, however, created a controversy in that Chimt and tlie U.S. presented little public evidence to 
positively link the ETIM organization with tlie specific incidents described. In 2001. the US State 
Dcpartincnt released a report that documented several separatist and terrorist groups operating inside the region 
and abroad, militating for an independent Xinjiang.'^"^ The list included "The United Revolutionary- Front of 
Eiistem Turkestan” w'hose leader Yusupbek Mukhlisi claimes to hiwe 30 armed units wdth “20 million” 
Uyghurs primed for an uprising: the "Home of East Turkestan Youth.” said to be linked to Hamas with a 


For studies of the influence of internet in influencing wider public opinion in Asia, sec a recent collection of 
essay's in the Asian Joimial of Social Science edited by Zaheer Baber in a special focus on “The Internet and 
Social Cliiinge in Asia and Bey'ond”. Vol, 30. No 2, 2002. 

' For studies related lo the inicmcl's role in building coTnnmnily and mobili/.ing support for specific causes, 
see Derek Foster. 1997. “Coniniunity and Identity' in the Electronic Village” in David Porter, editor. Internet 
Culture . New' York: Roiitledge Press; Steven G. Jones. 1997. "The Internet and Its Social Landscape” in 
Steven G. Jones, editor, Virtual Culture: Identity and Coimiiuiiitv in Cvbersocielv . London, New Dellii: Sage; 
Tiin Jordan, 1 999. Cvbcrpowcr: The Culture and Politics of Cvbcrsoacc and the Inlcmct . London and New 
York: Routlege: Douglas Ruslikoff, 1994. Cvberia: Life in tlte Trenches of Hvperspace . New York: Harper 
Collins; and Miirk A. Smith mid Peter Kollock. editors. 1999. Coimmmities in Cv'bersoace . London and New' 
York: Roullcdgc. 

The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is know n only as a sliadowy group know n only to be 
previously active in Afglianistan and founded in the niid-90s by Hassan Mashum, Mahsiim liad 
serx ed three years in a labor camp in Xinjwng and who recruited other Uighurs, including his number three 
leader Rashid who w as captured w ith the Taliban and returned to China in Spring 200 1 . See Hutzler. Charles. 
“China-Iraq Policy' Is Risky For US” Asian Wall Street Journal September 10. 2001. 

“China Also Hanncd by Scparalisl-Miiidcd Eastern Turkestan Terrorists.” People ’s Daily. October 1 0, 2001 ; 
Eckliohn, Erik, “U.S. Labeling of Group in ChinaasTerrorist is Criticized.” New York Times. September 13. 
2002; Hiitzler, Cliiirles, “U.S. Gesture to Cliiiui Rinses Crackdown Fears” Wall Street Jourmil . September 

13,2002. 

McNeal, Dew ardic L. “Chiiiii’s Relations with Central Asian States and Problems with Terrorism.” US 
Dcparlincnl of Stale, (Congressional Research Service Report, 2001. See also Scoll Fogden’s c.xccllcnl diesis, 
Writina Insecurity: The PRC/s Push lo Modemi/c China and the Politics ofUighur Identity . MscEcon Thesis, 
University of Wales. Abery'Stw'y'tli. 2002 




50 


22 


reported 2()()() members, (lie "Free Turkestan Movement” whose leader Abdul Kasim is said to have led the 
1990 Baren uprising discussed above; tl^ Or^nization for tlie Liberation of Uighiiristcin” how leader Asliir 
Valdiidi is said to be conunitted to the fighting Chinese “occupation” of the “Uighiir homeland;” and the so- 
called “Wolves of Lop Nor” who have claimed responsibility for various bombings and uprisings. The State 
Department report claims that all of these groups have tenuous links with al Qaeda. Taliban, the Hi/b-ut-Tahrir 
(“Islamic Reviviil”), and the Tableeglii Jamitat. Main- of these groups were listed in the Clhnese report tliiit 
came out in early 2002, but failed to mention ETIM. It came as some surprise, therefore, when at the 
conclusion of liis August 200 1 visit to Beijing. Deputy' Secretaiy- of State Ricliard Annitage identified ETIM as 
the main coordiiuiting Uyghiir group to be targeted as an international terrorist group, responsible for the vast 
majority' of violent incidents. Even the Cliinese repon. on which many believe tlie U. S. report w as based, did 
not link all the groups to ETIM. At the time, veiv' few people, including activists deeply engaged in working 
for an indcpcndcul East Turkistan, had ever heard of the ETIM group. Even ihc US mililaiy did not seem to 
be aware of the group, as the 28 September 2001 “Special Report; Uighur Muslim Sepiuatists” issued by the 
Virtual Information Center in Honolulu which is fimded by USCINCPAC (tlie Pacific Asia Conunand) not only 
did not mention ETIM, but concluded regarding separatist violence in Xinjiang tliat tliere is “no single 
identifiable group but there is violent opposition coordinated and possibly conducted by exiled groups and 
organizations within Xinjiang.”'^ Privately, State Department officials liave admitted to me personally tliat tliey 
felt the designation was a mistake. Since that lime, no other groups have been so designated. 


Tlie main criticism raised by those critical of this designation is that, with so many identified groups, it has not 
been ratide clear wlty ETIM in particuUu' was singled out, unless it wtis for tlie political purpose of strengthening 
US-Chirui relations. Calling them “scapegoat terrorists” the Oxford Analvtica report on tlie ETIM issue 
concludes that ETIM and otlier groups are only a “dubious tlireat" and lias been used as an excuse for increased 
repression. Inlcrcslingly, the Muklilisi’s United Revolutionary' Front was not included with ETIM, despite its 
frequent claims of responsibility- for violent acts in Xinjiang, such as the 1997 train derailment and police 
station bombings. At the same time, maity Uyghur have complained to me tliat although there have been 
many reported terrorist bombings in Tibet and frequent organized protests against Chinese rule that have led to 
violence outside of Tibet, given the sympatliy shown to Tibetans in the West, they do not see tlie U.S. ever 
siding witli China in condemning a Tibetan independence organization as terrorist. Despite international 


Conclusion of Cliina Visit Press Conference. Deputy Secretaiy- of State Richard L, Armitage, Beijing. China, 
U.S. Department of State. August 26. 2002. 

For example, Melimet Hazret in a recent interview (see following discussion), claimed he liad never heard of 
ETIM; "1 liadn'l even heard of ETIM uniil ihc Chinese govcmmeiil incniioued its name in a rcpori in JaTUiary 

2002. " he said. "But I knew- tlie leaders of tliis group whom die report mentioned. For many years, diey were in 
Clunese prisons for political reasons, and they escaped from Cliina. We don't have any organizational relations 
with them because politically w c dou'i share Ok: same goals. Bui I camiol believe they carried oul any icrrorisi 
attacks as the Chinese authorities say diey did. because tiiey Uieniselves are victims of Chinese state terrorism." 
Riidio Free Asia, Uyghur serv ice, “Separatist leader vows to Uuget Chinese government (RFA)”, 24 January- 

2003. hUo;//www.rfa.org/scr\icc/indcx.html?scrvicc=iivg 

See a “Special Report; Uighur Muslim Separatists” Virtual Infonnation Center . 28 September 2001. p. 6. 


www.vic-info.org , 


See “China; Cliina Increases Suppression in Xiiyiang” Oxford Analvtica 20 December 2002. The report 
concludes: “Distinguishing bcUvccii gCTUiiiic counlcr-lcrrorism and repression of minority righls is difficull and 
the Uighur case points to a lack of intenuitiontd giiidehnes for doing so. In any case, Chinese policies, not 
foreign-sponsored terrorism, are the cause of Uighur unrest. Cliiiia’s development and control pohey- in Xinjiang 
is unlikely lo stabilise Ihc region as long as development benefils remain so unevenly distribulcd.” 

"Exile Group Cl a i m s Bomb Blast in Xinjiang. 'LdF/* (Hong Kong), 1 March 1997, FBIS. 
FTS19970513001183 

Bombings in Tibet and other “terrorist acts” have been frequently reported in the press. “Explosion Hits 
Tibet's Capitcil After Cliiiui Aimoimces New Regional Leader,’L4g^e«c^ Fmwet? Pres.se (Hong Kong), 9 
November 2000, FBIS. CPP20001 109000079: “E?q)losion Hits Tibet's Capital After Cliina Amioimces New 
Regioiicil Leader,” Agence France Presse (Hong Kong), 9 November 2000, FBIS, CPP2000 1 109000079; 
"London Organization - Migranls' Shops Bombed in Tibet," AFP (Hong Kong), 27 December 1996, FBIS, 
FTS19970409001372; "Tibet Blames Dalai L ama for Bombing in Lhasa." Tibet People's Radio Netsvork 



51 


prolcsts, on 27 Januan 2002 China executed a Tibetan monk found guilty of lethal bombings in Tibet. ^ Yet 
few believe Tibetan organizations for a 'Tree'' or independent Tibet would ever be considered '‘terrorist." 
Miuiy feel tliiit is it is only due to tlie fact thiit they are Muslims tliat one Uyghur group liiis been singled out as 
being terrorist. The real issue for this testimom'. howe\'er, is tliat despite tlie designation of ETIM, there are 
active Uyglmr-rclalcd activist groups which can be said to be supportive of terrorism, but have never been 
proved to be directly implicated in any specific incident. 


Following Annitage's amiomicement and the State Deparmeitt's report, the Cliinese State Coimcil issued its 
own report on January 21. 2002. charging that 

from 1990-2001 various Uyghur separatist groups "w^ere responsible for over 200 terrorist incidents in 
Xinjiang" tluit resulted in the deaths of 162 people and injuries to 440 otliers. The report, titled "East Turkestmi 
Terrorist Forces Caimot Get Away With Impunity'." also dismissed allegations tliat Beijing liad used tlie U.S.- 
Icd war on terror as a pretext to crack down on Uyghurs. The report condemned immerous Uyghur groups 
including Hiizret's ETLO; the ETIM; the Isliunic Reformist Party' "Shock Brigade"; the Eiist Turkestan Islamic 
Party ; the East Turlcestiui Opposition Part\% the East TurkesUin Islamic Party of AUiili; tlie Uyghur Liberation 
Organization: the Islamic Holy Warriors; and the East Turkestan International Committee (sec Figure 3). 


iTyghUr R^idical Groups, Selected 


. -Unite'd'^ReuoluttonaivFrontofEaKterrr.TurkMtSn - 
: {ak» Medan MuKWtsi}.. , ' 

ir Including expert bembmak«r:6 

b''-.Mutthltst;boastS'of-hattIriQ “tw»M/.twamillton Uysiburs"^' •. 
Br*ady:1|0 conduct amleii struggle against PRC. ■ . 

Ctailm io'bak* ttea-tpseverai groupracros9.<tt».'bord«rin- ' - 
' Ktetakhstan ' 

I " — j - - 

notgatsd 1 

.Qtannad raSRorteibttrty for. a number af bombioga do trams 
i;?and'forKfcssnil'aasaa*tnaoor«. 

^''«’Hdme''dlty:QfLdp Mbfis tba atte oforia-o^Chlna s largest. . 
t'jnu'fiJadrtest'SlUrs-.’.'- 


. v- HpMadfEaat Turklstdn j 

[ Uaditi’ ndttlstad.. 

Br*ndeda4Klnllanfl*» Hamas. < 
iv Report S'jClOO.membars; may liaMe 
f:'.traming In cartipa tn8]ci.» Afghanltear 


. ..EastTurkistan tsIamic.Moxament (ETIM)- .. 

Leader: Hasan Imuran. . . . v c < • ' -a 

^-;Raponadlvraspon8ible'R!'r<as&asstri3t1orr3':of.UygharS';':?.-'<..:, 
. viewad.aa “conaborators’ .!With-.yia PRE-arief CafitratAarart ■ 
governments. 

r.-DIsperaed. throughout the-reglen:- I>iTajik-l 8 tan.v,Gyilnai-A. 5 ^;::Vr 

Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Cliechnya. ' 

■ No. 3 leader Rashid repatriated tp China from Pakistan 

- Free Tuikiatan Movement 
Leader Abdul hasim 

• Led Aprd'.1990upnaing in Barer kinjipng PRC officiali 
:repOit22-people'wer«ki1]ed.-' 

Weepona-uaed ih .die Barer may haveicome from : 

Mujahadeen v 

Oraanizabon for the llbefatlor of Uiyiurlsian 
Leader: Ashir Vakhidi. Committed to ffmed struggle- 
odcupaflen” ofthe y>ghur homeland 



Figure 3 : Uyghur Radical Groups Select List 


(Lhasa), 27 December 1996, FBIS, FTS19970409001370; Che, BCiing, "Bomb Explodes iiiLliasa, Local 
Authorities Offer Reward for Capture of Criminals." Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), 30 December 1996, FBIS. 
FTS19970409001371; "Suspect Detained for Bomb Attack on Tibetan Clinic," .4/fP (Hong Kong), 14 January' 
1999, FBIS, FTS 19990 114000015; "AFP: Explosion Hits Tibet's Capitiil after C hin a Amioimces New Regiomil 
Leader." Agence Prance Presse (Hong Kong), 9 November 2()()(), FBIS. CPP20001 109000079. 

^ Sec Jolm Pomfrcl, "China E.xcculcs Tibetan Monk for Alleged Bonibings” Wasliinglon Post Foreign Scivicc 
Tuesday. Januaiy 28. 2003; Radio Free Asia reported that the govcnuncnl is silencing any reporting on the 
execution; littp://www.rfa.org/serv'ice/article.html?ser\4ce=can<feencodjng=2&id=98250 . 




52 


24 


II is imporlanl lo nolc llial an inlcmcl search of many of Ihcsc organi/alions and their backgrounds reveals lilllc 
information if any. In addition, tliese orgiinizations and many of the internet news and informiition 
organizations discussed above luive rareh' if ever claimed responsibility for any specific action, though niiiny 
are sympathetic to isolated incidents regarded as challenging Chinese rule in the region. Interestingly, there 
seems lo be vciy lilllc support for radical Islam and a search for (he icnu “jihad'' (holy war) among ihc various 
websites and news postings related t these groups turns up almost no use of the term or call for a religious war 
against tlie Chinese. As noted by Janleowiak and Rudleson above, mimy of the Uyghur nationalists are quite 
seailar in their orientation, and overtlirow of Chinese rule is related to issues of sovereignty and human rights, 
rather than tliose of religion. By contrast, Uyghur e?q)atriots with whom I liave spent time in the U.S., Canada, 
Turkey, and Europe, however, tend to be quite religious, yet I have rarely heard them call for a holy war against 
tlie Chinese. Again their concerns are more related to historic claims upon their ancestral lands. Cliinese 
mislrcalmcnl of Ihc Uyghur populalion. and a desire lo lelum home lo a “free Easl Turkcslan", A Uyghur 
family with whom I spent the Rairuidan feast in Toronto in 2000 maintained a deeply religious life in Canada 
tliat they claimed was not possible in Cliina. Although disavowing violence, tlieir daily prayer was for a free 
“UyghurislaTf’ where Ihcir relatives could be free lo praclicc religion. In Islanbul. Ihc Uyghur communily is 
quite active in ihc mosques in Zeytinbunm and Tu/la. and strongly advocate a “libcralcd Easl Turkcslan.” bul 
on several visits to tliese communities since 1993 I have never once heard them call for a jihad against tlie 
Chinese govcmmcnl. even in ils mosl mild sense that John Esposilo has described as “defensive jihad”, or 
protecting Islam from persecution.^'^ If one were lo compare ETIM wilh many of these olher groups, il could 
be argued tliat ETIM as so described, is not even as radiciil as some of the other groups, based on their 
publications (see Figure 4). 



Figure 4: Comparative Chari of Uyghur Radical Groups 
Source: Gladney 2004: 203-21. 


As uolcd above, since Scplcmbcr 11. 2001, vciy few groups have publicly advocated terror against the Chinese 
state, and most liave denied aiw involvement in terrorist activities, though they may express sympathy for such 


Fora discussion of the various meanings of “jiliad” in Islam, sec John L. Esposilo. 2002. Unholy War: Terror 
in tlie Name of Islam . Oxford; Oxford University Press. Pp. 26-35. For studies among Uyghur and other 
Turkic communities in Istanbul, see Dm C. Gladney, "Relatioiuil Alterity: Constmeting Dungan (Hiii), Uygur, 
and Kazaldi Identities across Cliina, Central Asia, and Turkey" Histon- and Anthropology^ Vol. 9, No. 2: 445- 
77, and Ingvar Svanberg. 1989. Ka/ak Refugees in Tuikcv: A Study of Culliiral Persistence and Social 
Change . Stockholm and Uppsala; Almqvist and Wiksell loternational. 





53 


25 


aclivitics. A case in point is East Turkestan Liberation Oi^ani/alion (ETLO). led by llie secretive Mehmet 
Emin Hazret. In a Janucuy' 24, 2003 telephone interview with the Uygluir service of Radio Free Asia, Hiizret 
admitted tluit there imiy be a need to establish a military wing of his organization tliat would tiirget Cliinese 
interests, he nevertheless denied aity prior terrorist activity or ar^' association with tlie East Turkestan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM). "We have not been and will not be involved in any kind of terrorist action inside or outside 
Cliina," Hiizret siiid. "We liave been trying to solve the East TurkesUui problem tliroiigh peaceful means. But the 
Cliinese govermnent's brutality in East Turkestan may hav-e forced some individuals to resort to violence."' 
Hazret a former screenwriter from Xinjiang, migrated to Turkey' in Ms 40s, denied any- connection between Ms 
orgamzation mid al-Qaeda or Osamii bin Ladea Nev'ertheless, he did see the increasing need for a military- 
action against Cliinese rule in the region; "Our principal goal is to acMeve independence for East Turkestan by 
peaceful means. But to show oiu enemies and friends our determination on the East Tiukestan issue, we view a 
military wing as inevitable. ..The Chinese people arc not our enemy, Our problem is with the Chinese 
government, wMch violates tlie liuniaii rights of the Uygliur people." Once again, a conniion pattern to Ms 
response regarding Cliinese mle in the region was not to stress Islamic Jiliad or religious nationalisni but to 
emphasize himian rights violations and Uyghur claims on Eastern Turkestan 


Cliinese aiitliorities are clearly concerned tMtt increasing inlerruilional attention to tlie treatment of its minority 
and dissident peoples have put pressure on the region, w ith the US and many Western governments continuing 
to criticize CMna for not adhering to its conunitments to signed international agreements and human rights. 
Last year China ratified ihc Inicmational Covciianl on Economic, Social, and Culliiral Righls, Article One of ihc 
coveiiimt says: “All peoples Mive the right of self-determination. By v'irtne of tliat riglit tliey freely determine 
tlieir political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development," Article 2 reads: “All 
peoples may. for tlieir own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources witliout prejudice to any 
obligalions arising oul of inlcmaiional economic co-opcralion. based upon ihc principle of mulual bcncfil, and 
international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.” Altliough CMna 
continues lo quibble wilh ihc definition of "people”, it is clear ihai ihc agrccmcnls arc pressuring China lo 
answer crilicisms by Maiy Robinson and other high-ranking human riglils advocates about its ircalmcnl of 
minority peoples. Clearly, with Xinjiang representing the last Muslim region under communism, Uirge trade 
contracts witli Middle Eastern Muslim nations, and 5 Muslim nations on its western borders. CMnese autliorities 
have more to be concerned aboul than just intcnialional support for Iminan rights. 


8. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 

To iui extent never seen before, tlie continued incorporation of Xinjiang into CMna lias become inexorable, mid 
perhaps irreversible. The need for the oil and mineral resources of the region since Chiai became an oil 
importing nation in 1993 means tliat CMnese influence w ill only grow\ To be sure, the Uighur are still oriented 
culturally and liistorically tow ard Central Asia in temis of rehgion, hmguage, and etlinic custom, and interaction 
lias increased in recent years due to the opening of the roads to Piiidstan and Almaty. CMna Mis also recently- 
announced opening the border between Afghanistan and Xinjiang via the ancient Wakhan Corridor, where there 
is no road but only an ancient donkey trail used since Silk Road day's. ^ Certainly. pan-Turkism was appealing 
to some, blit not all, Uigliurs during tlie early part of this century. Historical ties to Central Asia are strong. 
Turkey's late Prime Minister Turgul 0/.al espoused a popular Turkish belief when, on Ms first slate visit lo 
Beijing in 1985. wMch sought to open a consulate there, he conmiented that tlie Turkish nation originated in 
wliat is now CMna. Yet separatist notions, given the current politicM incorporation of Xinjiang into CMna, 
while perhaps present, arc not practicable. As noted above, this is prcdicalcd on the assumption that China as a 
nation holds together. If China should fail at Ihc centre, the peripheries will certainly dcstabili/c, wilh Xinjiang 
and Tibet liavung the strongest prospects for separation given their cultural umty and attempts at government-in- 
exile. 

The problems facing Xinjiang, however, are much greater than tliose of Tibet if it were to become independent. 
Not only is it more integrated into the rest of China, but the Uighur pml of the population is less tlian Milf of the 
total and primarily located in the south, where Ihcrc is less industry and natural resources, except for oil. As 
noted above, however, unless sigmficant im-estment is found. Tarim oil and energy- resources will never be a 
viable source of independent w ealtli. Poor past relations between the tliree main Muslim groups, Uighur, Kazak, 
and Hui, suggest tMit conflicts among Muslims w'ouldbe as great as those betiveen Muslims and Han CMnese. 
Most local residents believe that independence would lead lo significant conflicts between these groups, along 



54 


26 


etliiiic, religious, urban-rural, and territorial lines. Given the luirsh cliimite and poor resources in the region, 
those caught in the middle would have few places to flee. Xinjiang Han would naturally seek to reluni to the 
interior of Cliina. since Russia and Mongolia would be in no position to receive them. Yet given the premise 
tluit only a complete collapse of the state could precipitate a vuible independence movement and internal civil 
war in Xinjiang, then; would be few places the Han would be able to go. Certainly , the bordering provinces of 
Gansu and Qinghai woirld be just as disrupted, and Tibet would not be an option. Uighur refugees would most 
lilcely seek to move soiitlr, since the north would be dominated by tire Han and the western routes would be 
closed off by Ka/akstan and Kyrgystan. That leaves only the soulhcni routes, and with the exception of 
Pakistan, no nation in the region would probably be equipped to receive them. Certainly, they would not be 
better off in present-day Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Gwen tlie on-going conflicts in Kaslunir. even Pakistan 
tlie most likely recipient of Uighur refugees, would probably not wish further destabilization of the region. Note 
also that the main southern route to India and Pakistan, along the Karakhomm highway through the Torghural 
pass, is generally passable less than six montlis out of the year. India, despite its poor relations with Cliina. 
would certainly not want to add to its Muslim population. During many conversations in Xiiijimig witli local 
residents, Muslim and Han alike, it became clear that this fact is well-known. Most think that in such a worst- 
case scenario, tliere would be notliing to do but stay and fight. 

In terms of religious freedom, as with mar^' other policies, tlie Cliinese constitution is laudable if honored, but 
in a countiy' where rule of law often gives way to local and national politics, it often only honored in the breech. 
As long as religion is perceived by Cliinese officials as a threat to Cliinese sovereignty, mosques and rehgious 
practice will be observ'ed and in some cases restricted. In light of international Islamic interest, however, 
Chinese officials have to be careful regarding any oppressive treatment of religious practice -- generally casting 
it as "splittest" or seditious as in the Februaiy- 1997 incident in Hi. 

In the past 10 years, tlie opening of Chinii to the outside w'orld lias meant much for tlie Uighur who, if tliey cmi 
obtain a passport, might travel beyond China's borders through Pakistan along ihc Karakhorain highway, 
tlirough the Hi valley into KazakstaiL or by several CAAC flights to Istanbul from Urumqi. Tlie number of 
Uigluir pilgrims travelling on the Hajj to Mecca hits increased by .^00 per cent in the 1990s, but luis since 
dropped oIT precipitously (though other Muslims from China travel much more freely), Inlcmational contacts 
liave allowed the Uighinto see themselves as participants in the broader Islamic Umma, wdiile at the same time 
being Muslim citizens of the Cliinese mition-stiite. As tliey return from the Hajj, many Uighur who generally 
travel together as a group have told me that they gained a greater sense of affinity with their own as one people 
than with the other multi-cilmic members of the intcnialional Islamic community. State promoted tourism of 
foreign Muslims and tourists to Muslim areas in China in hopes of stimulating economic investment is also an 
important trend related to tliis opening of Xinjiang and its borders. Urumqi, a Uirgely Han city constnicted in tlie 
last fifty years, is undergoing an Islamic racclift with the official endorsemetu of Central Asian and Islamic 
arcliitectnre wliich serv-es to impress many visiting foreign Muslim dignitaries. Most foreigners come to see the 
colourful minorities and the traditiomil dances <md costumes by wliicli their etlinicity' is portrayed in Cliinese 
and foreign travel brochures. One Japiinese tourist with whom I once spoke in Kashgar, w^ho litid just arrived by 
bicycle from Pakistan across the Karaklionim Ihghw.Ty, said that a tourist brochure told him that the real 
Uighurs could only be found in Kashgar, whereas most Uighur believe that Turfan is the centre of their cultural 
universe. Yet many of these Kashgaris w ill in the same breath argue that much of traditional Uighur culture lias 
been lost to Han influence in Turfan and that since they themselves are the repositories of the more unspoiled 
‘'Uighur” traditions, tourists should spend their lime, and money, in Kashgar, Tliis search for the so-callcd “real 
Uighur" confirms tliat the nationality' statistics and tourism agencies have succeeded. The re-creation of Uighur 
etlniicity lias come fiiU circle; tlie Cliinese nation-state hiis identified a people who luive in the last 40 yetirs 
taken on that assigned identity as their own, and in Ihc process, those who have accepted that identity have 
sought to define it and exploit it on tlieir own terms. The Uigliur believe tliey have a 6.000 year cultural and 
physical liistory' in tlie region. They are not likely to let it go. 

Tlic history' of Chincsc-Muslim relations in Xinjiang, as Millward’s (2007) book documented, has been one of 
relative peace and quiet, broken by enormous social and political dismptions, fostered by both internal and 
extenuil crises. Tlie relative quiet of the last decade does not indicate tluit the on-going problems of the region 
have been resolved or opposition dissolved. The opposition to Chinese rule in Xinjiang has not reached the 
lex'el of Chechnya or the Intifada, but similar to the Basque separatists of the ETA in Spain or former IRA in 
IreUmd and England, it is one tliat nuiy erupt in limited, violent moments of terror and resistance. And just as 
tlicsc oppositional movements liavc not been resolved in Europe, the Uygliur problem in Xinjiang docs not 
appear to be one that will readily go away. TIkj adinillcd problem of Uyghur terrorism and dissent, even in the 
diaspora, is tlius problematic for a government that w^ants to encourage integration and dev^elopment in a region 
where the iiuijority population are not only ethnicaUy different, but also devoutly Muslim. How does a 



55 


27 


government integrate a strongly religious minority (be it Muslim, Tibetan, Cliristian, or Buddhist) into a 
Marxisl-Capilalisl syslcm? China’s policy of intolerance toward dissent and economic stimulus has not seemed 
to liave resolved this issue. As a responsible stakeholder, China should find ways to open dialogue with 
representcitive Uighiir individiuils and groups to better cooperate in finding solutions to tins on-going problem. 
Tlicrc has been much progress and relatively peaceful development of this importanl region. Surely a dialogue 
can be opened up in order to help insure a more prosperous and peaceful future, for both Uighur and Han alike. 



56 


28 


9. BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Anuiest}' Interiiatioiial. Peoples Republic of China: Gross Violations of Human Rights in the Xinjiang Uighur 
Autonomous Region. London. 21 April 1999. 

Bcinister, Judith. China 's Changing Population. Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1987, 

Benson, Linda. The Hi Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944-1949. New 
York: M.E. Sharpe. 1990. 

CNN New s Serv ice. RymBrahimi, “Russia, Chimu and Centriil Asian Leaders Pledge to Fight Terrorism, Drug 
Smuggling" 25 August 1999 (clcclronic format <wvvvv.uygiir.org/cnorg/vvunn99/99()825c.hlml>). 

Chen. Jack, The Sinkiang Sior\K New York: Macmillan, 1977. 

Dawul, Rahilc. 2009. "Shrine Pilgrimage among the Uighurs” The Silk Road Joiinial Winlcr/Spring (6) 2: 56- 
67. ( http://wavav.silkroadfoundation.Qrg/newsletterA-ol6niim2/srioiirnal v6n2 pdD 

Dorian. James P, Brett Wigdortz, Dm Gladney. “Central Asia and Xinjiang. China: Emerging Energv. 

Economic, and Etluiic Relations". Central Asian Survey. Vol. 16. No. 4 (1997). Pp. 461-86. 

Eastern Turkistan Information Center. “Kasakistan Goveriunent Deport Political Refugees to China”. Munick 
15 June 1999 (electronic fonruit: www.uygur.org/enorg/reports99/990615.html). 

. “Population of Eastern Turldstiui: The Population in Local Records”. Municli n.d. (electronic 

fonnal: <wv\av. uygur.org/cnorg/lurkisian/nopus.hlml>). 

Eastern Turkcslani Union in Europe. “Brief History- of the Uyghers”. N. d. (clcclronic fonnal: 
<ww\v,gcocilics,coin/Capilo!HiII/17.>()/buh.hlinl>). 

Forbes, Andrew , Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986, 

Franke. Herbert and Denis Twitchett. Cambridge History of China: Volume 6: Alien Regimes and Border States 
(907-1368). Ciunbridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 

Gladney, Dru C. 2004, Dislocaiinu China: Muslims. Minorities, and Otlier Subaltern Subjects . Chicago: 
University of Cliicago Press. 

. “Maldng Muslims in Cliimi: Educiition. Islamiciz^ition. imd Representation” in Gerard A. 

Posliglionc (cd.) China ’s National Minority Education: Culture, Stale Schooling and 
Development. New York; Garland Press. 1999. 

, Ethnic Identity in China. Fort Worth; Harcouit Brace, 1998. 

(ed. ). Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan. Korea. China. Malaysia. Fiji. Turkey. 

and the United States. Stanford: Stiuiford University- Press, 1998, 

. “Etlmogenesis and Etlinic Identity- in China; Considering the Uygurs and Kazakhs" in Victor Mair 

(ed.). The Bronze Age and Early Iron Age People of Eastern Central Asia: Volume II. 

Washington DC: Inslilutc forihe Sludy of Man, 1998. Pp. 812-54, 

, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People ’s Republic of China. 2 cd. Cambridge MA: 

Han ard University Press. 1996. 

. “Cliina's Etluiic Reawakening”. No. 18 (1995). Pp. 1-8. 

, “The Ethnogcncsis of the Uighur”. Central A.sian Survey. Vol. 9. No. 1 (1990). Pp, 1-28, 

Inlcmalional Taklamakan Huiiian Rights Association (ITHRA). “How Has Ihc Population Dislribulion Changed 
in Eastern Ttirkestan since 1949”. N.d. (electronic format <www.taklamakan.org/uighur- 
L/ et_faq_pl . html> , 

Lattimore, Owen. Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Ru.s.sia. Boston: Little, 
Brown. 1950, 

Mackerras, Colin. China ’s Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century. Hong Kong: 
Oxford University Press. 1994. 



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Mciir. Victor. 'Introduction” in Victor Mair (ed.). The Bronze Age and Early Iron Age People of Eastern 
Central Asia: Volume U. Washinglon DC: Inslilulc for Ihc Study of Man. 1998, Pp. 1-40. 

Millward, Jaines A. 2007. Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang . New York: Columbia University Press. 

Minzii Tuanjie fBeijingl, No 2 (1984). 

Moseley. George. The Party and the National Question in China. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 1966. 

People's Republic of Cliina. Department of Population Statistics of State Statistical Bureau and Economic 

Department of Stiite Nationalities Affairs Commission. Population of China 's Nationality (Data 
of 1990 Population Censu.s) f/hongguo Minzu Renkou /iliao (1990 nian Renkou Fucha Shuju)\. 
Beijing; Cliina Statistical Riblisliing House. 1994. 

. National Population Census Office. Major Figures of the Fourth National Population Census: Vol 

4. Beijing; Chirui Statisticiil Publishing House. 1991. 

. National Population Census Office. Population Atlas of China. Hong Kong; Oxford University- 

Press, 1987. 

Renmin Ribao fBeijingl. “Guanyu 1990 nian renkou piiclui zhuyao de gongbao [Report reginding the 1990 
population census primaiy slalislicsj”. 14 November 1991 , 

Roberts. Sean R. Wailing for IJighurskm. Los Angeles: University of Southern Califomia. Center for Visual 
Antliropology. 1996 (video documentan-). 

Rossabi. Morris. '‘Muslim and Central Asian Revolts” in Jonathan D. Spence and John E, Wills Jr, (eds.). From. 
Ming to Ch ’ing. New Haven; Yale University Press. 1979. 

Rudelsoa Justin Jon, Oasis Identities: Uighur Nationalism along China 's Silk Road. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1998. 

Starr, Frederick S., Editor, 2004. Xiniumu: Cliina's Muslim Borderland , Amionl^, NY: M.E, Sliarpe, Inc. 

Turkistan News & Infomiiition Network. “Press Release”, 8 June 1999. 

Wall Street Journal. Ian Joluison. “Cliina Arrests Noted Businesswomiin in Crackdown in Muslim Region”, 18 
August 1999. 


^ Radio Free Asia, Uyghur service, “Separatist leader vows to target Chinese government 
(RF A)”, 24 January 2003. http://www.rfa.org/service/index.html?service=uvg . 

■ See the Slratfor report docuincnliug the Afghan Prime Minister's request for China to open the Wakhati 
corridor. June 11. 2009. “China: Afghan FM Seeks Wakhan Corridor Supply Route” 
(http://www.stratfor.com/sitrep/20090611 cltina afghan fm seeks \vakhan corridor supply route) 



58 


Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Professor Gladney. 

Next we will go to Ms. Kan. 

STATEMENT OF MS. SHIRLEY KAN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DE- 
FENSE, AND TRADE DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 

SERVICE 

Ms. Kan. Good morning. I am Shirley Kan, and I am honored to 
testify before you on this important question. And I work for CRS 
so I will just try to stick to some objective assessments without any 
of the policy recommendations of Randy and others. 

The United States faced a dilemma after the September 2001 
terrorist attacks of enlisting China’s full support in their inter- 
national fight against terrorism, but without being complicit in 
China’s crackdown against Uighurs. 

Human rights and Uighur groups have warned that after the 
9/11 attacks, the PRC shifted to use the international counterter- 
rorism campaign to justify the PRC’s long-term cultural, religious, 
and political repression of Uighurs both inside and outside of 
China. 

The Uighurs have faced crackdowns by the PRC Government for 
what it combines as the threat of so-called three “evil forces”: That 
is, separatism, extremism and terrorism, thus combining nation- 
alism, religion, and charges of terrorism. If the Uighurs have griev- 
ances, they are very directly targeted against the PRC regime. 

The Bush administration’s decision in 2002 to designate one 
Uighur-related organization called the “East Turkistan Islamic 
Movement” as a terrorist organization was controversial both in- 
side and outside of the government. Since then, the United States 
has refused to designate any other Uighur groups charged by 
China as “terrorist organizations.” 

Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage personally an- 
nounced while on a high-profile visit to Beijing on August 26, 2002, 
that after months of bilateral discussions, he designated ETIM as 
a terrorist group that committed acts of violence against unarmed 
civilians. 

Later, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly defended the 
designation as a step based on independent “U.S. evidence” that 
ETIM had links to al-Qaeda and committed violence against civil- 
ians, “not as a concession to the PRC,” he said. The State Depart- 
ment designated ETIM as a terrorist organization under Executive 
Order 13224. Later in 2004, the Secretary of State also included 
ETIM in a “Terrorist Exclusion List” to exclude certain foreign 
aliens from entering the United States. 

However, the United States has not further stigmatized ETIM by 
naming it to the primary U.S. list of terrorist organizations. The 
State Department has not designated ETIM on the list of Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations. Before 2008, the last bombing incident in 
Xinjiang was reported in 1997. Although many Uighur or East 
Turkistan advocacy groups around the world have been reported 
for decades, the first available mention of ETIM was found in 2000. 
Xinjiang has basically been a peaceful area. 

But after the September 11, 2001 attacks, China issued a new 
report in January 2002, charging ETIM and other “East Turkistan 
terrorist groups” — they are put in this vague term of “East 



59 


Turkistan terrorist groups” — charging them with attacks in the 
1990s and linking them to the international terrorism of al-Qaeda. 

In December 2003, the PRC’s Minister of Public Security issued 
its first list of wanted “terrorists,” accusing four groups as — again 
this vague term — “East Turkistan terrorist organizations,” and also 
11 individuals, who were all Uighurs, as “terrorists,” with Hasan 
Mahsum at the top of that list. However, the list was intentionally 
misleading or mistaken, because Mahsum was already dead. Paki- 
stan’s military reportedly killed Mahsum — ETIM’s reported lead- 
er — and others on October 2, 2003, in Pakistan. Then the leader- 
ship of what it called the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) announced 
in December 2003 that former Military Affairs Commander, Abdul 
Haq, took over as the leader. However, the PRC’s Ministry of Pub- 
lic Security did not list Abdul Haq. 

Two months ago, in April, the Treasury Department designated 
Abdul Haq as a terrorist and leader of the East Turkistan Islamic 
party (ETIP) another name something for ETIM, again targeted 
under Executive Order 13224. 

The Treasury Department declared that Haq, in January 2008, 
had directed the military commander of ETIP to attack cities in 
China holding the Olympic Games. But Treasury did not state that 
such attacks actually occurred. Also Treasury noted that as of 
2005 — that is, 4 years prior, Haq was a member of al-Qaeda’s 
Shura Council, that is the consultative group. In the same month, 
the U.N. Security Council listed Haq as a Uighur, born in Xinjiang 
in 1971, the leader in Pakistan of ETIM, and an individual specifi- 
cally associated with al-Qaeda (rather the Taliban). 

In 2008, there were videos threatening the Olympic Games, post- 
ed to the Internet by a group calling itself TIP, and several violent 
incidents, apparently unrelated to the Olympic Games, both in pri- 
marily Han — that is, ethnic Chinese — cities of eastern and south- 
ern China and in Xinjiang in the far West. Nonetheless, the Olym- 
pic Games took place on August 8 to 24, 2008, primarily in Beijing, 
with no attacks directed against the events. 

In another video in Uighur posted to YouTube in February 2009, 
a group calling itself TIP again discussed organizing in Afghani- 
stan in 1997, the leadership succession from Hasan Mahsum to 
Abdul Haq, oppression by China against the Uighurs, and China’s 
concerns about the Olympic Games in 2008. It showed photos of 
bombings in Eastern and Southern China in May and July 2008, 
and videos of training in the use of various weapons. However, 
there was no reference to al-Qaeda or the violent incidents reported 
in Xinjiang in August 2008. 

In addition to designations on the U.S. terrorism lists and assess- 
ments of any threats against the 2008 Olympic Games, U.S. policy- 
makers have faced a dilemma of how to resolve the fates of 22 
Uighur detainees at Guantanamo. While arguing that the United 
States had reason to detain the 22 ethnic Uighurs at Guantanamo 
during the early chaotic days of the war in Afghanistan, the execu- 
tive branch nonetheless began to contend in 2003 that at least 
some of the Uighurs could be released; and then conceded, in 2008, 
that all of them were no longer enemy combatants. 

However, the Uighurs posed a particular problem, because the 
United States would not send them back to China where they 



60 


would likely face persecution, torture, and/or execution. Even with- 
out having custody of these Uighurs, the PRC has already branded 
them as ETIM members and suspected terrorists. 

The Departments of Defense and State have sought a third coun- 
try to accept them. In 2006, only Albania accepted five. However, 
the Bush administration did not grapple urgently with how to re- 
lease the 17 remaining Uighurs until mid-2008 and offered con- 
flicting assessments about the Uighur detainees before finally de- 
claring them as not dangerous and suitable for release both to 
third countries or in the United States. 

In July 2008, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy wrote to 
the chairman and the Ranking Republican that many of the 
Uighurs detained at Guantanamo received what he called “terrorist 
training” at a camp run by ETIM. He also wrote that ETIM re- 
ceived funding from al-Qaeda. However, he nonetheless stressed 
that the Departments of State and Defense aggressively have 
asked over 100 countries to accept those same detainees. 

Moreover, in September 2008, the Justice Department conceded 
in a court filing that all of the 17 remaining Uighur detainees were 
no longer enemy combatants. But in the next month, the Justice 
Department argued against their release in the United States due 
to their dangerous “military training,” thus undermining the State 
Department’s ongoing diplomacy with foreign countries to accept 
them as not dangerous. 

Then in February 2009, the Department of Defense’s review of 
the detainees, led by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, confirmed 
that they are not security threats, since they were moved to the 
least restrictive area called Camp Iguana. Afterwards, Defense Sec- 
retary Robert Gates himself testified in late April that “it is dif- 
ficult for the State Department to make the argument to other 
countries that they should take these people that we have deemed 
in this case to be not dangerous, if we won’t take any of them our- 
selves.” 

In February, Sweden awarded asylum to one of those Uighurs 
who had gone to Albania. In early June, Palau agreed to accept 
Uighur detainees, and Bermuda accepted four of them. Another op- 
tion has been resettlement in the United States. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kan follows:] 



61 


1 


House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight 
Hearing on June 16, 2009, 

“Exploring the Nature of Uighur Nationalism: Freedom Fighters or Terrorists?" 

Testimony of Shirley Kan 
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs 
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division 
CRS 

The United States faced a dilemma after the September 2001 terrorist attacks of 
enlisting China's support in the counter-terrorism fight without being complicit in 
China's crackdown against Uighurs. Human rights and Uighur groups have warned 
that, after the 9/1 1 attacks, the PRC shifted to use the international counterterrorism 
campaign to justify the PRC's long-term cultural, religious, and political repression 
of Uighurs both in and outside of China. The Uighurs have faced crackdowns by 
the PRC government for what it combines as the threat of "three evil forces" (of 
separatism, extremism, and terrorism). Yet, if Uighurs have grievances, they are 
directed against the PRC. 

The Bush Administration's decision in 2002 to designate one Uighur-related 
organization called the “East Turkistan Islamic Movement” (ETIM) as a terrorist 
organization was controversial inside and outside the government. Since then, the 
United States has refused to designate any other Uighur groups charged by China 
as "terrorist organizations.” Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage personally 
announced while on a high-profile visit in Beijing on August 26, 2002, that after 
months of bilateral discussions, he designated ETIM as a terrorist group that 
committed acts of violence against unarmed civilians. Later, Assistant Secretary of 
State James Kelly defended the designation as a step based on independent "U.S. 
evidence" that ETIM had links to Al Qaeda and committed violence against civilians, 
"not as a concession to the PRC." The State Department designated ETIM as a 
terrorist organization under Executive Order 13224 (to freeze assets). 

Later, in 2004, the Secretary of State also included ETIM in the "Terrorist Exclusion 
List (TEL)" (to exclude certain foreign aliens from entering the United States, under 
Section 411 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-56)). 

However, the United States has not further stigmatized ETIM by naming it to the 
primary U.S. list of terrorist organizations. The State Department has not 
designated ETIM on the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 

No group calling itself ETIM claimed responsibilityfor violent incidents in the 1990s. 
Although many Uighur or East Turkistan advocacy groups around the world have 
been reported for decades, the first available mention of ETIM was found in 2000. 
But after the September 11, 2001, attacks, China issued a new report in January 
2002, charging ETIM and other “East Turkistan terrorist groups” with attacks in the 
1990s and linking them to the international terrorism of Al Qaeda. 


Congressional Research Service Washington, D.C. 20540-7000 




62 


2 

In December 2003, the PRC's Ministry of Pubiic Security issued its first list of 
wanted "terrorists," accusing four groups as "East Turkistan terrorist organizations" 
(ETIM, East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO), Worid Uyghur Youth 
Congress, and East Turkistan Information Center) and 11 Uighurs as "terrorists," 
with Hasan Mahsum at the top of the list. However, the list was intentionally 
misleading or mistaken, because Mahsum was already dead. Pakistan's miiitary 
reportedly killed Mahsum (ETIM’s reported leader) and others on October 2, 2003, 
in Pakistan. Then, the leadership of what it called TIP announced in December 
2003 that former Military Affairs Commander Abdul Haq took over as the leader. 
However, the PRC Ministry of Public Security did not list Abdul Haq. 

In April 2009, the Treasury Department designated Abdul Haq as a terrorist and 
leader of the East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP), another name for ETIM, again 
targeted under E.O. 13224 ("Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With 
Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism"). The Treasury 
Department declared that Haq, in January 2008, had directed the military 
commander of ETIP to attack cities in China holding the Olympic Games. But 
Treasury did not state that such attacks actually occurred. Also, Treasury noted 
that as of 2005 (four years prior), Haq was a member of Al Qaeda's Shura Council 
(consultative group). In the same month, the U.N. Security Council listed Haq as 
a Uighur born in Xinjiang in 1971, the leader in Pakistan of ETIM, and an individual 
associated with Al Qaeda (rather than the Taliban). 

In 2008, there were videos threatening the Olympic Games posted to the Internet 
by a group calling itself the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) and several violent 
incidents apparently unrelated to the Olympic Games both in primarily Han (ethnic 
Chinese) areas of eastern and southern China and in Xinjiang of the far west. 
Nonetheless, the Olympic Games took place on August 8-24, 2008, primarily in 
Beijing, with no attacks directed against the events. 

In another video in Uyghur posted to YouTube in February 2009, a group calling 
itself TIP again discussed organizing in Afghanistan in 1997, the leadership 
succession from Hasan Mahsum to Abdul Haq, oppression by China against 
Uighurs, and China’s concerns about the Olympic Games in 2008. It showed 
photos of bombings in eastern and southern China in May and July 2008 and videos 
of training in use of various weapons. However, there was no reference to Al 
Qaeda or the violent incidents reported in Xinjiang in August 2008. 

In addition to designations on U.S. terrorism lists and assessments of threats 
against the 2008 Olympic Games, U.S. policymakers have faced a dilemma of how 
to resolve the fates of 22 Uighurs detained at Guantanamo. While arguing that the 
United States had reason to detain 22 ethnic Uighurs at Guantanamo during the 
early chaotic days of the war in Afghanistan, the Executive Branch nonetheless 
began to contend in 2003 that at least some of them could be released and then 
conceded in 2008 that all of the Uighur detainees were “no longer enemy 
combatants.” However, the Uighurs posed a particular problem, because the United 
States would not send them to China, which claims their citizenship but where they 
fear persecution, torture, and/or execution. Even without custody of the Uighurs, 
the PRC already branded them as suspected terrorists and ETIM members. The 
Departments of Defense and State have sought a third country to accept them. 



63 


3 

However, the Executive Branch did not grappie urgentiy with how to reiease the 
Uighurs untii mid-2008 and offered confiicting assessments about the Uighur 
detainees before finally declaring them as not dangerous and suitabie for release, 
both to a third country as weil as in the United States. 

In July 2008, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy wrote to Congress that 
"many" of the Uighurs detained at Guantanamo received "terrorist training" at a 
camp run by ETIM. He also wrote that ETIM received funding from Al Qaeda. 
However, he nonetheless stressed that the Departments of State and Defense 
aggressively have asked over 100 countries to accept those same detainees. 

Moreover, on September 30, 2008, the Justice Department conceded in a court 
filing (at the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia) that all of the 17 
remaining Uighur detainees were "no longer enemy combatants." But in the next 
month, the Justice Department argued against their release in the United States 
due to their dangerous "military training," thus undermining the State Department’s 
ongoing diplomacy with foreign countries to accept them as not dangerous. 

Then, in February 2009, the Defense Department’s review of the detainees led by 
the Vice Chief of Naval Operations confirmed that they were not security threats 
since they were moved to the least restrictive area of Camp Iguana. Afterwards, 
DefenseSecretary Robert Gates testified (at a hearing of the Senate Appropriations 
Committee) on April 30, 2009, that it is "difficult for the State Department to make 
the argument to other countries they should take these people that we have 
deemed, in this case, not to be dangerous, if we won't take any of them ourselves." 

In 2006, only Albania accepted five, leaving 17 Uighur detainees. In February 2009, 
Sweden awarded asylum to one of those released to Albania. In early June 2009, 
Palau agreed to accept Uighur detainees, and Bermuda accepted four of them. 
Another option has been resettlement in the United States. 



64 


Mr. Delahunt. Thank you Ms. Kan. 

And next we will go to Ms. Susan Baker Manning. 

STATEMENT OF MS. SUSAN BAKER MANNING, PARTNER, 
BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN 

Ms. Baker Manning. Good morning, Chairman Delahunt, Rank- 
ing Member Rohrabacher, other members of the subcommittee. I 
very much appreciate the opportunity to address you this morning. 
Again, my name is Susan Baker Manning. I am a partner with 
Bingham McCutchen, and I have represented for many years a 
number of the Uighur detainees at Guantanamo. That includes the 
four men who were released to Bermuda last Thursday, to our 
great joy. It includes some of the people released to Albania in 
2006, including the gentleman we see in the picture over here, 
whose name is Abdul Hakim, and I represent two more of the 13 
Uighur men who languish at Guantanamo even today, even though 
they have long been cleared for release and their innocence is wide- 
ly, if not universally, recognized. 

I have been asked to address, by your staff in particular, some 
of the issues related to the Parhat v. Gates decision by the DC Cir- 
cuit. In Parhat v. Gates, the DC Circuit looked at the evidence that 
the Department of Defense had compiled to rationalize the deten- 
tion of Hozaifa Parhat, one of the four men now in Bermuda. And 
I think it is important to emphasize “rationalize” the detention of 
Hozaifa and the other men. There is no evidence that we have ever 
seen in the 4 long years of vigorous litigation that the original jus- 
tification for detaining any of the Uighur men was an affiliation 
with ETIM or with any other ostensible Uighur organization of any 
kind. 

But it is abundantly clear that when the Department of Defense 
was forced to state a rationale in a public way for their detention 
in 2004, 2005, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s Rasul decision, 
that ETIM became the hook for doing just that. 

And so I am happy to address any of the many, many facets of 
the Uighur cases in the Uighur situation, but I will focus in this 
particular testimony on the Parhat decision and its analysis of the 
facts, and, in particular, its analysis of the evidence related to 
ETIM. 

The DC Circuit was the first court to ever look at the evidence 
in any Uighur case. It is not the only one to do so. And any court 
that has ever looked at the evidence has ruled for the Uighurs, but 
it was the first one. 

Mr. Delahunt. Let me interrupt you at this point in time. If you 
can state for the record — we are not asking you to disclose — but the 
information that the court had access to included both unclassified 
and classified information; is that correct? 

Ms. Baker Manning. Yes, sir, that’s right. 

Mr. Delahunt. Thank you. 

Ms. Baker Manning. And the information that the court was 
analyzing in the Parhat case consisted of the hearing record of the 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal. 

And if you will indulge me for backing up a moment just to sort 
of frame the procedural process here. In 2005 when Congress 
passed the Detainee Treatment Act, which purported to strip the 



65 


Federal courts of habeas jurisdiction to consider Guantanamo 
cases, something that was found to be unlawful by the Supreme 
Court. 

But at that time, Congress created a new cause of action that 
would allow any Guantanamo detainee to challenge the basis of his 
detention in the DC Circuit. There were a limited number of ques- 
tions that could be addressed in a DTA proceeding, but one of those 
was whether the detainee’s classification as an enemy combatant 
was justified by a preponderance of the evidence. The evidence be- 
fore the Combatant Status Review Tribunal was, we think, the gov- 
ernment’s best case. It was certainly their opportunity to put to- 
gether in a robust way, in a way that would ultimately become 
public and was expected, frankly, to ultimately become public, to 
put forward their best case to, again, not justify in the first in- 
stance, but to rationalize the detention of people who had already 
been in prison at that time for many, many years. 

And in the case of the Uighurs, by the time the CSRTs were con- 
ducted, the great majority of them had already been cleared for re- 
lease and the Bush administration was actively seeking new homes 
for them. Nevertheless, they were put through the CSRT process, 
to the surprise of certainly members of the State Department and 
others who were on record as noting they thought that that was 
surprising, if not inappropriate, given that they had already been 
cleared for release. 

If I can also by way of stepping back just note a couple of things 
that were undisputed — that are undisputed. We have seen a lot of 
misinformation recently about who the Guantanamo detainees are. 
We have heard discussion of Speaker Gingrich’s disturbing com- 
ments and willingness to send them to their deaths in China. And 
we have heard a great deal of information, sort of accusations, and 
I should say slander, from people who suggest that these are al- 
Qaeda terrorists and the like. That is simply not true. There has 
never been any allegation of that and certainly never been estab- 
lished. 

So, if I can remind us all of a couple of the key facts. As I and 
others have noted, the military has cleared every single one of the 
men, Uighur men, at Guantanamo for release. The great majority 
of them were cleared for release 6 years ago, in 2003. The Bush ad- 
ministration conceded, as Ms. Kan noted, in 2008 that none one of 
them was an enemy combatant. 

Now, that takes on the language of “no longer an enemy combat- 
ant.” I have got a Federal judge who has written an opinion calling 
that term Kafkaesque. If you are not an enemy combatant, you 
were never an enemy combatant. These men were never enemy 
combatants. They should never have been in Guantanamo. And 
when that error was realized, they should have been released im- 
mediately. Two Federal Courts, as I will detail a little bit more, 
have taken a look at the evidence. Both the DC Circuit 

Mr. Delahunt. I am going to interrupt you once more, because 
I think this is very important. You are in a particularly — ^you have 
a particular perspective that no one else has. I know I have not, 
nor the ranking member, nor members of the committee sought ac- 
cess to classified information. You are not disclosing it, I under- 
stand that. But you have reviewed these records in detail. 



66 


Ms. Baker Manning. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Delahunt. You have had access to this information. Would 
you state — was your statement unequivocal that there was no evi- 
dence that the individuals whom you represented had any links 
whatsoever to al-Qaeda; is that an accurate statement? 

Ms. Baker Manning. That is an accurate statement, sir. And 
you don’t even need to rely on my representation for that; you can 
rely on the DC Circuit for that. There is no connection whatsoever 
to these men and al-Qaeda and the Talihan. 

Mr. Delahunt. I think that is really important, because what we 
are hearing today from Members of this body is that there are 
links. Let’s start to disassemble that inaccurate statement. I thank 
you. 

Ms. Baker Manning. Thank you, sir. That is just wrong. 

One of the interesting things that we have seen since the four 
men were released to Bermuda is, if you read your paper yester- 
day, you will see a number of articles reporting statements, report- 
ing the things that they have never been able to tell the world, 
things they have been telling me for years: We had never heard of 
al-Qaeda until we were questioned about al-Qaeda in Guantanamo. 

The great majority of them had never even heard of ETIM until 
they were questioned by interrogators about ETIM. These are im- 
portant things. 

Mr. Delahunt. I am going to, because I have been interrupting 
you, I am going to ask you just to wrap up right now because I 
want to give my time and his time to the gentleman from Cali- 
fornia. But I know he will have a number of questions to you. 

[The prepared statement of Susan Baker Manning follows:] 



67 


Testimony of Susan Baker Manning 
Before the 

Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and 
Oversight 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 


Hearing on 

Exploring the Nature Uighur 
Nationalism: Freedom Fighters or 
Terrorists? 


June 16, 2009 


Good morning Chainnan Delahunt, Ranking Member Rohrabacher, tuid all members of 
the Subcommittee. My name is Susan Baker Manning, and I am a partner with Bingham 
McCutclien. I want to tliank you for holding this hearing — botli for me, for my four 
clients recently freed to Bennuda, and for the 13 imiocent Uighur men who languish in 
Guantanamo. T am extremely grateful for your leadership in examining the important 
issues before the Subcommittee today, including the role of Chinese government 
propaganda in rationalizing the detention of the Uighurs at Guantanamo Bay. 

For over four years a team of Bingham attorneys and staff have acted as pro hono counsel 
to two of the thirteen Uighur men incarcerated toda\ at Guantantuno Bay. as well as all 
four Uighur men who were granted refuge in Bermuda last week. We have litigated their 
cases vigorously at eveiy- level of the federal courts, including the Supreme Court where 
wc arc currently seeking review. We have become intimately familiar with what is — and, 
equally importcuit, what is not — supported by die evidence. Eveiy- federal court that has 
looked at the evidence has ailed for the Uighurs. 

Tlie first federal court to do so was the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit. It issued a detailed opinion in Parhal v. Gales. 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. 

Cir. 2008), analyzing the administration's evidence (classified and unclassified) 
regarding the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (“ETIM”). The unanimous panel — made 
up of two Republican appointees and one Democratic appointee — vacated Huzaifa 
Parhat's enemy combatant classification. It held that there was no evidence that 
Mr. Parhat was a member of ETIM. no credible evidence that ETIM was associated widi 
either al Qaeda or the Taliban, nor credible evidence that ETIM had ever fought the U.S. 
Tlie Court rejected the government's ETIM evidence as wholly inadequate and likely 
little more than anti-Uighur propaganda by the Chinese govemment. 

The D.C. Circuit ordered the government to release Mr. Parhat, to transfer him, or 
conduct another CSRT. The government conceded tliat tliere was no purpose to holding 


A.’7;l066113. 



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cuiotlier CSRT for Mr. Parhat. Nevertlieless, it imprisoned him at Gutuitanamo until last 
Thursdax' when it finally trtuisferred him and tiiree others to Benmida for release. 

Background 

Before I discuss the Parhat case in more detail. I'd like to remind the Subcommittee of 
some of the undisputed facts in the Uighur cases. In 2002. twenty-two Uighurs were sent 
to Guantanamo. Most had been present together in a Uighur village m the mountains of 
Afghanistan. All were sold to U.S. forces by bounty hunters. In 200.^, five of the twenty- 
two were detennuied not to be enemy combatants, while the remaining seventeen were 
mislabeled enemy combatants even though the facts were the same as to all. However, 
the seventeen Uighur men have been exonerated repeatedly — by the U.S. military, by the 
Bush administration, and by multiple federal eourts. Specifically: 

• The military itself has cleared all ofthe Uighurs for release. Most of 
them were cleared for release six years ago, in 2003. 

• The Bush administration has conceded that none ofthe seventeen Uighur 
men classified as ‘‘enemy combatants" was in fact enemy combatant. It 
made that concession in tlie fall of 2008 after imprisoning them for over 
seven years. 

• Noting the government's concession that none ofthe Uighurs are enemy 
combatants, the U. S. District Court for tlie District of Columbia held that 
there is no lawful basis for imprisoning noncombatant Uighurs at 
Guantanamo. Although the district court’s release order was overturned 
on appeal, the finding that the Uighurs’ imprisonment is unlawful remains 
undisturbed. 

• It IS recognized at every- level ofthe U.S. govemmeiit that the only reason 
the Uighurs have been imprisoned long after being cleared for release is 
that they camiot be lawfully returned to China, where they would likely 
be tortured or killed. 

• In 2006. the government released five of the Uighurs to Albania on the 
eve of an appellate court hearing regarding the legality^ of their continued 
detention. They hav^c been living pcaccfiil productive liv^cs ever smcc. 

One was just granted pemianent asylum m Sweden. 

There has been an enormous amount of misinformation spread recently about the 
Uighuis. But the basic facts of these cases arc well known and beyond dispute. Let me 
talk about those facts for a moment. 

• The Uighurs are not terrorists. None has ever engaged in or planned any 
sort of terrorist activity, or been accused of terrorist activity. 

This is unciispured. 

• None ofthe Uighurs has ever engaged in hostilities against the U.S. 

None has ever contemplated engaging in hostilities against the U.S . 


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69 


Page 3 


None has even been accused of contemplating liostiles against the U.S. 
This loo is undispiiled. 

• Most of the Uighiirs had never even heard of the ETIM until they were 
questioned about it b\ U.S. interrogators. Nor had they heard of al 
Qaeda. 

• None of the Uighurs have undergone terrorist training. Many of tiiem 
were previously accused of having obtained ‘iiiilitary trainmg" because 
they were shown how to break down and reassemble a single Kalashnikov 
rifle. Some, but not all, fired two or three bullets at a target. Tocalltliat 
‘military training" or ‘icrrorist training" is absurd. In this country, such 
conduct would be protected b\ die Second Amendment. In 
Afghanistan — a country that had no effective government, much less a 
police force, in 2001 — is certainly unremarkable. 

• None were in a "terrorist training" camp. In the fall of 2001, eighteen 
Uighurs — including all of the men now living peacefully in Albania or 
Bermuda — were in a Uighur expatriate village in the mountains of 
Afghiuiisttui. It is imdisputed that die so-called "camp" had only Uighurs. 
There were no Taliban or al Qaeda tliere. Moreover, what happened there 
was not '"training." 

• The Uighur men at Guantaiituiio object to die oppression of dieir people 
by the Chinese government, and to Chinese human rights abuses. But so 
does the U.S. govermnent. 

• ETIM was placed on die exclusion list after die Uigliur men at Gitiiio had 
been in U.S. custody for over ayear. This was part of the Bush 
administration’s quid pro quo for Chma’s support of the Iraq war. 

The D.C. Circuit’s f/utc.v Opinion 

When Congress purported to strip the federal courts of Jurisdiction over Guantanamo 
habeas claims — an effort die Supreme Court found unconstitutional in Bonmediene v. 
Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008) — it created a new cause of action under the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005 that allowed any detainee to challenge his classification as an 
enemy combatant. In 2006 my firm filed a case on behalf of Huzaifa Parhat and other 
Uighum that became a lead DTA case. 

Under the DTA, the D C. Circuit had jurisdiction to consider three specific issues, one of 
which was whether the decision of a Combatant Status Review Tribunal ("CSRT") to 
label the detainee an '"enemy combatant" was supported by a preponderance of the 
evidence.' It took well over a year of DTA litigation to obtam even one page of 


’ Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § l()()5(e)(2)(C). 


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evidence that purported to justifv' the Mr. Parhat's imprisonment. Wlien counsel finally 
received the records of his CSRT, vve immediately moved for judgment due to the lack of 
evidence. 

Tlic key facts were undisputed: 

• ‘‘It IS undisputed that | Parhat | is not a member of al Qaida or the Taliban, and 
diat he has never participated in any hostile action against tlie United States or its 
allies."' 

• There was ‘‘no source document evidence was introduced to indicate ... tliat tlie 
Detainee had actually Joined ETIM, or that he himself had personally committed 
any hostile acts against the United States or its coalition partners[.J"'' 

• "No evidence was introduced to support" tlie proposition tliat ETIM was 
focusing its efforts on the United States "or that the Detainee himself had played 
any role in doing so; in fact the Detainee denied tliat he considered tlie United 
States an enemy.“^ 

• "I T |he Tribunal was presented with no evidence that the Detamee had any 
involvement witli any ETIM operations targeting United States' interests or tliose 
of its allies[-j"' 

As the Court noted, the Tribunal had based its decision to classify’ Mr. Parhat as an 
enemy combatant on its finding tliat he was "affiliated witli forces associated with al 
Qaida and tlie Taliban (i.e., tlie East Turkistan Islamic Movement,) that are engaged in 
hostilities against the United States and its coalition partners."^ 


■ Parhat. 532 F,3d at 835-36. As Mr. Parhat and Ins companions have repeatedly stated 
since being freed in Bemiuda. tliey had never even heard of al Qaeda until after they 
arrived in Guantanamo. Sec. e.g.. Jonathan Kent, "We’d never heard of al Qaeda," THE 
Royai. Ga/,KTTK (Jnne 13, 2009), available at wvvw.rova1gazette.com/ 
siftolotrv.rovaluazette/Articlc/article.isD?articleId=7d966a73003001e&sectionld=60 : For 
Gitmo Uighurs, new life is no walk on the beach, ClIRIS'l'IAN SciliNCK MONI'IOR (June 
15, 2009), available al littp://\vv\\v.csmomtor.coni/2009/0616/p06s04-\\ oeu.html . 

’ Id. at 843, 

^ Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (unclassified), Parhat v. 
Gates, No. 06-1397 (D.C. Cir. filed Jan. 7, 2009) (quoting Tribunal statement of 
decision). 

"Id. 

Id. at 843 (quoting Tribunal Staternent of Decision) (internal quotations omitted). 


fupi HP A'73066n3.l 




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Page 5 


But as the Tribunal itself acknowledged, tlie ETIM allegation was itself not reliable. Tlie 
Tribunal President w rote; 

Tlic Tribunal found the Detainee to be enemy combatant 
because of his apparent ETIM affiliation ... (as ETIM 
is apparently associated with al Qaida cuid Taliban 
because they have received support from them), but 
despite tlie fact tliat the ETIM is said to be making plans 
for future terrorist activities against U.S. interests, no 
source document evidence was introduced to indicate 
whether or how this group has actually done so. that the 
Detainee has actually Joined ETIM. or that he himself 
had personally committed any hostile acts against the 
United Stales or its coalition partners. 

The Court found tlie Tribimal's rationale for labeling Mr. Parhat an enemy combatant 
wanting: 


The Tribunal's determination that Parhat is an enemy 
combatant is based on its finding that he is "affiliated" 
with a Uighur independence group, and the further 
finding that tlie group was "associated" with al Qaida 
and the Taliban. Tlie Tribuiiars findings regardmg the 
Uighur group rest, in key respects, on statements in 
classified State and Defense Department documents that 
provide no information regarding the sources of the 
reporting upon which tlic statements arc based, and 
odierwise lack sufficient indicia of tlie statements' 
reliability. Parhat contends, with support of his own, that 
the Chinese government is the source of several of the 
key statements.^ 

The Court rejected the Tribunal’s finding as unfounded. As noted above, it was 
undisputed that Mr. Parhat was not a member of ETIM.^ As to the claims that ETIM is 
'‘associated" wdth al Qaeda, or that ETIM had engaged in hostiles with U.S. or coalition 
forces, die former administration relied on four classified documents. Altliough the 
public unclassified version of the Parhat opinion redacts the Court’s specific discussion 
of these documents, its overall analysis is instructive. In short it rejected goveniment 
say-so. 


’’ hi. at 836 (emphasis added). See also id. at 834 (also noting lack of evidence 
connecting Mr. Parhat with ETIM), 

® Id. at 843 ("no source document evidence was introduced to indicate ... tliat [ParhatJ had 
actually joined ETIM"). The Court did not rule upon the government’s giiilt-by- 
association theory^ tliat being present in the same Uighur village as an alleged ETIM 
member could constitute an "affiliation’’ between Parhat mid ETIM. See id. at 844. 


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Page 6 


The dociunents make assertions — often in haec verba — 
about activities undertaken by ETIM, and about that 
organization’s relationship to al Qaida and the Taliban. 

Tlic doaimcnts repeatedly describe tliose activities and 
relationsliips as having '‘reportedly” occurred, as being 
■‘said to” or "reported to” have happened, and as things 
that "may” be true or arc "suspected of having taken 
place. But in virtually every instance, the documents do 
not say who "reported” or "said” or "suspected” tliose 
things. [J Nor do they provide any of the underlying 
reporting upon which the documents’ bottom-line 
assertions arc founded, nor any assessment of the 
reliability of that reporting.'^ 

The Court was umnoved by tlie govenmient claim that repetition of tliese assertions was 
an indication of their reliability: "Lewis Carroll notwithstanding, the fact that the 
govemmeni has "said it thrice” does not make an allegation true.”"’ Nor did it fmd 
persuasive the government claim tliat assertions must be true because they appeared in 
Defense Department mid State Department documents. "Tliis conies perilously close to 
suggesting that whateverthe government says must be treated as truc[.J”“ 

Tlic D.C. Circuit made it clear that it would act as a court of law, insist that evidentiary^ 
standards be met, and — importantly — not accept Chinese propaganda imcritically: 

Insistence that the Tribunal and court have an 
opportunity^ to assess the reliability- of the record 
evidence is not simply a tlieoretical exercise. Parhat 
contends that the ultimate source of key assertions in the 
four intelligence documents is the government of the 
People's Republic of China, and he offers substantial 
support for diat contention. [] Parhat fuitlier maintains 
tliat Cliinese reporting on the subject of tlie Uighurs 
cannot be regarded as objective, and offers substantial 
support for tliat proposition as wclLfl'' 


'Id. at 846-47. 

Id. at 848-49 (quoting Lewis Carroll, The Hunting of the Snark 3 (1876) ("I have said it 
thrice: Wliat I tell you three times is true.”)). 

Id. at 849 (also noting the repeated use of qualifiers and the lack of any reliability- 
assessment). 

’* Id. at 848 (classified footnotes oinittcd). 


liapi HP 

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Because the Court found tliat the Tribiuial's decision was not supported by credible 
evidence, it vacated Mr. Parhat's enemy combatant classification tuid ordered the 
govcmmcnl to '‘release Parhal, to iraiisfei him, or to expeditiously convene a new 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal to consider evidence submitted in a manner consistent 
witli this opinion. On August 4, 2008, the government conceded tliat it would not rc- 
eSRT Parhat.'"* It imprisoned him for another year until transferrmg him to Bermuda for 
release on June 11,2009. 

Other Evidence of the U.S. Military’s Reliance on Chinese Propaganda. 

Although the documents in the Parhal case cited bv the Court with regard to Chinese 
propaganda were classified, at least one Uighur CSRT hearing record had an unclassified 
description of how ETIM had “allegedly" been involved in terrorist acts within China, 
and was “allegedly” connected to al Qaeda. The document's source? Tlie Chinese 
Tnfonnation Office of the State Council. It was propaganda top to bottom — and yet it 
was part of die rationale for imprisoning tuiotlier of ni\ Uighur clients at Guantanamo. 

The U.S. Government Conceded That None of the Uighurs are Enemy Combatants. 

Ever)' one of the Uighur men was labeled tui “enem\' combatmit” based on the same 
tenuous alleged affiliation with ETIM the Court analyzed and rejected in Parhat. In the 
wake of the D.C. Circuit's decision, the Bush administration conceded that none of the 
Uighur men were enemy combatants. ' It could not connect of the Uighurs at 


at 836. 

Petition For Rehearing at 1-2, Parhatv. Gates, No. 06-1397 (D.C. Cir, filed Aug. 4. 
2008) (“After reviewing this Court’s decision, the government has dctcmiincd that it 
would SCR'C no useful purpose to engage m further litigation over his status. As the Court 
is aware, the government had concluded tliat Parhat should be cleared for release, and it 
has now determined that it whll treat Parhat as if he were no longer an enemy 
combataiitr.l”). 

Combatant Status Review Tribunal hearing record for Edham Mamet (ISN 102) at 
Exhibit R-5 (unclassified), Mamet v. Bush, No. 05-1602 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 29, 2005). 

See Government's Motion to Enter Judgment from Parhal v. Gales in These Aetions. 
With Modification, and to Remove from Oral Argument Calendar at 4, Abchil Semetv. 
Gates, era/.. Nos. 07-1509, 07-1510, 07-1511, 07-1512 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 18, 2008) 
(conceding non-combatant status as to four Uighur men); Judgment. Abdul Semet v. 
Gales. e/c?/.,Nos. 07-1509, 07-1510, 07-1511, 07-1512 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 12,2008) 
(granting government motion and vacating enemy combatant classification of four 
Uighur men); Notice Of Status, la re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation (a.k.a. 
Kiyembav. Bush). Misc.No. 08-442 (TFH). 05-1509 (RMU). 05-1602 (RMU), 05-1704 
(RMU), 05-2370 (RMU), 05-2398 (RMU), and 08-1310 (RMU) (D.D.C. filed Sept. 30. 
2008) (conceded that none of the 12 other Uighur men were enemy combatants either). 


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Page 8 


Guaiittuiaiiio with ETIM. tuid made no attempt to prove any connection between ETIM 
cuid our enemies. Four of the men have been released to Bermuda, but tlie other tliirteen 
remain imprisoned at Guaiitaiiaino. 

President Obama specifically noted in his May 21, 2009 on detainee issues that the courts 
had ordered tlie executive branch to release the 17 Uighur men. The President also 
confinned his intention to release the cleared Uighur men: 'The United States is a nation 
of laws, and wc must abide by these ailings.” 

I submit to you tliat the President is exactly right. If we respect the Constitution and tlie 
rule of law, this country ctuuiot continue to knowing imprison innocent men for even 
another day. Chinese propaganda w'as used to rationalize the imprisonment of men who 
should never hav-e been at Guantanamo at all. Releasing all of the Uighurs now is one of 
the most important steps tlie American government could take to reject China's 
maiiipLiiation of tlie ‘'war on terror,” and its false claim that Uighur political dissent is a 
form of terrorism. 

Conclusions and Recommendations 

The prison at Guantcuiamo Bay has become notorious — tlie best recruiting poster our 
enemies could ever have imagined. President Obama has ordered that it be closed, and 
has made clear that his administration w'ill work with Congress as it takes the necessary^ 
steps to carry out his Executive Order, But the issues facing the administration and 
Congress are not simple, and are made more difficidt by misinformation about die 
detainees. This Subcommittee's hearings are tui important tool for bringing tlie tmtli to 
light. 

My colleagues and I hav^c known the Uighur men for several years now. But until a few 
days ago. the only Americans who did were their guards mid us. To tins day the 
Department of Defense refuses to allow any detainee to speak with the press or have his 
picture taken. The Uighurs, like other men at Guantanamo, arc faceless — and tlicrcforc 
profoundly dchtmiaiiizcd. 

Now that four Uighur men have been released to Bermuda, the world can see them for 
w^ho they really are. Chainnan Delahunt and Ranking Member Rohrabacher, I urge you 
to go to Bermuda to meet the Uighur men. Talk witli tlicm yourselves. It is critical tliat 
Members of Congress from both sides of the isle imderstmid who we are really talking 
about here. Only then will Congress be able to make fully informed decisions on critical 
issues related to the upcoming closure of Guantanamo Bay, and to our nation's detention 
policies going fonvard. 

Tliank you for diis opportimity to speak with y ou. 


Attachments: 

• Parhal v. Gales, 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (unclassified opinion) 

• Combatant Status Review Tribunal hearing record for Edliani Mamet (ISN 102) 
at Exliibit R-5 (imclassified),M7/wei v. Bush. No. 05-1602 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 29, 
2005) (relying on and citing Chinese government propaganda re ETIM) 


Hapi HP 


A'730(;(;ii3.i 



75 


Mr. Delahunt. But I did read those statements, that according 
to these individuals, they had never heard of al-Qaeda, they had 
never heard of this so-called ETIM or ETIP. It seems to have 
changed names according to the need of the moment. But we will 
get back to you. 

Let me just conclude with my friend from Washington, DC, and 
I would ask him to be concise so that we can let Congressman 
Rohrabacher have 20 minutes or so, whatever he needs. And I 
want to assure the rest of the panel over here I don’t intend to pose 
questions until everyone else has an opportunity, so I will try to 
bat clean-up. Bruce. 

STATEMENT OF BRUCE FEIN, ESQ., PRINCIPAL, THE 
LITCHFIELD GROUP 

Mr. Fein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be brief, as a 
concession to the shortness of life, about the importance of these 
issues that you have addressed today. 

I want initially to begin to suggest that the Founding Fathers 
would be shocked at the necessity of this hearing. I think also this 
committee and the Congress is responsible for the fact that it was 
the executive branch that was enabled to unilaterally label this 
group as a terrorist organization without any due process of the 
law. This Congress today could end that. 

You just pass a bill I could draft in 10 minutes that says no mon- 
eys in the IJnited States can be utilized to list ETIM as a terrorist 
organization. It is another example of how over the years Congress 
has forfeited its obligation to police national security matters to the 
executive branch. 

Why did you authorize this monstrous violation of due process of 
law, this listing in secret? No one has an opportunity to defend. No 
judicial review anywhere. That is the responsibility of this Con- 
gress to take this power back. And the abuse is there, because you 
let the executive branch get away with it. That is the first thing 
to remember. All this pointing the finger at Bush and Obama and 
whatever, the buck stops here. We the people are sovereign. 

The second thing I want to say is we need to remember who we 
are as a people. This hearing is about the United States of Amer- 
ica, every bit as much as it is about the Uighurs, what we stand 
for as principles. 

And let me just give a personal — you know I grew up in Concord 
where you did, Mr. Chairman. One of the first things I memorized 
was the Concord Hymn: 

By the rude bridge that arched the flood. 

Their flag to April’s breeze unfurled. 

Here once the embattled farmers stood. 

And fired the shot heard round the world. 

And we wrote in our own charter, the Declaration of Independ- 
ence, the circumstance that justified rising up against a govern- 
ment that was violating those unalienable rights to life, liberty and 
the pursuit of happiness and establishing a new government. And 
it says when you are subject to a long train of abuses that evince 
a design to reduce the people to tyranny, you not only have a right, 
a duty to revolt. 



76 


And let’s apply that standard to the Uighurs here and what ter- 
minology accurately describes them. Now, Ms. Kadeer should be 
there with Lexington Green with those other eight who died at the 
Battle of Lexington and Concord, rather than listed as an associa- 
tion of some kind of terrorist organization. 

We, the United States people, said we have a right to revolt if 
we are denied right to jury trial, if the prologue legislatures to dis- 
tant places, if there is a subordination of the civil authority to the 
military authority, if there is no independent judiciary. These are 
trifles compared to what the Uighurs are suffering. They don’t get 
any trial at all, not to say a jury trial. Do they get to elect their 
leaders? No taxation without representation was the cause of our 
revolution. They don’t get any vote at all in any circumstances 
whatsoever. 

And I think that we have come as a Nation — it is not just the 
Uighurs — to embody the psychology of the empire instead of recog- 
nizing the roots, who we are as a people. Why are we selling these 
people who have the same right we had to throw off the bonds of 
vassalage, and we are criticizing them because they may voice pro- 
test, even though it is largely nonviolent. 

We have Sheila Jackson Lee. Mr. Ellison, remember John Brown 
at Harpers Ferry? That became the Battle Hymn of the Republic. 
Are you going sit there and do nothing in consequence of this enor- 
mous oppression? The fact that the United States of America re- 
fused — not only the executive branch but the Congress could have 
enacted a law that says those 17 Uighurs are hereby permanent 
residents of the United States — did nothing, that is a disgrace. 

We care more about the Chinese buying our bonds than showing 
our true character? That is a disgrace. I am humiliated to be an 
American associated with that. We go to Bermuda and Palau. We 
have all the power in the world to defend ourselves. It just to me 
it is an insult. 

And the last thing. It is the United States of America and our 
character that is at issue here. The Uighurs should not have to go 
through this again. We should not have the executive branch being 
able to list these people as terrorists, or anybody else, without any 
due process of law. 

We had that in our own experience in the United States. It was 
called McCarthyism. We used to have a list of subversive organiza- 
tions that the Attorney General promulgated without any due proc- 
ess, and it was held illegal by the United States Supreme Court, 
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath. And we got rid 
of that. 

We should know by now when you give authority to do things in 
secret, the danger will be inflated and it will be manipulated and 
there will not be justice. 

I will stop now and take questions there, but I can’t empha- 
size — 

Mr. Delahunt. I am thinking you should just keep rolling on, 
Mr. Fein. 

Mr. Fein. And the last thing is, again, this is the mentality of 
the people. To a hammer everything looks like a nail; to a 
counterterrorist, everything looks like a terrorist. And that is why 
you need checks. That is why you need due process of law here. 



77 


And we just think about a comparison today. We find in the streets 
of Tehran people are rising up and saying, no, their election was 
fraudulent. The United States isn’t condemning these people as ter- 
rorists. Well, they don’t even have elections in Xinjiang. At least 
they had the pro forma pretense in Iran. And we even have the au- 
dacity to suggest they are terrorists. I won’t say anymore because 
I think our own history speaks for itself. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fein follows:] 


STATEMENT OF BRUCE FEIN 


RE: EXPLORING THE NATURE OF UIGHUR NATIONALISM: FREEDOM 
FIGHTERS OR TERRORISTS 


BEFORE THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE 


JUNE 16, 2009 



78 


Dear Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to share my views on Uighur nationalism as either an 
expression of the natural right to establish a government to secure unalienable 
rights to hfe, hberty, and the pursuit of happiness enshrined in the United States 
Declaration of Independence, or as terrorism. I am convinced the facts best fit the 
former characterization. A few pages of history are worth volumes of logic on that 
score. 

The Declaration defines the circumstances when a people hke the Uighurs 
enjoy not only a right but are saddled with a duty to overthrow an oppressive 
government aimed to reduce them to vassalage; and, to establish new forms that 
will secure their unalienable rights: 

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unahenable Rights, that among 
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights. 
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed, — That whenever any Form of Government becomes 
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to 
institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing 
its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and 
Happiness. . . [Wlhen a long train of abuses and usui-pations, pursuing invariably the 
same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their 



79 


right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for 
their future security.” Exemplary of King George Ill’s despotism that justified the 
American Revolutionary War were denial of jury trial, a subservience of civil to 
mihtary authority, taxation without representation, and a pliable judiciary. 

By any reasonable interpretation of the Declaration of Independence, 
UIghurs have suffered persecution at the hands of the Chinese government to 
justify a resort to force. Consider the foUomng. 

Oppressed Uighurs in East Turkestan (China’s Xinjiang province) are 
neglected relics of the “big power” politics that informed the 1945 Yalta 
Conference’s cynical division of Europe and Asia. As President George W. Bush 
declared in Riga, Latvia on May 6, 2005, “[T]he Yalta Conference was a huge 
mistake in history.” And Uighur subjugation under Chinese Communist (PRC) 
tyranny has intensified. 

The Uighur people occupy a comer of Central Asia called “Xinjiang or the 
New Territory” by the PRC. During the Nineteenth Century, they were a pawn in 
the hands of the Russian and British Empires. Sporadic uprisings against their 
oppressors eventuated in the short hved establishment of an independent Uighur 
repubhc in 1944. But Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin quickly exerted control over the 
new repubhc through KGB infiltration of the Uighur leadership. As a derivative of 
the Yalta Conference, Stahn signed the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty on August 
14, 1945, which sold out the independent East Turkestan to China. The United 
States acquiesced because it wished to strengthen the hand of Generahssimo 



80 


Chiang Kai Sheik in his civil war with Communist Mao Tse Tung. Further, the 
United States then thought that the Soviet Union would be a cooperative partner in 
advancing its policies in the Far East. The 1945 Pact was followed by the Sino- 
Soviet Treaty inked by Stalin and Mao in Moscow on February 14, 1950, which 
extinguished any idea of an independent Uighur repubhc for the duration of the 
Cold War. Chairman Mao is said to have clucked, “Xinjiang is a colony, a Chinese 
colony.” 

The Berlin Wall fell in 1989. Central and Eastern Europe escaped from 
Soviet clutches. In 1991, the Soviet Union disintegrated. Uighurs believed their 
hour was at hand. In April 1990, they organized the Barin Uprising, followed by a 
large scale non-violent demonstration in the Hotan region in 1995. From February 
5-7, 1997, Uighurs in Ih region demonstrated peacefully for freedom from Chinese 
rule. The PRC crushed the demonstration with mihtary force slaying 407 unarmed 
civihans. Many Uighurs were an-ested and sentenced to execution within seven 
days. 

With the witting or unwdtting assistance of the United States, Uighur 
persecution has climbed since the 1997 atrocities. In the aftermath of 9/11 and to 
ehcit the PRC’s non-opposition to invading Iraq, the United States designated the 
East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIM), a phantom organization, as a foreign terrorist 
organization in August 2002. The PRC exulted at the counter-terrorist pretext 
available to destroy Uighurs and their non-Han Chinese culture. Uighur activists 
were falsely accused of terrorism and executed. The Uighur language was purged 



81 


from the classroom and cultural events. At a meeting of the National People’s 
Congress on January 18, 2008, Mr. Rozi Ismail, head of the Department of Justice 
in Xinjiang, reported more than one thousand pohtical cases during the previous 
five years. More than 15,000 Uighurs had heen arrested and sentenced to prison for 
a term of years, for hfe, or for execution. 

Since 2002, the PRC has forcibly relocated young Uighur women. In 2007, 
the number of relocations surpassed 1.5 miUion, and approximately 130,000 had 
been directly relocated to Han Chinese regions, such as Tianjin, Shandong, Jiansu, 
etc. Of that number, more than 80% were Uighur women. During the last three 
years, relocations reached 3.3 million, and more than 90,000 were moved directly as 
cheap labor to factories in Chinese villages and hamlets. At the same time, the PRC 
dispatched large numbers of Han Chinese in the opposite direction to achieve 
demographic ethnic cleansing. The United States has remained largely mum to 
avoid friction with the PRC and jeopardizing its financing of staggering United 
States debt. 

The State Department’s 2007 human rights report on China documents a 
government campaign of discrimination and persecution of Uighurs and the 
destruction of their cultural identity by changing the demographics in favor of the 
Han Chinese in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). 

The report relates: “Racial discrimination was the source of deep resentment 
in some areas, such as the XUAR, Inner Mongolia, and Tibetan areas... 



82 


The government’s policy to encourage Han migration into minority areas 
resulted in significant increases in the population of the Han Chinese in the 
XUAR... 

The migration of the ethnic Han into the XUAR in recent decades caused the 
Han-Uighur ratio in the capital of Urumqi to shift from 20 to 80 to 80 to 20 and was 
a deep source of Uighur resentment. Discriminatory hiring practices gave 
preference to Han and discouraged joh prospects for ethnic minorities... 

The XUAR government tightened measures that diluted expressions of 
Uighur identity, including measures to reduce education in ethnic minority 
languages and to institute language requirements that disadvantage ethnic 
minority teachers... 

Since 2001 authorities have increased repression in the XUAR, targeting in 
particular the region’s ethnic Uighur population. In January XUAR Party 
Secretary Wang Lequan again urged government organs to crack down on the ‘three 
forces’ of rehgious extremism, ‘sphttism,’ and terrorism, and to ‘firmly establish the 
idea that stability overrides all.’ It was sometimes difficult to determine whether 
raids, detentions, and judicial punishments directed at individuals or organizations 
suspected of promoting the ‘three forces,’ w^ere instead actually used to target those 
peacefully seeking to express their political or rehgious views. The government 
continued to repress Uighurs expressing peaceful political dissent and independent 



83 


Muslim religious leaders, sometimes citing counterterrorism as the reason for 
taking action... 

Uighurs were sentenced to long prison terms, and in some cases executed, on 
charges of separatism. On February 8, authorities executed Ismail Semed, an 
ethnic Uighur from the XUAR, following convictions in 2005 for ‘attempting to spht 
the motherland’ and other counts related to possession of firearms and explosives. 
During his trial, Semed claimed that his confession was coerced... On April 19, 
foreign citizen Huseyin CeUl was sentenced to life in prison for allegedly plotting to 
split the country and 10 years in prison for belonging to a terrorist organization, 
reportedly after being extradited from Uzbekistan and tortured into giving a 
confession... During the year the government reportedly sought the repatriation of 
Uighurs Living outside the country, where they faced the risk of persecution... 

Possession of publications or audiovisual materials discussing independence 
or other sensitive subjects was not permitted. According to reports, possession of 
such materials resulted in lengthy prison sentences.” 

In sum, Uighurs in the XUAR are denied every human right protected by the 
United States Constitution, including self-government, freedom of speech, freedom 
of religion, freedom of association, freedom of press, due process, protection against 
invidious discrimination, ex post facto laws, torture and arbitrary detention. 

The United States acknowledges the repression of Uighurs by refusing its 
requests for repatriation. Uighurs have a weU founded fear of torture or 



84 


persecution based on ethnicity, religion, or political belief. The United States has 
released five Uighurs from Guantanamo Bay, but dispatched them to Albania. 

The Government of China alleges that many Uighurs are part of ETIM, 
which was listed by the Secretary of State under Executive Order 13224 on 
September 3, 2002. Whether such a group constitutes a genuine terrorist 
organization is doubtful. A story in The Washington Post (December 5, 2006, A13), 
reported that then Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Ai’mitage met with 
Chinese officials in Beijing in late August 2002 to discuss Iraq. He said at the time 
that ETIM was placed on the foreign terrorist hst by President Bush after months 
of discussions with China, while making clear that China should respect the human 
rights of its minority Uighur population. 

‘‘They had been after us to put ETIM on the list,” Armitage said in a recent 
interview. He said the decision did not have anything to do with winning China’s 
tacit approval with the Iraq invasion. “But at the time, we didn’t know when we 
were going to invade Iraq. It was done in response to information gathered by the 
intelhgence group.” 

Internationally recognized East-West Center’s study on separatist 
movements in Xinjiang observed a cynical transformation in rhetoric between 
China’s pre-9/1 1 and post-9/1 1 view of the threat raised by Uighurs. 

In welcoming Chinese and international trade partners to the Urumqi trade 
fair on September 2, 2001, Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang Lequan together with 



85 


Abdulahat Abdurishit proclaimed that the situation in Xinjiang was “better than 
ever in history.” While mentioning separatism, they stressed that “society is stable 
and people are living and working in peace and contentment.” 

In the aftermath of 9/11, “the official line on Xinjiang” somersaulted. “PRC 
pronouncements began to stress the threat of ‘terrorism’ in Xinjiang as China’s 
leadership maneuvered to position itself ‘side by side with the United States in the 
war against terror.’ This apparently required a revision of the official description of 
separatists in Xinjiang. What had generally heen described as a handful of 
separatists was now a full-blown terrorist organization.” 

President Bush met with a Uighur human rights activist, Rebiya Kadeer, on 
July 29, 2008 in the White House to honor her courage and convictions. She does 
not believe that ETIM even exists, at least as a Uighur organization. She had 
contributed the following article to National Review Online on September 14, 2005: 


I am a terrorist. I would argue that I'm not. but because the Chinese 
government says lam a terrorist, it must be true... 

The Chinese authorities sent me to prison for eight years in 1999 
because I'd sent newspaper articles to my husband in America about 
the plight of the Uyghur people. They accused me of "leaking state 
secrets to foreign organizations. " Td used my status as a successful 
businesswoman — once lauded by the same people who later 
imprisoned me — to work for the protection of Uyghurs' human rights. 
The Chinese government was so terrided I might say .something that 
impugned their infallibility, they arrested me just as I was about to 
meet a US. congressional research committee in my hometown of 
Urumchi .. 

When I was released, I was warned not to speak on behalf of the 
Uyghur people when I came to America, or my children and by 



86 


business would be "finished. "I think they were trying to scare me, and 
to give credit where credit is due, they did. True to them word, they 
consequently ransacked my oSice and dragged away two former 
colleagues who are still in detention. They accused me of owing 
millions in debts and taxes, and threatened to break every one of my 
son's ribs if he cbdn't sign a statement saying this was "true." Who 
wouldn 't be scared by that?... 

I have been terrified for young Uyghur mothers who become pregnant 
when the Chinese government .say they shouldn't! and I have been 
horrified when their pregnancies have been forcibly terminated. 1 have 
been terrified for the Uyghurs' ancient culture! and watched horrifed 
as the Chinese authorities have stooped to burning Uyghur books. 1 
have been terrified for those Uyghurs who have stood up and objected! 
and been horrified when they have been executed as "terrorists. " And 
yes, I have been horrified by the treatment of my friends and family.... 

On July 10, 2008, the Uighur Ameiican Association issued the following 

press release emblematic of Chinese Communist repression of Uighurs: 


According to Chinese state media reports, five Uyghurs were shot to 
death by pohce in Urumchi, the regional capital of East Turkistan (also 
known as Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) on July 9. The Xinhua 
News Agency reported that the £ve were members of a 15-member 
criminal gang, including five women and 10 men, that had trained for 
“holy war” and had melded knives, injuring one policeman, during the 
raid. Two other Uyghurs were said to have been injured in the raid 
Xinhua also reported that three men in the group had been implicated 
in a recent stabbing at a beauty salon in Urumchi... 

In recent months, as the Beijing Olympic Games have drawn closer, 
officials in the People’s Bepubhc of China (PRC) have intensified the 
persecution of Uyghurs in East Turkistan, while simultaneously 
ratcheting up claims of Uyghur terrorism and rehgious extremism. 

The Uyghur American Association (UAA) has learned of unofficial 
accounts of the Urumchi raid that are at odds with the official version 
of events. According to these accounts, the 15 young Uyghurs were not 
religious extremists, and were merely gathered peacefully in an 
apartment in the Chen Guang residential area of Urumchi... 

UAA calls upon the PRC government to provide evidence to the 
international community regarding its allegations of the criminal 



87 


nature of the 15 Uyghurs, and to ensure that any criminal proceedings 
carried out with regard to the ten surviving Uyghurs are held in a free 
and fair court, in accordance with international legal norms... 

Also on July 9. a court in Kashgar, in the southern part of East 
Turkestan, sentenced live Uyghurs to death out of a group of 15. Two 
of the live were shot to death immediately after being sentenced, and 
the other three were sentenced to be executed after a two-year 
reprieve. The remaining 10 Uyghurs were sentenced to hfe 
imprisonment. AB 15 were convicted of terrorism charges... 

“As the Olympics approach, instead of showing progress in its 
treatment of Uyghur people and enhancing the transparency of its 
judicial system, the PRC is clamping down even harder and using 
executions and imprisonment to choke off peaceful Uyghur dissent,” 
said Ms. Kadeer. ” 

In recent years, and particularly in the past few months, using 
'terrorisin' as a justiScation. Beijing has undertaken a renewed, 
systematic, and sustained crackdown on all forms of Uyghur dissent in 
East Turkestan. . . . 

The persecution of Uighurs did not alleviate in 2008. The State 
Department’s Country report elaborates: 

“Executions of Uighurs whom authorities accused of separatism, but 
which some observers claimed were pohtically motivated, were 
reported during prior reporting periods. In February 2007 authorities 
executed Ismail Semed. an ethnic Uighur from the XUAR, following 
2005 convictions for "attempting to spht the motherland" and other 
counts related to possession of firearms and explosives. ” 

“Many pohtical prisoners remained in prison or under other forms of 
detention at year's end, including rights activists Hu Jia and Wang 
Bingzhangi Alim and Abhkim Abdimeyim, sons of Uighur activist 
Rebiya Kadeeri journalist Shi Taol dissident Wang Xiaoning,' land- 
rights activist Yang Chunhn, Internet writers Yang Zih and Xu Wei,' 
labor activists Yao Fuxin, Hu Mingjun, Huang Xiangwei, Kong 
Youping, Ning Xianhua, Li Jianfeng, Li Xintao, Lin Shun 'an, Yue 
Tianxiang, Li Wangyang. and She Wanbao: CDP cofounder Qin 
Yongmini family planning whistleblower Chen Guangcheng', Bishop Su 
Zhimini Chri.stian activist Zhang Ronghangi Inner Mongolian activist 
Hada; Uighurs Tohti Tunyaz and Dffkex TihvaldL and Tibetans Jigme 
Gyatso, Tenzin Deleg, and Gendun Cboekyi Nyinia. Labor activist Hu 



88 


Shigen was released in August. Political prisoners obtained parole and 
sentence reduction much less frequently than ordinary prisoners. ” 

“In August Mehbube Ablesh, a Uighur writer, poet, and employee of 
Xinjiang People's Radio, was &ced from her post and detained by police 
after posting articles online that criticized the central government and 
provincial leaders. ~ 

“At year's end Korash Huseyin, the former editor of the Uighur- 
language Kashgar Literature Journal, remained in an undisclosed 
prison. In late 2004 Huseyin was sentenced to three years for 
publishing Nurmuhemmet Yasin's short story "Wild Pigeon," which 
authorities considered critical of CCP rule of Xinjiang. Yasin remained 
in prison .serving a 10-year sentence. Authorities continued to ban 
books with content they deemed controversial. ” 

“The government tightly controlled the practice of Islam, and official 
repression of Uighur Mushms in the XUAM increased. Regulations 
restricting Muslims' religious activity, teaching, and places of worship 
continued to be implemented forcefully in the XUAR. Measures to 
tighten control over religion in XUAR included increasing surveillance 
of mosques, rehgious leaders, and practitionersi detaining and 
arresting persons engaged in unauthorized religious activities: curbing 
illegal scripture readings: and increasing accountability among 
implementing ofScials. On August 5, authorities in Kashgar reportedly 
issued accountability measures to local ofScials responsible for high- 
level surveillance of religious activity in the region. Also in August in 
Kashgar, authorities called for enhancing controls of groups that 
included rehgious figures as part of broader CCP measures of 
"prevention " and "attack. " Authorities in Hotan reportedly restricted 
women from wearing head coverings (Hijab) in government ofSces. 
Coupled with news of a proposed government ban on headscarves, this 
led to large protests in March. In addition some men were required to 
shave their beards. 

The government reportedly continued to hmit access to mosques, 
detain citizens for possession of unauthorized religious texts, imprison 
citizens for rehgious activities determined to be "extremist, " pressure 
Mushms who were fasting to eat during Ramadan, and conhscate 
Mushms' passports to strengthen control over Mushm pilgrimages. 
Following violent clashes in western Xinjiang during the Olympic 
Games, XUAR authorities imposed widespread detentions, restricted 
movement within the XUAR, and established curfews in some cities. 
XUAR party secretary Wang Lequan declared in September that the 
XUAR government would carry out "preemptive attacks, " implement 



89 


"antiseparatist reeducation" across the region, and increase policing of 
religious groups. 

XUAR authorities maintained the most severe legal restrictions in the 
country on children 's right to practice religion. Authorities continued to 
prohibit the teaching of Islam outside the home to elementary- and 
middle- school- age children in some areas, and children under the age 
of 18 were prohibited from entering mosques. In August authorities 
reportedly forced the return of Uighur children studying religion in 
another province and detained them in the XUAR for engaging in 
"illegal rehgious activities. " 

According to procuratorial oSrcials, XUAR authorities arrested nearly 
1.300 persons on .state security charges during the first 11 months of 
the year. Authorities approved the prosecution of 1,154 of these 
individuals for committing one or more of the "three evils" of terrorism, 
separatism, and extremism. This was a dramatic increase from 2007, 
when the number of individuals arrested for state security crimes 
nationwide was 744. 

Authorities reserved the right to censor imams' sermons, and imams 
were urged to emphasize the damage caused to Islam by terrorist acts 
in the name of the religion. Certain Muslim leaders received 
particularly harsh treatment. Authorities in some areas conducted 
monthly political study sessions for religious personnel, which, 
according to one CCP official who took part in a study session, called 
for "creatively interpreting and improving" religious doctrine. 
Authorities also reportedly tried to restrict Muslims' opportunities to 
study rehgion overseas. The China Islamic Conference required 
religious personnel to study "new collected sermons" compiled by an 
Islamic Association of China (lAC) committee, including messages on 
patriotism and unity aimed at building a ".sociaRst harmonious 
society. " in contrast to the heavy-handed approach to Muslims in the 
XUAR, officials in Ningxia, Gansu. Qinghai. and Yunnan Provinces did 
not interfere heavily in Muslims' activities. 

in addition to the restrictions on practicing religion placed on party 
members and government officials throughout the country, teachers, 
professors, and university students in the XUAR were .sometimes not 
allowed to practice religion openly. Authorities imposed restrictions on 
state employees' observance of Ramadan and prohibitions on closing 
restaurants during periods of fasting. A local party secretary, Zhang 
Zhengrong, reportedly called on schools to strengthen propaganda 
education during Ramadan and to put a stop to activities including 
fasting and professing a religion. The Kashgar Teachers CoRege 



90 


reportedly implemented a series of measures to prevent students from 
observing' Ramadan, including imposing communal meals and 
requiring students to obtain permission to leave campus. School 
authorities also made students gather for a school assembly at a time 
of day coinciding with Friday prayers. 

The government took steps to prevent Mushms from traveling on 
unauthorized pilgrimages. The government continued to enforce a 
pohcy barring Muslims from obtaining hajj visas outside of China. The 
government published banners and slogans discouraging hajj 
pilgrimages outside those organized by the lAC. Foreign media 
reported that XUAR officials confiscated the passports of Uighur 
Muslims in some areas to prevent unauthorized hajj pilgrimages. 
Government officials in some areas also arbitrarily detained Mushms 
to prevent them from going on the hajj. required them to show that 
their hajj travel funds were not borrowed from other sources, required 
them to pay a large deposit to retrieve their passports for overseas 
travel, and required them to pass a health test. 

Ofhcial reports noted that 11.900 Muslims traveled to Mecca during 
the year for the hajj pilgrimage. This figure did not include 
participants who were not organized by the government, for whom 
there were no official estimates but who numbered in the thousands in 
previous years. 

The government's policy to encourage Han Chinese migration into 
minority areas has significantly increased the population of Han in the 
XUAR. In recent decades the Han-Uighur ratio in the capital of 
Urumqi has shifted from 20 to 80 to 80 to 20 and was a deep source of 
Uighur resentment. Discriminatory hiring practices gave preference to 
Han and discouraged job prospects for ethnic minorities. According to 
2005 statistics published by XUAR officials, eight mUhon of the 
XUAR's 20 mUhon official residents were Han. Hui, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, 
Uighur, and other ethnic minorities comprised approximately 12 
mUhon XUAR residents. Official statistics understated the Han 
population, because they did not coimt the tens of thousands of Han 
Chinese who were long-term "temporary workers . " WhUe the 
government continued to promote Han migration into the XUAR and 
fdl local jobs with migrant labor, overseas human rights organizations 
reported during the year that local officials under direction from higher 
levels of government have deceived and pressured young Uighur 
women to participate in a government sponsored labor transfer 
program. 



91 


The XIJAR government took measures to dilute expressions of Uighur 
identity, including measures to reduce education in ethnic minority 
languages in XUAR schools and to institute language requirements 
that disadvantaged ethnic minority teachers. The government 
continued to apply policies that prioritized Mandarin Chinese for 
instruction in school, thereby reducing or eliminating ethnic-language 
instruction. Graduates of minority language schools typically needed 
intensive Chinese study before they coidd handle Chinese-language 
course work at a university. The dominant position of standard 
Chinese in government, commerce, and academia put graduates of 
minority-language schools who lacked standard Chinese proficiency at 
a disadvantage. 

During the year authorities increased repression in the XUAR. and 
targeted the region 's ethnic Uighiu- population. In August officials in 
XUAR reiterated a pledge to crack down on the government-designated 
"three forces" of religious extremism, "splittism," and terrorism. In 
September XUAR CCP Chair Wang Lequan stated that "this winter 
and next spring we will launch a concentrated antiseparatist 
reeducation campaign across the whole region." It was sometimes 
difficidt to determine whether raids, detentions, and judicial 
punishments directed at individuals or organizations suspected of 
promoting the "three forces" were instead actually used to target those 
peacefully seeking to express their political or religious views. The 
government continued to repress Uighurs expressing peaceful political 
dissent and independent Muslim religious leaders, often citing 
counterterrorism as the reason for taking action. 

Uighurs were sentenced to long prison terms, and in some cases 
executed, on charges of separatism. In April 2007 foreign citizen 
Huseyin Celil was sentenced to life in prison for allegedly plotting to 
split the country and 10 years in prison for belonging to a terrorist 
organization, reportedly after being extradited from Uzbekistan and 
tortured into giving a confession. During the year the government 
reportedly sought the repatriation of Uighurs living outside the 
country, where they faced the risk of persecution. 

Possession of publications or audiovisual materials discussing 
independence or other sensitive subjects was not permitted. According 
to reports, those possessing such materials received lengthy prison 
sentences, such as Uighur Mehbube Ablesh, who was detained for 
expressing sensitive views online. Uighurs who remained in prison at 
year's end for their peaceful expression of ideas the government found 
objectionable included Abdulla Jamal. Tohti Tunyaz, Adduhelil Zunun, 
Abdulghani Memetemin, and Nurmubemmet Yasin." 



92 


In sum, if the United States were to honor the principles of its own 
Declaration of Independence, It would recognize not only the right, but the duty of 
Uighurs to revolt against the People’s Republic of China and to establish a new 
government dispensation to secure their unahenable rights to hfe, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness. 


Mr. Delahunt. Well, thank you Mr. Fein, and we admire your 
passion. And I think you know that I, too, have been an advocate 
for recapturing, if you will, the role of the first branch in the proper 
constitutional order as envisioned by our founders. And I too agree 
that we have ceded too much to the Executive. And that has to 
come to an end or we will become a Parliament that one could de- 
scribe as more in the nature of the Chinese Parliament as opposed 
to the United States Congress. And we have to take back that au- 
thority. 

And you are right about secrecy. And that is why we will go, if 
we are invited and if we can work it out, we will go to Bermuda 
and listen to what these men have to say to us and to the Amer- 
ican people. It is time that everyone be given an opportunity to 
speak out. Secrecy promotes utilitarianism and totalitarianism. 

With that I yield to my friend from California, and then we will 
go to Eni, and then I want to recognize, too, that we have been 
joined by the gentlelady from Texas, Sheila Jackson Lee. And by 
the way, that distinguished white-haired gentleman from Vir- 
ginia — who I am often confused with, I guess we Irish look alike — 
Jim Moran. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. I think it behooves me to note that while I 
do agree with the chairman and most of the witnesses on a large 
percentage of what has been said today, rather significant percent- 
age, there are areas of disagreement that I have. And I would like 
to just mention those in passing, as we get on to the discussion spe- 
cifically of the Uighurs. 

I do not agree with the last witness whatsoever, his assessment 
of what is going on since 3,000 of our citizens were slaughtered, 
3,000 of our citizens were slaughtered in front of our face. This is 
not just a criminal situation where we can give rights that are 
guaranteed to the citizens of the United States to people who are 
captured in a battlefield situation across the world. 

I believe we have not had other thousands of people slaughtered 
because the situation in Guantanamo has prevented that. But 
when you agree with that, as I do, and that is being my position, 
it would behoove us, I believe, that we should have a very, and, I 
would say, forceful policy toward people who are highly suspected 
of being involved in this terrorist network that is out to slaughter 



93 


Americans, as they already have. Then it also behooves me to say 
and all of us to say that, because we have not extended these same 
kind of rights, because that would hinder our efforts to protect our 
own people, we must be — how do you say — we must be absolutely 
committed to admitting mistakes when the mistakes are made and 
recognized. 

The problem that we have here is not that we fought a war with- 
out giving constitutional rights to people who were engaged with 
military activities in Afghanistan, which had just served as a basis 
for attack that caused so many deaths, more deaths than were 
caused at Pearl Harbor. But our problem is, once it was recognized, 
that there was an error that was made in terms of the Uighurs. 
Our people did not admit that mistake. And our leaders, dem- 
onstrated by Mr. Gingrich as well as other leaders, showed a dis- 
tinct lack of courage, and in fact showed actually worse than that 
by suggesting that we send the Uighurs back to China, that they 
showed their own level of commitment to truth. 

And I would suggest — I am sorry, people are fallible, and I do not 
believe as you just suggested that we should be in any way extend- 
ing constitutional rights in a wartime situation. And if we did, I 
really believe that there would be many, many more dead Ameri- 
cans right now. But at the same time, I would agree with witnesses 
and agree with your assessment. 

I might add to Mr. Fein, I certainly agree with your assessment 
that the Uighurs and other people like them should be considered 
as on par with our Founding Fathers. The fact is that there are 
people all over the world who long for freedom, long for democracy, 
long to control their own destinies. The American people should be 
on their side. We should never be on the side of the oppressor; we 
should always be on the side of the oppressed. 

That is the challenge that was given to us by Thomas Jefferson 
and George Washington and all those other people throughout our 
history who struggled to maintain the principles our country was 
founded upon. 

So while I may be someone who believes in the mission that set 
up Guantanamo, and believe in enhanced interrogation, I certainly 
understand that the United States fell short in the case of the 
Uighurs, and perhaps in some other folks in Guantanamo too. It 
is possible other people — after all, we have freed from Guantanamo 
hundreds of prisoners. Hundreds of prisoners have been freed who 
went there, and that kind of was an admission of mistakes. But we 
also know that a significant number of the prisoners that were 
freed ended up going back and killing Americans on the battlefield. 

I am sorry; my loyalty is to the people of the United States. But 
I think how we show that is also that we remain true to the funda- 
mental principles that make us Americans. After all, we are from 
every religion, every ethnic group, every part of humanity is here 
in the United States of America. What makes Americans, hope- 
fully, is a commitment to liberty and justice for all, and giving 
them the ability to have self-determination in the East Turkistans 
of the world. 

So with that said, let me go into a little bit about this specific 
case. Shall I say, Mr. Secretary or Mr. Assistant Secretary, do you 
believe that the reports that were provided you and the administra- 



94 


tion about acts of violence were based on direct knowledge by 
American intelligence, or were those reports provided by Chinese 
intelligence to our own people? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Congressman Rohrabacher, my strong impression 
is that it was based on a comprehensive view of information avail- 
able. But the information provided by the Chinese was not taken 
at face value. One of the reasons some have raised the questions 
why ETIM, why not these other organizations, the information pro- 
vided by the Chinese had to be corroborated by the United States. 
Information also had to be collected independently of information 
provided by the Chinese and by third parties as well. So in the case 
of that, that criteria was met. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. So we have that many agents out there in 
East Turkistan to verify these acts of violence. Maybe I am mis- 
taken. Do we have that many agents out there verifying all these 
things? 

Mr. SCHRiVER. Well, my understanding is when this specific case 
was being worked, dedicated people to this effort, including people 
from our embassy and consulates, do a proper investigation to ei- 
ther corroborate what the Chinese had provided or to collect inde- 
pendent information. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. On all of these 200 cases of reported violence. 

Mr. ScHRiVER. I suspect not. Congressman. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. I would suspect not, too. 

Mr. ScHRiVER. But I think what the statement said is that there 
were reportedly claims of this many attacks. It didn’t verify. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. And did we verify independently the exist- 
ence of the ETIM? 

Mr. SCHRiVER. Well, I didn’t hear anybody suggest that it didn’t 
exist. In fact, a previous panelist suggested that the leader himself 
had been interviewed. So I think, again, there is a question of why 
this organization and not others. And I would return to the point 
that this was an organization that, for whatever reason, limited 
itself to independent corroboration and a proper investigation. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. So you don’t believe that this coincidence 
that the chairman pointed out with the 200 acts of violence and the 
number of deaths and injuries, that seems to indicate that we had 
just taken those statistics from Chinese — from the Chinese Govern- 
ment itself, and then just resubmitted it out in our name, do you 
think that is just a coincidence that we actually verified those 
things? 

Mr. ScHRiVER. No. Again, I looked very carefully at that state- 
ment and it said “elements of,” it didn’t say ETIM, and it said “re- 
portedly committed.” 

Mr. Rohrabacher. Weasel word is what we call them. Now, wea- 
sel words. Now, so we used weasel words to make sure that we 
could use information that obviously was spoon-fed us by the intel- 
ligence arm of the world’s worst human rights abuser. Beijing, by 
its very nature, by its bigness alone, not to mention the crimes, is 
the world’s worst or biggest human rights abuser. And just from 
what you are saying, it doesn’t — I mean you, are trying to tell us 
that those things were corroborated, but you are not saying that, 
are you? 



95 


Mr. ScHRiVER. What I am suggesting is that the designation was 
made based on independent information collected and some cor- 
roboration of the information provided, as well as by 

Mr. Rohrabacher. But not in individual cases, just on a general 
concept. 

Mr. ScHRiVER. Well, it was based on the criteria established in 
the Executive Order and the assessment as to whether that criteria 
was met. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. I would suggest that even from what you are 
saying, that it would be proper for us to surmise that our Govern- 
ment was just basically being spoon-fed information and that we 
were not doing that. 

Mr. SCHRiVER. If I could respond to that, there were many orga- 
nizations which the Chinese brought forward. And again, I took of- 
fice after this particular designation was made, but I used to be the 
personal recipient of volumes and reams of information from the 
Chinese about alleged terrorist organizations that we were not in 
a position to designate, because we were not able to make those as- 
sessments. 

So I respectfully would reject a notion that we were spoon-fed 
and simply relied solely on that. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. And 

Mr. Delahunt. Would you — just one moment. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. Sure. 

Mr. Delahunt. What I find interesting, Mr. Secretary, is that up 
to the designation, the Communist Chinese Government spoke 
about multiple terrorist groups. And after the designation, every- 
thing was ascribed to ETIM. In other words, that designation in 
my opinion was a signal to — not an intentional signal, but a signal 
to Beijing, if you use ETIM, that is going to resonate in the State 
Department and among the executive branch. And that, I would 
suggest, was very dangerous. 

I yield back. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. I would agree with the chairman. Are there 
any acts of violence against a civilian population, aimed at terror- 
izing that population, that you can think of, that the ETIM was 
guilty of? That it was verified? 

Mr. SCHRiVER. I couldn’t go into the full review of the organiza- 
tion and the incidents for a variety of reasons. I would not disagree 
with anything that has been said about secrecy and the problem- 
atic nature of making these decisions. But in fact, I did take an 
oath to not reveal classified information. I am privy to some of this. 
Much of it I am not privy to. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. Do you know any secret information that 
would indicate that the ETIM, that you are privy to, that you have 
seen, that would indicate that the ETIM had committed an act of 
violence against a civilian target? That is what terrorism is. 

Mr. ScHRiVER. I understand. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. Fighting for your freedom against, as Mr. 
Fein says, fighting against the British troops or against Chinese 
military and occupiers. 

Mr. SCHRiVER. Let me say, as I said in my testimony, I am con- 
fident in the decision that was made at the time, based on the cri- 
teria set forth in the Executive Order. I would certainly not have 



96 


any objection to further — by this committee or anybody else — fur- 
ther review of those decisions. These lists should be active and 
fluid tools. If this committee is charged with a full examination of 
these issues, perhaps a classified briefing would certainly be appro- 
priate. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, I am just asking you. You don’t have 
to break a rule about classification by simply saying whether or not 
you know of something. 

Mr. ScHRiVER. As I said, I am confident in the decision that was 
reached in August, 2002. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. That is not what I asked you. Do you know 
of any specific incident where the ETIM was accused of actually 
committing an act of violence against a civilian target? 

Mr. ScHRiVER. Again, I was not an intelligence official. I was not 
involved in this review. When I state I have confidence, I have seen 
reports saying that the criteria have been met, yes. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. That is not what I asked you, whether you 
think the criteria had been met. I asked you if you had known 
about. But we will move on. 

Again, when we make mistakes — and we do make mistakes. We 
have made mistakes in every war that we have been in. But it be- 
hooves us to admit our mistakes and to correct it. I think we 
should be embarrassed that our leaders are not willing to do that 
in the case of the Uighurs and perhaps in the case of several other 
people in Guantanamo. I say that as a supporter of the basic strat- 
egy of using that in this time of terrorism, when people have tar- 
geted American cities and American neighborhoods. 

Let me ask about some of this here. Some of the experts here on 
the ETIM and the East Turkistan population, do the Uighurs and 
do these organizations in any way — are they advocating an inde- 
pendent countiy that would be a democratic country? One would 
expect something like Mongolia. Or are we talking about a group 
of people that are advocating an Islamic-based country in which 
church and state are one and that we might expect to be allied 
with more radical elements within the Islamic world? 

That is open to the panel. 

Mr. Gladney. I think I can refer you to page 24 of my testimony, 
and there I give you a spectrum based on my own research and 
others of the possible groups out there. And there is the whole 
spectrum, sir. There are groups on the Internet. 

Now, the problem with looking at a YouTube video or a posting 
on the Internet, you don’t know how many people are involved with 
that. One of the problems with some of these organizations, they 
have been described as one-man presidencies, one man organiza- 
tions. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. They might be fronts for the Chinese. 

Mr. Gladney. They may be front from other groups. So I am dis- 
turbed that YouTube postings are taken as serious material if it is 
not corroborated. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. So you have cast doubt on the postings that 
we can see. 

Let’s go to the lawyer here. Your clients want to establish a Mus- 
lim state, that the church and state is the same that might be in- 
clined to be allied with these other radical Muslim elements? 



97 


Ms. Baker Manning. No, sir. Absolutely not. That has never for 
a moment been the goal of any of them. None of them would even 
admire such a goal. We explained to them recently that these kinds 
of charges were being leveled against them in the American debate, 
and they laughed out loud at the absurdity of the suggestion. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. 

Yes. 

Ms. Kan. We have a record to go on. Whatever some people 
might or might not do would be speculation, but we do have a 
record of what has actually happened; and that is, in exile, there 
are at least two large Uighur communities in exile. One is in Ger- 
many, and one is right here in Washington, DC. And so they have 
sought to go to Western democratic countries when they are able 
to. In fact 

Mr. Rohrabacher. Are there any of these groups that have been 
identified in Iran or in radical Islamic countries? 

Ms. Kan. They speak Uighur. They don’t speak Arabic. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. Persian, I think. 

Ms. Kan. Right. Or that other language. Exactly. 

They have gone to live in Munich, in Germany. The German 
Government is well aware of the large Uighur community there. 
We have a rather large Uighur community here. Just last month, 
the World Uighur Congress held its third general assembly right 
here on Capitol Hill at the new Capitol Visitors Center at which 
six Members of Congress spoke to Rebiya Kadeer at the World 
Uighur Congress. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. What was the position there on the separa- 
tion of church and state, which is basically kind of the element, the 
essence of what radical Islam is all about? 

Mr. Fein. Mr. Congressman, the Uighurs are of Turkic ethnicity. 
You will remember Turkey is a government that overwhelmingly 
represents a Muslim population. It is more secular than most of 
Christian Europe. The separation of church and state that Ataturk 
ushered in is stronger than in western European allies, members 
of the EU. 

Mr. Roberts. Can I add a point? 

Mr. Delahunt. Please, Professor Roberts. 

Mr. Roberts. I just wanted to note that there is a long history 
of Uighur nationalist groups. And I think that what we see after 
the fall of the Soviet Union is that none of them have really had 
the opportunity to establish a comprehensive program as you are 
asking about. I think only now do we see that starting to happen 
after Ms. Kadeer was released into the U.S. and she has taken a 
leading role in the World Uighur Congress. 

Prior to that, a lot of the Uighur nationalists were actually in the 
Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union was supporting ideas of ethnic 
autonomy in China largely as a ploy in the Sino-Soviet split. And 
then later, in the ’90s, most of the Central Asian states kind of 
started to restrict any Uighur nationalist groups on their territory, 
in part at the request of the Chinese Government. 

So I guess the short answer is I think that right now is the time 
where we may see a group of Uighurs in a comprehensive way put 
forth a program. But I have not really seen a united program to 
date. 



98 


Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you very much for holding this 
hearing. I want to thank the witnesses. I am going to he going off 
to another event that I have scheduled myself for. I apologize. 

But, again, those of us who have supported the war against rad- 
ical Islam feel very strongly, as you noted, and as you should have 
noted, that what we have tried to do in Guantanamo is aimed at 
protecting the people of the United States. Every war that has ever 
happened, mistakes are made and people — innocent people are 
hurt. What makes us a moral people is not that we don’t make mis- 
takes during times of war. What makes us an honorable people is 
that, when we make a mistake, we admit it, because that should 
be at the heart of our soul and character as Americans. We admit 
it, and we try to make it right. 

In this case and perhaps in several other cases in Guantanamo, 
trying to protect our people, trying to prevent another 9/11, per- 
haps something wrong happened, and I am ashamed the leadership 
of my party has not stepped up and done the honorable thing. 

We just had a Member of Congress who, I think, had courage to 
stand up. He just left. Mr. Moran. And I really respect him for 
what he has done and having the courage to stand up recently on 
that. 

With that said, I want to thank you for the hearing; and I will 
be looking forward to look into this issue more. Because what we 
have got here, I believe, is the worst type of situation, where Com- 
munist China, a massive abuser of human rights, is manipulating 
our Government and our own leaders for their benefit. And we 
can’t let that stand. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Delahunt. Thank you. Congressman Rohrabacher. 

Now I will go to Eni Faleomavaega, and then we will go to Mr. 
Ellison. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I note with interest the fact that this is not an issue that was 
just brought to the subcommittee’s attention in a matter of a couple 
of months. This has been going on for almost 2 years now. 

I do want to say for the record I duly commend you and the gen- 
tleman from California for pursuing this. Unfortunately, it has 
taken now 2 years, and we are still trying to get more answers to 
the questions that have been raised as you had initiated and espe- 
cially to some of the comments and observations made by our ex- 
pert witnesses now before us. 

I seem to get a common thread with all the testimony that has 
been provided here, the fact that the Uighurs are totally innocent 
of anything that seems to have brought them to this stage of 
classifying them as terrorists. Do I hear a disagreement of that 
sense? 

This is something that our Government, unfortunately, made a 
mistake in passing judgment, in classifying, first, ETIM as a ter- 
rorist organization. The next thing we know, we heard 22 or 
more — because of some bounty hunters that turned these 22 
Uighurs over to us and now transferred them to Guantanamo, and 
now we got into more complications because of the problems that 
we did. 



99 


I would like to ask the panel, what would be your recommenda- 
tion to resolve this issue once and for all? 

Mr. Fein. Well, my recommendation is Congress enact the stat- 
ute, at least with regard to the Uighurs, and give them permanent 
residency in the United States of America, like we should have 
done all along, rather than begging other countries to take it. 

The other thing, there needs to be, in my judgment, a complete 
overhaul of the system, the procedures by which organizations are 
designated as terrorist organizations. There is no due process at 
all. It is the classic example where you don’t have a right to know 
the charges against you. That is not a system that is going to get 
anything that is reliable whatsoever. 

We need to remember as well there is always the backup of the 
criminal law. If people conspire to do things that are bad, you can 
prosecute them. And conspiracy is forward looking. You get them 
before they have even taken virtually a single step toward its exe- 
cution. 

But at least in a prosecution you have due process. You have a 
chance to defend yourself. The government just lists individuals or 
organizations as terrorist organizations. You are associated with 
them, you give $5, then you immediately come under suspicion. No 
one knows how you get there. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Fein, I hate to interrupt your com- 
ments, well taken, but supposedly we are in a state of war, and 
sometimes in a state of war we are under martial law. And I am 
sure you are well aware of the historical significance of that fact 
during the time of the Civil War where Abraham Lincoln, our fa- 
mous President, did some things that were somewhat unconstitu- 
tional. 

But I am not going to argue you your point. I just want to say 
sometimes due process doesn’t come about. 

Mr. Fein. Let’s take the very case right here, Mr. Congressman. 
Because that issue was raised, habeas corpus, and the United 
States Supreme Court held in the Boumediene case habeas corpus 
was unconstitutionally suspended by this Congress. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. I also recall the fact that the Supreme Court 
made the decision and President Jackson said, ‘You made the deci- 
sion, now you go enforce it.” 

Mr. Fein. But remember, the reason why the Uighurs got here 
today is because of that decision. They got into court because of 
that decision. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. Sir, that is the reason why we are having 
the hearing. 

Mr. Fein. Exactly. That is why you shouldn’t be worried about 
constitutional rights. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. My time is running out, and I have got to 
ask more questions. I appreciate your statement there, Mr. Fein. 

Ms. Kan, you indicated that the fact that Mr. Armitage made the 
formal statement that the ETIM is considered a terrorist group, 
and then Assistant Secretary James Kelly reaffirmed that decision 
made by the administration. But I noted that you mentioned that 
it was based on independent evidence that Assistant Secretary 
Kelly stuck to the decision made by Mr. Armitage or, for that mat- 



100 


ter, by the Bush administration that these people should be classi- 
fied as terrorists. 

I was curious, what was the independent evidence that that deci- 
sion was based upon? Was it something outside of what the Chi- 
nese intelligence shared with us, or something that none of us 
know at this point? I think the chairman made that very point, 
critical. Does this require, Mr. Schriver, that we have to have a 
classified briefing in terms of this independent evidence that Ms. 
Kan had referred to earlier? 

Mr. Schriver. Well, I would encourage that. I don’t know that 
there is a need for me to repeat what I said earlier, but one of the 
reasons this organization was designated and not the many others 
that the Chinese brought forward to us is that we had a process 
where we could either corroborate information provided, independ- 
ently gather and collect the information, or seek a third party. 

Mr. Delahunt. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. Faleomavaega. I would gladly yield. 

Mr. Delahunt. You know what happens, Mr. Schriver? Every 
member here has attended classified briefings. We go into these 
classified briefings, and we leave with very little information. What 
we discover is that we are then prohibited from discussing classi- 
fied information that in our opinion ought to be out in the public 
domain. There is a great tool — and I think Mr. Fein understands 
this. There is a great tool that the Executive has. 

We will have a classified briefing. Now that means that the 
members who attend that briefing — and I don’t attend those kind 
of briefings — are never able to discuss it. Yet, among ourselves — 
and this is commonplace, among Republicans and Democrats — 
what was that all about? And it was totally unsatisfactory, and it 
didn’t even meet minimal standards in terms of, in our opinion, 
being appropriately classified. 

That is the problem that Mr. Fein is passionately bringing to our 
attention. Because the mistake that we make is to confer upon the 
Executive, whether that be a Democratic or a Republican adminis- 
tration, the ability to play this rope-a-dope game. And that is what 
it comes down to. 

We clearly share the concern about threats to our national secu- 
rity. We all do. But we also know what is real and what is pretend 
and what is meant to deal with embarrassment. 

The ranking member is correct. It is sometimes easy to say you 
made a mistake. There is no one on this side of the dais that 
doesn’t make multiple mistakes daily. But what we seem to do and 
we get here in Washington is classified, it is super secret, and the 
American people are never told what the truth is. 

Here is my problem with ETIM. How big is it? Is it two? Is it 
dozens? Is it hundreds? Where did this military training take 
place? Was it an installation the size of Fort Bragg? What were the 
weapons that were involved? 

Reports that I read in the media indicate that there was one AK- 
57. By the way, there is no reference to these 22 individuals that 
were detained as a result of a bounty system, that they were in- 
volved in that training. What is the relationship with al-Qaeda, 
other than some double, triple, quadruple kind of connection that 
I am sure, if you ran it out, we would all be part of al-Qaeda. 



101 


Mr. Roberts. Congressman, this is a question — kind of American 
civics question. Does Congress have the right to have a closed clas- 
sified hearing? Would you be able to question the intelligence on 
this? Because my opinion is that there is probably a dozen not even 
specialists in Xinjiang and Uighurs in the United States. And we 
all know each other. To my knowledge, nobody was brought in to 
discuss this issue. 

Mr. Delahunt. Were you brought in. Professor Roberts, to dis- 
cuss this issue about the classification of ETIM? 

Mr. Roberts. I was not. In fact 

Mr. Delahunt. Do you speak Uighur? 

Mr. Roberts. I do. 

Mr. Delahunt. Secretary Schriver, you don’t speak Uighur, do 
you? 

Mr. Schriver. I do not. 

Mr. Delahunt. I don’t mean to personalize this. Let me pause 
for a moment. 

Professor Gladney, do you speak Uighur? 

Mr. Gladney. Some; better Turkish. 

Mr. Delahunt. Well, your Uighur is better than mine, I can as- 
sure you of that. 

Secretary Schriver, last week in the testimony proffered by Ms. 
Kadeer, who, I dare say there is no one on the planet that knows 
the Uighur community, both inside and outside of China, like the 
gentlelady who is with us here today, she had never heard of 
ETIM. If this is a terrorist group, they certainly were well versed 
in being secret. 

This is the problem in terms of the Congress and the American 
people relying upon a secret process that has consequences. Be- 
cause that was the hook. As Susan Baker Manning says, that was 
the hook that kept these 22 Uighurs incarcerated for almost 7 
years. Yet, I think it was Professor Gladney in his testimony indi- 
cated that someone from the State Department personally told him 
that it was a mistake. Am I mischaracterizing? 

Mr. Gladney. That is correct. 

Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Secretary, was there debate over this des- 
ignation within the Department of State? You know, we are all 
human beings. We are all subject to different views. Was there 
some dissension as to the designation? If there was not, why was 
ETIM never designated as an ETO, a foreign terrorist organiza- 
tion? Can you explain that to me? 

Mr. Schriver. Eirst of all, in terms of admitting mistakes, my- 
self, others who served in the administration, I hope are big 
enough to step up to that challenge. And I think in my own testi- 
mony I have acknowledged Guantanamo was a tragic error and the 
circumstances they find themselves under. I would be prepared — 
it might be an awfully boring hearing — but to go through all the 
mistakes I have made, and there are plenty. 

But the issue is whether or not this particular designation at 
that particular time was an appropriate designation based on the 
evidence and based on the criteria of the Executive Order. My be- 
lief is that it was. But I would 

Mr. Delahunt. I respect your belief. Was there consideration to 
place ETIM on the foreign terrorist — listed as a foreign terrorist or- 



102 


ganization which, my understanding, is of a significant — a higher 
degree of significance than under the Executive Order? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. I would confess this falls a bit out of my expertise, 
but my understanding is it is not only sort of in precedence, in a 
higher precedence, as you suggest, but it is also based on different 
criteria and relies on information related to activities outside of the 
country. We did have some of that information, but I think people 
felt the case wasn’t as strong to go to that second designation. 

Mr. Delahunt. Okay. I interrupted somebody. I don’t know who. 
Let me yield back the gentleman his time. Congressman 
Faleomavaega. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. This is always one of the problems being 
chairman. You can do anything you want. But I do thank the chair- 
man for his allowing me to do this. 

I have as part of my jurisdiction in my subcommittee the Central 
Asian countries. I wanted to ask the panel, as a result of — I guess 
this is based on the Soviet-Sino agreement, that we ended up hav- 
ing Kazikastan, Kurgestan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and 
Turkmenistan as independent countries as a result of the demise 
of the former Soviet Union. 

Was there ever a discussion historically about having 
Uighuristan as another republic? It seems to me the time when 
this was going on there was a fear of Balkanization of the different 
countries. I suspect that this is probably one of the biggest con- 
cerns that the Peoples Republic of China was having, the fear of 
breakouts among the different groups. China is trying to bring Tai- 
wan into the fold, Hong Kong, Macau, all these bases of where 
China is claiming sovereignty overall. 

But I just wanted to ask the panel, was there ever any move- 
ment or any consideration seriously of having Uighuristan as a 
possible republic, just as the way these other five countries are now 
part of the Central Asian region? I just wanted to ask. 

I was very impressed with your statement. Dr. Gladney, con- 
cerning the history not only of Uighuristan but the other areas 
there, too, surrounding it. 

Mr. Gladney. Of course, there would not have been a discussion 
of that possibility, because Xinjiang has never been a part of the 
former Soviet Union. In my testimony I do say there was certainly 
some hope among Uighurs on the street. 

Interestingly enough, it wasn’t in 1991, 1992, when the Central 
Asian states were established with the demise of the foreign Soviet 
Union. It was really in the ’90s, in 1997 with the reincorporation 
of Hong Kong that that hope was enlivened. I was frequently trav- 
eling to the region at that time; and there were a lot of discussions 
of that 

reintegration of Hong Kong, if it were not to go well, then there 
would be more opportunities for those kinds of imagined situations. 

But, clearly, from the China side it was much more fear of that 
possibility. And of course many people, when they focus on Xinjiang 
and Tibetan independence issues, they forget that really the jewel 
in the crown that China sees as a part of all this issue of sepa- 
ratism is really Taiwan. So you can’t really distinguish these issues 
about China’s desire to maintain a unified country. 



103 


In my testimony also I go into the historical establishment of in- 
corporation of Xinjiang as part of the People’s Republic of China. 
And there were — prior to that, in 1949, there were two separate 
states. Eastern Turkistan Republics established in the ’30s and in 
the ’40s. Those were legally bona fide nation states. They were rec- 
ognized. They were democratic. One was quite secular, supported 
by the Soviets. The other in the south was more Islamically in- 
spired. But, nevertheless, the Uighurs look to those two independ- 
ently recognized states as the historical precedence for a separate 
Uighuristan. But those were very short-lived and 

Mr. Faleomavaega. I just have one more question because my 
time is out. Again, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your indulgence. 

Was there a desire among the Uighur people to have a sov- 
ereignty within a sovereignty, to the extent that they just want to 
be autonomous but be part of the mother country in that respect 
and to be free but not totally independent? They are not seeking 
total independence from China. All they want is more of an autono- 
mous relationship, I suppose similar to what the Dalai Lama has 
been trying for years to seek with China. Is this basically what the 
Uighur people are seeking to establish in its relationship between 
China and the Uighurs? 

I notice. Secretary Schriver, you are shaking your head. 

Mr. Schriver. I am shaking my head, but I think there are peo- 
ple that are probably more expert. My impression is maybe per- 
haps to some that is a suboptimal outcome, but it is probably the 
most realistic outcome and one that gives very concrete objectives 
that can be pursued, defining what genuine autonomy would mean, 
as the Tibetans have, and then pursue through negotiation with 
China that kind of outcome. So I think that is the current cir- 
cumstance, and that is the objective. And I think U.S. policy should 
support that. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. I also have China as part of my sub- 
committee with my good friend from Massachusetts. 

But I think to settle the issue once and for all, Mr. Fein, you in- 
dicated earlier, pass a statute, bring these 22 Uighurs into the 
United States and be done with it. Is this about as best as we can 
resolve the situation and not go back and forth? Well, we made a 
mistake. Is this the best way that we can correct the mistake that 
we have made? 

Mr. Fein. I think the answer is yes; and, of course, there is 
precedent as well. Mr. Rohrabacher mentioned the killings — re- 
member Pearl Harbor and 5 months after we had concentration 
camps. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. I think Ms. Kan and I very well remember 
Hawaii. 

Mr. Fein. We did make amends in that same circumstance in the 
Civil Liberties Act in 1988. The same thing we can do today. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. They say, what we did to the native Hawai- 
ians, we took their land; we stole it fair and square. 

Mr. Roberts. I think also another thing that needs to be done 
that was obvious in the exchange between Congressman Rohr- 
abacher and Assistant Secretary Schriver is that we need to define 
what we are talking about when we are talking about terrorism. 
I know Assistant Secretary Schriver kept on saying that it met the 



104 


criteria at the time, but maybe the question is that criteria should 
be reviewed and we should really think about what we are talking 
about when we are talking about terrorism. If we are really fight- 
ing all violent separatist movements around the world, that is, ob- 
viously, not a winnable war. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. Dr. Roberts, I know what you mentioned 
about terrorism, but let’s talk about colonialism. Let’s talk about 
patriotism. Let’s talk about nationalism. I think our patriots during 
the Revolutionary War were considered terrorists. I think the 
Israelis who fought very hard to gain independence were classified 
as terrorists. So it is a matter of perspective, I suppose. How do 
you do that? Ho Chi Minh was considered a nationalist patriot be- 
cause all he wanted to do was fight against 100 years of French 
colonialism in Vietnam. How many Americans know about that 
fact? 

Mr. Fein. But the statutes do define and the Executive Orders 
define the criteria. They can vary. But it just isn’t Humpty Dump- 
ty; I make it mean whatever I want it to mean on a current day. 
That is what rule of law means. You have to write down standards 
so you can apply them evenhandedly. 

I do agree with the suggestion you had that we should review 
what the standards are and see whether or not the distinctions you 
made we can put in words in the statute so it prevents, for exam- 
ple, the immigration authority holding people as terrorists in 
Burma because they are fighting against the oppressive regime 
there and can’t get in the United States. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much. Let’s go 
to Bermuda and Palau and settle this thing once and for all. 

Mr. Delahunt. I concur with that. I look forward to the trip to 
Palau. I thank my friend. 

Mr. Secretary, there was a report that was done by Mr. Fine, 
who is the Inspector General at the Department of Justice, that 
confirmed that the Uighur detainees were interviewed, were inter- 
rogated, and there are other reports that indicate they were intimi- 
dated by Communist Chinese intelligence agencies while at Guan- 
tanamo. 

Is it a common practice to allow intelligence agents from foreign 
countries into Guantanamo or other facilities to interrogate detain- 
ees that are incarcerated? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Again, slightly outside my purview, but my under- 
standing is the decision was based on a general application of ac- 
cess to the detainees from people representing the countries of ori- 
gin. I personally think in the case of the Uighurs it was ill-advised. 

Ms. Baker Manning. May I comment on that, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. Delahunt. Yes, please. 

Ms. Baker Manning. The reports that you have seen that the 
Uighurs were intimidated by Communist Chinese officials in Guan- 
tanamo, if the report is that they were intimidated, that is a dra- 
matic understatement. What actually happened is they were 
abused and threatened, and it was made abundantly clear to 
them — this is a paraphrase of one of them reporting to me — ^but he 
was told by his Chinese interrogator after being kept up for a day 
and a half and softened up by U.S. soldiers so that they would co- 
operate with the Chinese interrogators, he was told by his Chinese 



105 


interrogator that he was lucky to be in Guantanamo because as 
soon as they got him back to China, he was dead. That is what ac- 
tually happened in these interrogations. 

The important thing to remember for the broader context of what 
we are talking about here today is that Secretary Armitage — As- 
sistant Secretary Armitage went to Beijing in late August, 2002. 
ETIM goes on the terrorist list I think a couple weeks later. And 
right after that is when the Chinese interrogators show up in 
Guantanamo. 

I have never heard it suggested to me that this is a coincidence. 
It can’t possibly be a coincidence. So it seems that there is a direct 
connection between this cooperation, going on the terrorist list, and 
these abusive, threatening interrogations that happen in Guanta- 
namo with the complicity of U.S. soldiers. That is a remarkable se- 
ries of events — and to our great shame. 

Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us how the decision 
was made to allow Chinese Communist intelligence agents into 
Guantanamo to interview these detainees? 

Mr. ScHRiVER. I cannot. I would just repeat I think it was ill-ad- 
vised. My suspicion would be that it was part of a general policy 
access to the countries of origin. But I think in this case it was 
very ill-advised if applied in that way. 

Mr. Delahunt. Well, if it was the Department of State and they 
read their own human rights reports, not only was it ill-advised but 
I would say that it was morally repugnant where, with a human 
rights report that describes in great detail the persecution and the 
gross violation of human rights perpetrated on the Uighurs in 
China, to allow Communist Chinese agents, security agents into 
Guantanamo, is beyond unacceptable. 

It is my intention at some point in time to determine how that 
decision was made. Because Attorney Baker Manning is correct. 
This isn’t going to be satisfied simply by saying it was ill-advised, 
with all due respect. And then fast forward to now and we have 
a former Speaker of the House of Representatives suggesting that 
these individuals be sent back to China. I am sure you reject that 
suggestion. But it is most disturbing. 

Do you know if the decision to allow these intelligence or these 
security agents into Guantanamo was made by State, by Justice, 
or by Defense? 

Mr. SCHRiVER. I am not sure I can answer with precision, but my 
memory is it was not the State Department. It seems to me I would 
have been aware of that decision. 

Again, I apologize if my language suggested sort of an offhanded 
view of this. No, it was absolutely inappropriate and unacceptable 
to have them treated in that manner at Guantanamo, as well as 
a lot of other activities in that detention facility, in my view. 

Mr. Delahunt. If you know — I am always interested in how 
these decisions are implemented. If you know, did we provide the 
transportation for the Communist security agents to come to Guan- 
tanamo? 

Mr. SCHRiVER. I don’t know. 

Mr. Delahunt. I mean, I just have this rather disgusting vision 
of putting up Communist Chinese security agents at some hotel 
somewhere on the base after providing them with transportation on 



106 


some Gulfstream aircraft. And they are told that they are lucky 
they are in Guantanamo because if they returned to their home- 
land, they would be tortured and most likely summarily executed. 
That is disturbing. And when I think of the American taxpayers 
supporting this activity, I am sure — maybe you can tell me I am 
wrong — ^but I am sure that it wasn’t a Communist Chinese aircraft, 
military aircraft that landed at Guantanamo. If you know. 

Mr. ScHRiVER. I don’t know the specific circumstances and the 
issues associated with transportation. But I would just underscore 
I think it is important that Secretary Powell at an early juncture 
said under no circumstances would they be returned to China. 

President Bush, when Hu Jintao, as a part of maybe three or 
four issues he chose to raise with President Bush during a summit 
meeting, said we want them returned to China, President Bush re- 
fused. So there is certainly recognition, based on everything we 
know about their treatment in Xinjiang, that they would not be 
treated fairly or humanely and they faced these risks. Certainly 
that was appreciated and put into action through policy by mem- 
bers of the Bush administration. 

Their circumstances at Guantanamo I think are tragic, as I said 
in my testimony. It bears close scrutiny from this committee and 
others. 

Mr. Delahunt. Anyone is free to respond. I am directing some 
of these questions to the Secretary because I have made these 
notes as you have each testified. But how do you account — here we 
have the Chinese Government saying that there were various 
groups involved in violent acts or demonstrations, whatever they 
were. And then, subsequently, we come out with the same statis- 
tics, practically the same language, and attribute it all to one 
group. 

Those 200 — and the numbers, 200, 120, and 40, was that an 
error on our part or were 

Mr. ScHRiVER. I think the language that you put up said ele- 
ments of ETIM. It didn’t attribute all the acts. I think it is impor- 
tant to be very precise at the Department of State and other execu- 
tive agencies when you are reporting on these activities, and per- 
haps more precision was required there. 

Ms. Baker Manning. If I may, Mr. Chairman. The type of cave- 
ats that we see in some of the language here, what Representative 
Rohrabacher calls “weasel words,” I think quite accurately so, in 
the Parhat case when the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, the three- 
judge panel, two Republican appointees, a Democratic appointee, 
they come up with a unanimous opinion that is all about how shod- 
dy the evidence is in the case, that the government’s best case 
against these guys — and they are all identically situated, even 
though they are focusing on Parhat in that particular case. They 
are all the same. 

They have a lengthy opinion that is very, very specific and very 
detailed and, among other things, addresses precisely this issue of 
things are said to be true, ETIM reportedly did this, there is infor- 
mation that such and such has happened; and it is precisely those 
kinds of weasel words, in the gentleman’s phrase, that, among 
other things, causes the DC Circuit to reject this. This is not even 
worth considering, and we are going to reject it. It cannot possibly 



107 


justify any official act like imprisoning these men. Because there 
is just nothing there. 

Mr. Fein. If I can add, one of the questions raised was, does Con- 
gress have the authority to demand classified briefings in ways 
that enable you to get access to genuine information that you can 
discuss, not just conduct soliloquies with yourself? 

I think the constitutional law is very clear. The Gravel case in 
1972 establish that then Senator Gravel could declassify 47 vol- 
umes of the Pentagon papers that allegedly were going to cause all 
sorts of calamities that never did. Under the speech or debate 
clause in the congressional oversight power, the court held that act 
was shielded from any retaliation, any regulation by the executive 
branch or the judicial branch; and the effort to try to indict him 
was squashed. 

My view is the law is clear. If Congress wishes, you can demand, 
even through a provision of the appropriations power, no informa- 
tion shall be collected and classified by the United States of Amer- 
ica with the use of U.S. funds that can be withheld from commit- 
tees of Congress exercising oversight functions. And I believe that 
would be constitutional. It would enable you to go and say, you 
can’t tell me to keep quiet. This is what the law is. You can’t spend 
money if you are going to conceal that from us. You have to have 
oversight power. 

I think the Church Committee hearing showed what happens 
when it is just a game out there and you don’t know. The Church 
Committee got into the real details and had some real reforms that 
were enacted afterwards. But, without that, we may solve the 
Uighur issue. There will be another case in 5 or 10 years. It will 
be the same reason. We will be back here holding a hearing. 

Mr. Delahunt. You are arguing for a truly select committee in 
dealing with this whole issue of transparency, secrecy, and classi- 
fication within our own Government to maintain the viability and 
the health of our democracy. That is why I think — and I said this 
in my opening statement — not only is this about 22 individuals and 
justice to them, but it is also about remedying the serious issues 
that I think need to be addressed because of what we are learning 
as a result of Guantanamo, not just these 22 detainees. 

I intend to have a hearing on the CSRTs, the Combatant Status 
Review Tribunals. Lawyers that were there, that participated, de- 
scribe it as a sham. I don’t know how we provoke — again, it is not 
those kind of issues that people are going to follow with assidu- 
ously. They are just not going to do it. But they are so funda- 
mental. 

Because you are right, Mr. Fein. Today, it is the Uighurs. A year 
from now, it is Irish Americans. And that would make me very 
nervous. But it is about our democracy and really those principles. 

And with all due respect, and I appreciate your sincerity and I 
know you are well-intentioned, Mr. Secretary, but bureaucratic 
speak just ain’t gonna make it. You are going to get people like my 
friend from California who is going to say it like it is: These are 
weasel words. And I am not accusing you of that. But when we 
read what we get from the executive branch, we know what caveats 
have to be put in there. That is not what, I dare say, American de- 
mocracy is about. 



108 


Do we know what happened, by the way, to the families of these 
detainees that were incarcerated in Guantanamo? Do we have any 
information, Mr. Secretary? 

Mr. ScHRiVER. I don’t. But I know Ms. Kadeer, after her release, 
her sons faced persecution and imprisonment. So I suspect the Chi- 
nese are certainly not above that kind of heavy hand with others. 

Mr. Delahunt. Because once — I understand from a 

newspaper report that the four in Bermuda are using pseudo- 
nyms in an effort to protect their families back in northwest China. 

Ms. Baker Manning. That is right. 

Mr. Delahunt. I mean, let’s put this on a very, very human level 
here. 

Well, let me throw some questions to Mr. Roberts, since he seems 
nice and relaxed there. Can you tell us anything about this pur- 
ported link between al-Qaeda and ETIM? 

By the way — and I will pose this to the panel as well as you, 
Mrs. Kadeer — all of the experts have hardly heard of ETIM. Yet, 
our Government, according to the Secretary, has independent infor- 
mation about ETIM. Has anyone heard about it? If you have heard 
about it, how big is it? Is it cohesive or is it just a group that got 
together and came up with a name? 

Professor Roberts. 

Mr. Roberts. Eirst of all, I think that we don’t know very much 
at all about ETIM. 

And it is interesting. I have been a part of some other panels the 
last couple of years, particularly right around the Olympics where 
I encountered some terrorist experts “who do contract work for the 
U.S. Government.” And they would go through charts with the or- 
ganizational structure of the group and provide all this definitive 
information; and then, as soon as they were questioned by some- 
body who actually was a specialist in the region and in the Uighur 
people, they actually stepped down, which, to me, was very sus- 
picious. My assumption 

Mr. Delahunt. Are you suggesting. Professor, that there is a cot- 
tage industry of terrorist experts out there that come and appear 
on cable news shows and testify when necessary? 

Mr. Roberts. Not only that, I think also — I think some of them 
are doing contractual work for the Defense Department and other 
agencies in the U.S. Government. And my impression of the people 
I encountered was that they didn’t really have much more sub- 
stantive information than was available on the Internet. And, as 
Dr. Gladney said, we can’t always trust everything that is on the 
Internet. 

As I said in my testimony, I think that it is highly likely that 
ETIM was a group of a handful of people in Afghanistan in the late 
’90s. But I also have encountered lots of information from the late 
’90s when the Chinese Government was engaging the Taliban, par- 
ticularly on the issue of Uighur separatists. 

I think that one of the questions that arises when you look at 
the Uighur situation, why wasn’t there a separatist movement 
based in Afghanistan? I think in all likelihood the Taliban strongly 
discouraged it, if not tried to prevent anything like that happening. 
I think that ETIM, after this purported leader’s death, may not 
have existed at all. 



109 


What is interesting is now these videos that were on YouTube I 
think are something that raise some interesting questions. I said 
in my written testimony I think that those videos could be either 
Chinese Government or they could be perhaps, as Dr. Gladney 
said, one-person shop, two-persons shops, somewhere, anywhere in 
Germany and Istanbul and the United States, trying to exaggerate 
the power of a potential Uighur terrorist threat, because they obvi- 
ously have not had much success with political attempts to get at- 
tention. 

Or, finally, they could be attempts by transnational terrorist 
groups to recruit Uighurs, because they see that the Uighur people 
have kind of been abandoned by the West. 

Mr. Delahunt. Thank you. 

Ms. Kan, do you wish to comment? 

Ms. Kan. First of all, this is an important question. Because 
there have been a lot of allegations and insinuations about ETIM 
in any connection or vague, ambiguous terms of association or af- 
filiation with al-Qaeda. We do not base our assessments in the 
United States on what China says at face value. No reputable ana- 
lyst in the U.S. Government would do that. 

So, looking at what the United States officials have said that can 
be more specific than these ambiguous terms of association or af- 
filiation, since 2002 — it has been almost 9 years — we have only 
been able — I can only find two, which is, one, that supposedly the 
camps in Afghanistan received money from al-Qaeda funding; and, 
secondly, the newest assertion that the leader of ETIM was in- 
cluded in al-Qaeda’s Shura Council. Beyond that, there is really 
nothing else about if there is an ETIM, if there is any kind of con- 
nection or relationship, that it is part of the network that has com- 
mitted any attacks against U.S. interests. 

Mr. Delahunt. Professor Roberts. 

Mr. Roberts. I just want to add one thing. I do think it is very 
important to note that there have not been any instances of suicide 
bombings or car bombings, nowhere where we could say we have 
explosive devices that would point to a Uighur group being associ- 
ated with a transnational terrorist network. To me, that is the 
most striking evidence against this argument. 

I think that it is fair to say almost any specialist in the Uighurs 
is open to seeing evidence that in fact there are large groups of 
Uighurs involved with al-Qaeda. But I think that the evidence is 
against it. There may be one or two people associated with al- 
Qaeda, but it is also interesting that we have not seen a lot of in- 
formation about Uighurs in Pakistan’s Northwest Province right 
now. We hear about Uzbeks, but we don’t hear about Uighurs. So 
I think that is another point that questions whether we are talking 
about one or two people who may be associated with al-Qaeda or 
whether we are talking about any significant movement. 

Ms. Baker Manning. If I may offer one more thing on this point. 

The sensible sort of funding relationship and whether an ETIM 
member has contact with al-Qaeda, one of the specific issues con- 
sidered by the DC Circuit in the Parhat case was whether there 
was any evidence that ETIM is associated with either al-Qaeda or 
the Taliban. And the court, although it was based on classified evi- 
dence that, although I am privy to, I cannot for obvious reasons 



110 


comment on, once we reviewed the evidence, including the evidence 
on this point, 3 days after we received that evidence for the first 
time, we moved for judgment, and we got judgment. 

Mr. Delahunt. 3 days. 

Ms. Baker Manning. The court engaged in a review of precisely 
this issue, was there any evidence in the government’s best case of 
a connection between ETIM and al-Qaeda, and the court ruled for 
us on precisely that point. 

Mr. Delahunt. You know what concerns me is that we don’t 
even know what ETIM really is. And we have this allegation out 
there about links to al-Qaeda, and it gets amplified every time 
there is a discussion, and it becomes an accepted fact. And that is 
what is really disturbing. If there is evidence, let’s listen to it. But, 
again, it is that veil of secrecy. 

I mean, up until recently, the Vice President — the former Vice 
President continued to maintain there was some relationship be- 
tween al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, when just a review of the 
history of the region would indicate that Osama bin Laden consid- 
ered Saddam Hussein an apostate, a defiler of Islam. 

I mean, we have to be more careful as a people and as policy- 
makers in terms of what we say, and we are prone oftentimes to 
throw away a comment that has very little validity. 

I mean, maybe we will have to have a classified briefing. But I 
have attended classified briefings, and I can remember weapons of 
mass destruction and mushroom clouds and operational relation- 
ships. I can remember being told that al-Qaeda camps existed in 
Iraq. It was false. 

Do we know where this village or this camp existed in Afghani- 
stan? No. We are making it up. That is what the rest of the world 
is thinking. And now we find ourselves in this very difficult, em- 
barrassing situation. 

And Dr. Gladney, what I found remarkable, and you pointed it 
out in your testimony, is that our own military, the U.S. military, 
had never heard of ETIM according to a report at the end of 2001. 
And yet, again with all due respect, we are designating ETIM less 
than a year later through an Executive Order as a terrorist organi- 
zation. 

Mr. Secretary, I think Ms. Baker Manning said it well. If you 
were sitting here — you are sitting out there, and you are putting 
August 22nd together and then, you know, different reports, and 
all of a sudden ETIM emerges as a terrorist organization — what in- 
ferences would you be drawing? Dr. Gladney, if you will, can you 
amplify what I alluded to in terms of our own military not having 
heard of ETIM? 

Mr. Gladney. I wish I could. Just based on a SINCPAC report 
that was published which they extensively examined, a special re- 
port, Uighur Muslim Separatists, Virtual Information Center, 
dated 28 September, 2001, ETIM was not even mentioned. 

Mr. Delahunt. What conclusion can we reach, Mr. Secretary? I 
mean, you see the predicament that serious people have about the 
designation or the existence of ETIM. Even if we grant you that it 
existed, you know, because a leader acknowledges this — and who is 
this guy Hak? 



Ill 


And, by the way, has anybody heard from ETIM in the last 4, 
5, 6, 7 years? Where are they? Where are they? Can anybody an- 
swer? Dr. Roberts; Dr. Gladney; Mr. Fein; you, Mr. Secretary; Ms. 
Kan; can someone tell me where they are? Are they taking any re- 
sponsibility for any acts, any violent acts? The only ones that seem 
to be giving them any credibility is the Chinese Communist Gov- 
ernment in Beijing. Will anyone comment? 

Because here in September post-9/11, in September 2001 the 
United States military does an in-depth study of the region with 
a focus on Uighur Muslim separatists; and there is no mention of 
ETIM. If you were me, Mr. Secretary, what would you think? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Well, again 

Mr. Delahunt. Put yourself in my position. 

Mr. SCHRiVER. I understand the tone and your purpose in having 
this hearing and trying to draw people out on these issues. I think 
it is an important issue. But again if you look at sort of the com- 
prehensive approach of the administration it is just analytically un- 
sound that this was simply to try to engage the Chinese on coun- 
terterrorism cooperation because there are so much other efforts 
that would run contrary to that. In fact, this is a data point that 
is inconsistent with our overall approach to Xinjiang and to the 
Uighur community. 

Mr. Delahunt. With all due respect, I don’t agree with you. I 
think if I am negotiating and the Chinese are really important, 
they are a major — they are a super power, we know that. If I can 
just feed the beast a little bit, give them a dollop, if you will, of, 
okay, we know you have got a problem. We know that you are con- 
cerned not so much about Islamic jihadis but a growing sense of 
a possible independence movement or demands for more autonomy 
or demands for human rights. Okay, give us what you have. And 
you gave us some stuff. You gave us some statistics. And, you 
know, all right, rather than having a whole bunch of — because the 
testimony from these experts are there were groups out there that 
were of more consequence than the ETIM. Is that true, Mr. 
Gladney? 

Mr. Gladney. That was our feeling at the time. 

Mr. Delahunt. Professor Roberts, is that your understanding, 
that if you take a look at the Uighur dissidents that there were 
some groups that existed that were of more consequence than 
ETIM? Or am I misstating it? 

Mr. Roberts. No, absolutely. I wouldn’t say that — I have never 
really encountered a group that has any militant capabilities, 
though. But there is no doubt that in the Uighur community — I 
was in Kazakhstan for much of the 1990s, spent most of that time 
in Uighur communities, knew all of the political leaders, and I 
never once encountered the Eastern Turkistan Uighur movement. 
And I lived in Uighur neighborhoods where I encountered all kinds 
of visitors from organizations in Turkey, from organizations in Ger- 
many, from organizations in all other countries, but I never heard 
of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic movement until February 2002 
when it was designated a terrorist organization. 

Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Fein. 

Mr. Fein. Mr. Chairman, let me make a couple of observations. 



112 


One, what this hearing shows is sunshine is the best disinfect- 
ant. We still have all this shrouded in secrecy. And if we think of 
the history of all of the leaks of classified information, none of them 
have been shown to be greatly detrimental to the United States of 
America, including the Pentagon Papers. 

There is a risk anytime to have a totally open society. But the 
consequences of — you know, this discussion today, which just illus- 
trates it is not limited to the Uighurs, there have been injustices 
to many other groups as well, that is why they have habeas corpus 
and are being released. It shows that all the claims that if you do 
this in the public, you let it out, all these calamities will happen. 
History just doesn’t bear that out. 

That was said before the Church Committee hearings as well. 
You can’t have any of these hearings. We will never have anyone 
who will ever do a covert operation again. It didn’t happen that 
way. 

And to the extent that there is some kind of inhibition, so what? 
The benefits to democracy to getting it right are so much better to 
have members like you know what is going on. 

The same questions that you are asking Mr. Schriver has been 
asked to those people in Congress who are actually the ones who 
are making those decisions, and you had it right to get the answers 
to them, and if you did they wouldn’t have been listed on the orga- 
nizations of terrorist groups. 

Mr. Delahunt. Let me yield to the gentlelady from Texas, Sheila 
Jackson Lee, for as much time as she may consume. 

Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to thank you 
for your kindness to yielding to me. 

I am a member of the full committee, and the chairman has been 
gracious with his time to allow me to be involved in what I think 
is an enormously crucial issue. And if you ever want to be dressed 
down or undressed down, let Bruce Fein get in the mix of it. And 
it is appropriate that you have done so, and I do appreciate it. 

I am going to be somewhat redundant, because I like making the 
record very, very clear. Because we have seen the denunciation of 
Bermuda. We have seen a representation on the public stage of all 
kinds of things. And it is always the last word that someone hears 
is what they go off with. And so I imagine that the public has al- 
ready been, I will use the term tainted, meaning the American pub- 
lic. They have got their attitude about the Uighurs, and they be- 
lieve that we have released major terrorists who are floating in the 
sea in Bermuda and that we are reckless and uncaring. 

So let me try to, first of all, say, coming from a Caribbean Amer- 
ican heritage, I want to thank the people of Bermuda for respond- 
ing to what was a necessity. And, frankly, I want everyone to know 
that Bermuda would like to have snow slopes and terrible weather, 
but, unfortunately, they are in an area that doesn’t allow them to 
have that. So when you do see them on video you are going nec- 
essarily see them in a beautiful backdrop. I thank again the people 
of Bermuda for what I think is helping to establish freedom. 

The other thing that I would like to mention as I pose this ques- 
tion is my sense of outrage of the continued peppering of sweetness 
on Iran, even in light of the atrocious public scenes that we have 
seen and the clarity of understanding that elections that seem to 



113 


come out one way were — the statistics show that 70 percent of the 
people might have voted the other way. And, again, I don’t pretend 
to select Iranian leaders, but I will say that that certainly brings 
a question to me. 

I will add the backdrop to the sugaring and pampering that we 
have done of our good friends in China. And let me make it very 
clear, I am a friend of Mainland China. We have a wonderful con- 
sulate. They have been always so very gracious. But it always 
amazes me how we are able to use a lot of sugar when we talk to 
people who have some extreme failings that don’t allow us to speak 
openly and forthrightly. 

Not only are we dealing with the Uighurs, we are dealing with 
the Tibetans. I have been in the Tibetan mountains to the extent 
that I have even been thrown off a yak, not while I was drinking 
yak milk, but literally that is one of my famous acts here in the 
United States Congress, and for the panel that was called cultural 
exchange. But, obviously, he was not interested in too much dia- 
logue. 

So I have been in the temples. I have seen and discussed with 
those individuals about their crisis. I have met with the represent- 
ative of the Dalai Lama, as well as the Dalai Lama, but particu- 
larly with his representative and spoke extensively about these 
issues. 

So let me try to ask a question to Susan Baker Manning. How 
do you know the Uighurs and those gentlemen that are now in Ber- 
muda were not associated with al-Qaeda? 

Ms. Baker Manning. I know that because it is undisputed. They 
have never been accused of being associated in any way, shape, or 
form with either al-Qaeda or the Taliban. The government has con- 
ceded this repeatedly. It is in a number of military documents. It 
is undisputed. And the DC Circuit has noted that it is undisputed. 
They have no association whatsoever with al-Qaeda, the Taliban. 
They never took up arms against the U.S., any members of the coa- 
lition. They have never been accused of taking up arms against 
anyone. 

Ms. Jackson Lee. So if we were to seek a written affirmation or 
an affirmation we could go to Federal judiciary court papers. 

Ms. Baker Manning. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. Jackson Lee. Would we have access to these military docu- 
ments that you suggested? Have you had access to them? 

Ms. Baker Manning. There is a classified and unclassified por- 
tion of the record to which I have access. I could certainly provide 
the unclassified portions of that to the committee. 

We have had some discussion about access to classified informa- 
tion. I have encouraged the executive branch to share with this 
committee its correspondence with Attorney General Holder. I have 
encouraged them to share the relevant classified information with 
the Uighurs, because it is critical that Congress understand who 
we are really talking about here. There is a great deal of misin- 
formation. 

Ms. Jackson Lee. On the unclassified — and I am grateful for the 
chairman’s yielding. I just have a pointed question. 



114 


On the unclassified, will I — in sort of supporting the chairman if 
he has asked for it, I would like to ask for it. On the unclassified, 
would we find written language that says that? 

Ms. Baker Manning. What you will find is you will find that in 
the Parhat v. Gates opinion issued by the DC Circuit — actually, it 
is attached to my written testimony today. I can point you to the 
specific passage in there. 

The court notes, after review of both the classified and the un- 
classified evidence in that case — and all the Uighurs are the same. 
Evidence is the same. The court notes, after review of both the 
classified and the unclassified evidence, that there is no allegation 
that Parhat was in any way a part of either the Taliban or al- 
Qaeda; and the court also notes that there is no evidence that he 
was a member of ETIM. 

Ms. Jackson Lee. And the reason why I just continue to focus 
on this — and I thank you for that — is that the spoken word some- 
times is loose and light. But we have court affirmation having — the 
court having reviewed the classified documents. 

And the other aspect of it is we are on Foreign Affairs, some of 
us are on Armed Services, some of us are on Homeland Security, 
all part of the synergism of protecting America; and the first front- 
liners of blame, rightly so, is the government for saying I told you 
so. These are in fact terrorists. 

But we have investigated documents, documents that were the 
results of an investigation that says that they were not associated. 
Let me then ask you, why were they in the Afghan camps, as have 
been alleged? 

Ms. Baker Manning. Well, as we have seen from discussions 
that the four men released to Bermuda have had with the press 
over the last few days, the first time they have ever been able to 
tell the story themselves, the same stories they have been telling 
me, these men end up in Afghanistan because Afghanistan is at 
the time a place that has no reciprocity with China. Every single 
one of them leaves China because of the oppression of the Uighur 
people. 

A1 Abu Hakeem, the gentleman in this picture right there, he 
leaves China in part because that little girl sitting on his lap is his 
niece. His sister was about to be forced to abort that child under 
China’s one child policy. His sister escapes. He escapes about the 
same time. 

They are fleeing the remarkable persecution of their people with- 
in China. Every single one of the 22 Uighur men who ended up in 
Guantanamo was leaving to escape that kind of oppression. Every 
single one of them is philosophically opposed to the Communist 
Chinese regime and to its remarkable and well-documented oppres- 
sion of human rights and of their people specifically. But not one 
of them has ever sought to take up arms against China or anyone 
else. 

Ms. Jackson Lee. Do we have a court order that — the release, 
I am sorry, of these individuals, are they able to see their families? 
Are families coming to Bermuda? Or how is that working. 

Ms. Baker Manning. The four gentlemen who are now in Ber- 
muda are free. They are not able to travel because their Chinese 
passports were long ago lost. And the Bermudans have indicated 



115 


that they are willing to move them toward citizenship. That is a 
somewhat time-consuming process. It probably won’t happen with- 
in the year. But upon their naturalization as citizens of Bermuda 
and, therefore, the commonwealth, they would be able to travel. 
And I understand there will be some restrictions about whether 
they will be able to travel to the United States. But they would be 
able to travel abroad. They will be able to see their families. 

Ms. Jackson Lee. Will their families be able to come to Ber- 
muda? 

Ms. Baker Manning. Yes, ma’am. The difficulty is that most of 
their family members are still in China, and there are enormous 
concerns with treatments of their families by the Chinese Govern- 
ment. There are just enormous concerns about that. So the dif- 
ficulty is not whether the Bermudans would allow the family mem- 
bers to come visit them. The Bermudans have made it quite clear 
to me that they are more than welcome. The difficulty is getting 
out of China. 

Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you very much. 

Mr. Delahunt. Would the gentlelady yield for a moment? I want 
to inform her that it is the intention of the committee to go to Ber- 
muda. 

Ms. Jackson Lee. That was my next point. I would like to join 
you. And I think that is an excellent suggestion, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Delahunt. And I have discussed it with the ranking mem- 
ber. We would hope — and, clearly, there are logistical issues, and 
this is a matter that would have to be discussed with our Speaker 
and Chairman Berman. But it would be my hope that we could 
conduct a hearing in Bermuda and have these four individuals tes- 
tify. 

Because, as I said earlier I think it is very important that we — 
and not we necessarily but the American people hear from them di- 
rectly without the filter of pundits and talking heads and those 
that may or may not have a particular bias. And I think it would 
be very, very instructive and very, very informative and hopefully 
accelerate the process of closing down Guantanamo as promised by 
President Obama and sought, actually, by President Bush, Defense 
Secretary Gates, Secretary Powell, and others. 

Because what has happened — and I am sure you have noted it. 
Congresswoman — is that there have been many statements such as 
send them back to China by people who are 

Ms. Jackson Lee. Misinformed. 

Mr. Delahunt. Misinformed but who are — people who are per- 
ceived to be leaders in this country. And they have created such a 
hostile environment that the actions of our Government are not 
necessarily welcoming to those who were hoping to resettle here in 
the United States. Instead, we go around the world to countries 
who I never really, in all honesty, knew existed, such as Palau, as 
well as Bermuda and Italy and others, hat in hand asking that 
they accept these individuals whom it is indisputable are no threat 
to the United States and hopefully can contribute to whatever soci- 
ety they end up in. 

It is my current intention to take a trip probably this weekend 
and speak to the Bermudan authorities and sit down with people 
on the ground from the executive branch and discuss the logistics 



116 


of our going there and having these individuals come before us so 
that we can put to rest whatever the facts are, their views. And 
if anybody wants to refute them, now is the time for them to stand 
up after they testify. 

So that is the intention of the committee, and that is my own 
short-term plan. But I would anticipate some time after the July 
district work period to go to Bermuda and to have a briefing, have 
a hearing, whatever it is appropriately called. 

With that, I yield back to the gentlelady. 

Ms. Jackson Lee. And, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your gra- 
ciousness. 

I think that is highly appropriate. I think it should be known 
that the chairman is also on the Judiciary Committee, and this is 
perfectly in sync with those issues. 

I will have just two brief questions, and then I will conclude my 
remarks. And that is to ask Mr. Fein, how do we fix this going for- 
ward? And then I have a question for a professor who is traveling. 

But how do we fix this going forward? You enunciated that — I 
had left because, in fact, I am going back to a Homeland Security 
Committee hearing, a committee that I chair, dealing with securing 
the critical infrastructure, dealing with issues of chemical security. 
And, you know, over there we are trying to be the face of securing 
America. 

But you mentioned something about our values, civil liberties. I 
almost think — if I can refresh people’s memory about the Japanese 
camps in World War II, and I would ask them would we still want 
to have those camps today even if they existed and there was no 
one in them, or we say, well, we are holding them because we may 
have to do it again. 

Don’t people understand that is what Guantanamo Bay equal- 
izes? Because it was no less serious when the Japanese bombed 
Pearl Harbor. It was like the world had come to an end. Well, it 
was like the world had come to an end on 9/11. 

But we got ourselves back together. We realized that that was 
a heinous thing to do. And so no one voted to say. Well, why don’t 
we keep these in here? Because we may hear about so and so, 
maybe might have been with the Japanese on that heinous act. But 
we closed them. And I guess our shame is to never do that again. 

Why is it that we are in this complex situation with Guantanamo 
Bay and we seem to fail in our remembrance of history? 

Mr. Fein. Well, there is a whole host of reasons. One of those 
that is most unpleasant to mention is, at present. Congresswoman, 
the names of the victims are difficult to pronounce — Brumidi and 
Hamdan or whatever. It doesn’t sound like Smith and Joe and 
whatever that we heard about during Watergate. So people think 
it is not going to happen to me. 

A second reason is because I think the government and the exec- 
utive branch tried to inflate the fear 5 million fold, calling the chal- 
lenge the equivalent of fighting Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini, Hirohito, 
Lenin combined. 

It is clearly a danger out there. That is why we have criminal 
justice systems. That is why we have covert actions. And, therefore, 
it became this idea — remember the worst of the worst at Guanta- 
namo Bay? And we believed that because we find this the equiva- 



117 


lent of refighting World War II, and there are all these allusions 
to Munich and things of that sort. 

So people get frightened, and they trusted their government and 
said. Okay, I guess that is what we have to do. And it took finally 
the Supreme Court in Boumediene that said, you know, the rights 
do apply there; habeas corpus applies here. And that is why we 
have the hearings on the Uighur. 

And Congressman Dana Rohrabacher didn’t quite understand 
that. He said, “Well, why, Mr. Fein, are you wanting these people 
to have rights?” Well, he wouldn’t be sitting there and questioning 
the other panelists if we didn’t have that Supreme Court decision. 

Habeas corpus does apply. And it is something that we need to 
reestablish, in my judgment, an entire different culture that recog- 
nizes, yeah, being an open society creates some risk. But that is 
who we are as a people. And it prevents a lot more injustice than 
risk that it creates. 

How do you go forward in addressing these issues? I think when 
we think about the listing of organizations as terrorists, some kind 
of stigma, building upon what we learned from our own — we had 
a list of subversive organizations that we had around for about four 
decades as well. I was in the Office of Legal Counsel. We abolished 
the damn thing finally under President Nixon. 

We need to have a set of hearings. What are the criteria and the 
due process that ought to go forward if we are going to list anybody 
at all without an actual trial? How much do we get from these list- 
ing organizations other than being able to make people frightened? 
There has never been any systematic study of that. 

How much judicial review can we have? Because, at present, you 
are listed. That is it. You don’t know what the charges are against 
you. You don’t even know how to refute it. 

The standing issue is, well, you are an organization abroad. You 
don’t have standing in the United States to bring a lawsuit. 

How are you going to hire a lawyer? 

A whole examination of how we go about the process of listing 
and how many different lists we have. Executive order lists under 
the Economic Emergency Powers Act. It should be — ^you might call 
it mini Church Committee hearings on all of these different ways 
you get listed. Individuals, organizations, no due process at all. 
How accurate are they? Is there any examination after the fact? 
Should these people be on the list at all or not? 

And that is what I think is critical that could come out of this 
hearing. Because the Uighurs are just a microcosm of this much, 
much larger issue of secrecy and arbitrariness and just listing peo- 
ple. 

It reminds me a little bit of the Pope’s Index of Forbidden Books. 
Oh, you are just thrown off the list. Okay, now no one can read it 
anymore. 

You need process out there. Perhaps the most important idea in 
the history of civilization has been two words, due process. Always 
come back to that. Due process, the most important idea that we 
have ever contributed to civilization. 

Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, you have given us a road map. 



118 


We have lost a dear professor. It looks like we have talked him 
into oblivion. But we appreciate what he was able to put on the 
record; and I will peruse the record, Mr. Chairman. 

But what I want to just point out — and I want to thank the other 
witnesses. I will not pose questions to you. But what I want to say 
to Mr. Fein, that is an appropriate, if you will, road map for us. 
To bring us back to the questioning of these practices that we uti- 
lize, in essence, to secure ourselves and really probe into the cri- 
teria. 

For example, Mr. Chairman, I hope we can look into what has 
been called the Iranian Resistance Movement. They are located in 
Paris, France. I am sure you have received many invitations. We 
have been castigated, some of us, for trying to listen to them. I just 
want to find out what they are. They indicated their resistance. 
They have been labeled as terrorists. We have had some comings 
and goings. 

But there are a number of groups like this that I think are cru- 
cial. The whole issue of due process is crucial. And we have had 
moments in our culture. We have had moments with McCarthyism. 

I was on the COINTELPRO subcommittee dealing with the in- 
vestigation of the King and Kennedy assassinations, the one that 
they organized in late 1978. And let me just say that I was there 
when I was about 2 years old. But I was a staffer, and we had 
what we called COINTELPRO, which is the surveillance of Dr. 
Martin Luther King. 

And we thought that was securing America. And we had all 
kinds of allusions or suggestions that he was a Communist and 
taking over America, and tragically we lost him in a tragic assas- 
sination that was successful. We don’t know whether the creation 
of that aura contributed to the misthought of individuals, just as 
the tragedy that happened in the Holocaust Museum. 

So we have got to find the terrorists, yes. We have got to know 
whether they are domestic or foreign, yes. But we have got to find 
a way to frame our fight in the work or in the mind-set of due proc- 
ess. 

I conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying the beginning of the Con- 
stitution says that we, the people, have formed to create a more 
perfect union. We have never said it could be superbly 100 percent, 
but we said more perfect. And I think that goes to the Bounding 
Eathers leaving, in this instance. Great Britain, and found that it 
was not perfect. 

And so I am hoping that we can work for a more perfect union 
and look at the hearings on these terrorist lists and particularly 
follow up on the Uighurs. And I think this is instructive, and I 
think it is instructive for the State Department. 

I appreciate, Mr. Secretary, your representation of my fellow 
Texan who had an interest in this, but I also think it is extremely 
important that we look at Guantanamo Bay and ask ourselves a 
question: Would we want the Japanese camps here today as a sym- 
bol of America? Then do we want to have Guantanamo Bay as a 
continuing symbol of America? 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. Delahunt. I thank the gentlelady. 



119 


Ms. Jackson Lee. And I am not sure, it looked like Ms. Kan was 
trying to say a word. 

Mr. Delahunt. Go ahead. 

Ms. Kan. I appreciate your comment. 

I would just make one clarification, that those camps in World 
War II, they were actually for Americans who happened to he of 
Japanese heritage. They were not Japanese. They were Americans. 
And that was part of the historical record. 

On your earlier question of whether or not we ought to ask ques- 
tions about these designations, including the most recent one in 
April by the Treasury Department, there are indeed questions. Be- 
cause we don’t need to go back to the 1990s or the 19th century. 
We can focus on the concerns about the threats last year sur- 
rounding the Olympic Games. And that is what Treasury tied the 
individual to those supposed threats last year. That is not the 

Mr. Delahunt. But if I am correct, there were no incidents. 

Ms. Kan. There was no attack against the Olympic Games. There 
were incidents in May and July that were in Han ethnic Chinese 
cities. 

Mr. Delahunt. But not in the autonomous Uighur region. 

Ms. Kan. Well, that is just the point. When they happened in the 
Han ethnic Chinese cities in the east and the south, China denied 
that they were terrorism. When there were incidents in the far 
west, in Xinjiang, China immediately called them terrorist inci- 
dents. 

And there is another discrepancy, that the threats that were 
posted on YouTube — and we by no means take them at face 
value — they claimed credit for the incidents on the eastern part of 
China, but in fact those were not considered terrorist incidents by 
China nor by the United States Government. And there were some 
mistakes in making those claims at the same time. 

Mr. Delahunt. This is just — ^you know, this has been very in- 
formative. It was Professor Gladney, I think that you said that the 
majority of information regarding ETIM was traced back to Chi- 
nese sources. And I think your words were that leaves a significant 
credibility gap. Am I stating the gist of your own statement? 

Mr. Gladney. Yes, sir, I believe that your quotation that started 
this whole session set it out very perfectly. That clearly the statis- 
tics, whether they were reportedly — are the words used — were ver- 
batim repeated. In other words, there was not even the effort to 
check if there were 443 civilian injuries or it was 445. It was 444. 

Mr. Delahunt. You can do a better job of pasting and cutting 
here. 

Mr. Gladney. My students would get a C minus for that report. 

Mr. Delahunt. That is shoddy. 

You know, I was just thinking, prior to 9/11 — and you can re- 
spond, too, Mr. Secretary — was there ever any reference anywhere 
which would have linked ETIM or any of the Uighurs to al-Qaeda? 
Was that referenced anywhere in your knowledge in any reporting 
to the government, whether it is classified or unclassified or top se- 
cret or code red or code blue or whatever? 

Mr. Gladney. Can I speak to that, sir? 

I think even more interesting is that al-Qaeda themselves, 
whether bin Laden or his spokespersons, have never raised the 



120 


Uighur cause as of interest to them. There is one reference to one 
of his lieutenants in one statement. But bin Laden himself has 
never mentioned the Uighur cause. There are a lot of theories 
about that. 

But he has mentioned specifically other so-called Muslim libera- 
tion causes, whether it was in Chechnya, or Mindanao, or what- 
ever. So al-Qaeda is interested in supporting these. 

The other incident — the other aspect of this whole situation that 
should be made clear is that Uighurs traditionally have not been 
interested in radical Islam. They have a strong Sufi tradition. Sufis 
are persecuted by the Taliban and by al-Qaeda. There is some 
Wahabi influence in the region. It may be growing. 

But, traditionally, we have all called attention to the fact that 
Uighur culture is long, history of celebrating, a vibrant culture, 
dance, music, vibrant colorful clothing, all of the kinds of things 
that we have seen Taliban trying to wipe out. So it has never reso- 
nated with the al-Qaeda. 

Mr. Roberts. If I 

Mr. Delahunt. We welcome back from Kosovo Professor Roberts. 

Mr. Roberts. I have been here. I have just been off the screen, 
I think. I just want to note, also, if you are examining this issue 
about foreign intelligence, I would also suggest that sources from 
places like Kazakhstan and Pakistan and Kyrzykstan are also — I 
would not see them as credible third-party sources in this instance, 
because they have their own interest also in classifying Uighurs as 
terrorists. 

Mr. Delahunt. Again, let me throw this to the panel. Do they 
support a Sharia state? Have we ever heard that? Because that is 
being stated by colleagues of mine here in the United States Con- 
gress. 

Of course, that conjures up images of the extreme form of 
Wahabism that has been embraced by, obviously, al-Qaeda. But is 
there any evidence of that anywhere in any document? Mr. Sec- 
retary, are you aware of any? 

Well, I think I have kept you here long enough. But this has 
been extremely informative. You have left us with more questions, 
but we have made a commitment to pursue, to create a record 
hopefully that will be 

Ms. Kan, you mentioned that it was met — the designation was 
met with controversy outside and inside the State Department. Do 
you remember making that statement? 

Ms. Kan. Yes. 

Mr. Delahunt. Do you want to expand and amplify, or would 
you prefer to avoid that answer? 

Ms. Kan. I don’t think I can get into specifics. But over the time 
of my research several sources have told me that it was controver- 
sial inside. 

Mr. Delahunt. Within the Department of State. 

Ms. Kan. But I think Randy can speak to that better. 

Mr. ScHRiVER. Well, again, not having directly participated in 
this decision my recollection is, yeah, there were different views, 
but the controversy was mostly surrounding the very issues we are 
talking about today: What are the second and third order effects 
that we may not be able to control? Will this give the Chinese an 



121 


imprimatur that we certainly don’t want them to have for their re- 
pressive activities in Xinjiang? 

So I think the controversy mostly rested in believing that was 
the right designation, but would it be the appropriate thing to do 
in light of some of the possible consequences. 

Mr. Delahunt. Has anyone — I want to get back to where are the 
ETIM now. Do you have any information that they have existed in 
the past 3 years, 5 years, 6 years, 8 years? Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. SCHRIVER. If you allow me to answer that indirectly, I think 
people could sort of create a road map of where some of the folks 
ended up or morphed into this other organization, ETIM. 

But I am not aware that anyone from the Bush administration 
who participated in this decision would object to a new administra- 
tion reviewing that decision or saying that things have changed 
from the time in fall of 2002 when the decision was made. It is 
highly appropriate if the nature of the organization has changed or, 
as some suggest, no longer even exists that the government should 
take a fresh review of that. I wouldn’t object to that. I don’t think 
my boss would object to that, who made the original designation. 
It seems to me an entirely appropriate thing to do. 

Mr. Fein. Mr. Congressman, it shows some of the flaws, again, 
in the legal structure here. If you are listed as an FTO, the govern- 
ment is required to reexamine the listing at a minimum every 5 
years and perhaps 2 years; and it is supposed to base its listing on 
the most recent window of time. Whereas 

Mr. Delahunt. Does that really occur in the real world? 

Mr. Fein. Maybe when 

Mr. Delahunt. Other than in a perfunctory manner? 

Mr. Fein. At least it has some element of sunset to it. And you 
are able under the statute after 2 years to go and petition the ad- 
ministration to take a new look. 

Now, maybe it is pro forma. But there isn’t even that oppor- 
tunity, just bureaucratic inertia in the — when you are listed by an 
Executive Order, it can be there for ages. It can just appear as an 
entity. Just people worried in post-9/11 I don’t want to be said I 
removed a terrorist organization. That leaves you vulnerable — were 
you weak on terrorism — if there is some incident. 

Mr. Roberts. If I can add one thing. Congressman Delahunt, is 
that I think the people who will try to convince others that ETIM 
is still a threat will point to these things on the Internet related 
to the so-called Turkistan Islamic Party. Now, that is a com- 
pletely — as far as I know, I have no evidence that that exists any- 
where but on the Internet. 

It may indeed exist somewhere else. I saw last week an issue of 
Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorist Monitor which purports that 
this organization is now putting out journals. And they found these 
on jihadi Web sites, which makes me really question how much 
they are related to Uighurs at all. But that would be one group 
that people will point to. 

Mr. Delahunt. Well, thank you. Professor. 

Ms. Kan. 

Ms. Kan. On your question about Sharia law, maybe I can just 
add a small point. 



122 


If you look at the authoritative history of Xinjiang and the 
Uighur people going back to the Qing Dynasty and also in the Re- 
publican era, Republic of China era, when the Kuomintang con- 
trolled things. Sharia law was allowed. The Xinjiang people prac- 
ticed Sharia during the Republican era. It was only when the Com- 
munist Party of China started to take control in 1950 that the 
Communist Party, which bans these kinds of religions, tried to ban 
Sharia law, but it was in place historically. So what does that 
mean if people want to reinstitute something that they have had 
historically and was allowed previously? 

Mr. Delahunt. Well, this has been extremely informative. I am 
confident that some of you will be invited to return as we proceed, 
using the case of the 22 Uighurs who had been or are currently in- 
carcerated at Guantanamo as an object lesson, as a case study, if 
you will, for I think some very serious issues that have been raised 
here today. 

Thank you. Professor Roberts. We appreciate your input. 

And to all of you, again, thanks; and we are done. 

[Whereupon, at 1 o’clock p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 



APPENDIX 


Material Submitted for the Hearing Record 


( 123 ) 



124 


SUBCOMIVIITTEE HEARING NOTICE 
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

II.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20515 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT 


William D. Delahuiit (D-MA), Chairman 


June 12,2009 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend the following OPEN hearing of the 
Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight, to be held in 
Room 21 72 of the Ravbum House Office Building: 

DATE: Tuesday, June 16, 2009 

TIME: 9:00 a.m. 

SUBJECT: Exploring the Nature of Uighur Nationalism: Freedom Fighters or 

Terrorists? 

WITNESSES: Panel I 

Mr. Randall G. Schriver 
Partner 

Armitage International 

(Funner Deputy Assislan! Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs. IJ.S. Department of State) 

Sean R. Roberts, Ph D 
Director and Associate Professor 
International Development Studies Program 
Elliott School of International Affairs 
The George Washington University 

Dru C. Gladney, Ph D. 

President 

Pacific Basin Institute 
Pomona College 

Panel II 

Ms. Shirley Kan 

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division 



125 


Congressional Research Service 

Ms. Susan Baker Manning 
Partner 

Bingham McCutchen 

Bruce Fein, Esq. 

Principal 

The Litchfield Group 


By Direction of the Chairman 


The Commiime on T'orei^n Affairs seeks lo make its facilities accessible iopersonswlh disabitilies. If yon are in need of special 
accommodations, please call 202/225-3021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Que.'itions 
regard to special accommodations m general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive 
listening devices) may be directed to the Committee as noted above 


with 



126 


COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 


MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON WHRO 

Day Tuesday Date 6-16-09 Room 2172 

Starting 1'ime _?««» Ending 12:1 Ipm 

I 

Recesses^ J(^ to ) 

Presiding Member(s)o^,„,„„„ 

CHECK ALL OF THE FOLLOWING THAT APPLY: 


MEETING 


Open Session [3 Eiectronicaliy Recorded (taped) [7] 

Execntive^oscd) Session □ Stenographic Record \7\ 

Televised I / I — 


TITLE ^V^^^^^WQMMUAWKM^\LVV;Mclude..MLmmbsrM.md.tjMs).ofkgisigtioii.l 
|£cp/uri«g the Nature of Uighur Nationalism: Ereedom Fighters or Terrorists? \ 

! ! 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT; ' 

Rnhrabacher " I 

“^<H:SI'BC0MMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENTirMiri :nth an ifthev are noJMemhers qfHIRC.) ' 
Faleomavacga, Jackson-Lee 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes gy‘i Nol "1 
below and include titles agency, department, or organization.) 


ST ATEMENTS EOT THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.) 


ACTIOI^TAKEN DURING JDiE MARKlIP:, (4ffaeA£o/Jie.s pfie| 2 s^a(mn aBd.amendments,)_ 


RECORDED VOTES TAKEN (FOR MARKUP): (Attach final vote tatty sheet 'ttstingeach member) 


Snhject Yeas Nays Present Not Voting 


TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE 
or 

TIME ADJOURNED 



127 


Material Submitted for the Record by the Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a 
Representative in Congress from the State of California 





128 


STATEMENT CAIJTNG FOR THE RELEASE OF THE UIGHIJRS 

Al present, seventeen Chinese Muslims — or Utghurs- -are still being held at Guantanamo Bay, 
where they have been detained for nearly seven years. The courts, the United States military, and 
the former administration under President Bush have long recognized that these men arc not 
“enemy combatants,'’ and do not pose a threat to the United States. After nearly seven yeiU's, 
there are no legal or moral grounds for holding these men one day longer. We call upon the U.S. 
government to end the unlawful detention of these men, release ihcni into the United States, and 
recognize the United States’ obligations to resettle some Guantanamo detainees in our country in 
order to encourage other nations to share in this responsibility. 

in the fall of 2008, federal district judge Ricardo Urbina ordered the release of these seventeen 
Uighur detainees whom the Bush adrainistration admitted were not enemy combattints. Detained 
for nearly seven years, these seventeen men were ordered to appear at a hearing in Washington, 
D.C. to determine the terms of their release. The Justice Department appealed the release order, 
and in February 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed 
the district court order on tlie ground tiiat the courts lack power to order such a release. 

Unfortunately, the Uighurs cannot be repatriated to China, their homeland, due to state sponsored 
persecution, and it is an open question whether any other country would admit them. Indeed, 
both the Defense and State Departments have been trying for more than five years to persuade 
other countries to accept them and have failed in that effort. While it is clearly neccssaiy for the 
United States to detain foreign terrorists to protect national security, that is not at issue here. 
Throughout the litigation process, the Bush administration agreed that the Uighurs are not enemy 
combatants, and there is no evidence that these men pose any threat to the United States. Rather, 
the record from the court proceedings shows that the Uighurs represent a persecuted mmorit>^ in 
China, that these men cannot return to their home country, and that numerous resources are 
available to help them resettle m the United States, including the assistance of the Uyghur 
American Association. 

The continued detention of the seventeen Uighurs in Guantanamo continues to compromise our 
principles and undermine our standing in the world. It also severely damages our credibility with 
our allies. When the United States government refused to admit detainees who arc not enemy 



129 


combatants into the country, tliis undermined the ability of the State Department to negotiate for 
other countries to accept any detainees. 

Those detainees for whom we have evidence of terrorism oftenscs should be prosecuted in our 
federal courts to the fullest extent of the law. But in order to close the Guantanamo detention 
facility successfully and to encourage our allies to partner with us in resettling the remaining 
detainees, the United States must accept our share of responsibility. Since resettlement in China 
is not an option, no other home has yet been found, and the Uighurs do not pose any threat to the 
United States, there is no good reason to object to their release into the United States. In fact, the 
court records included a detailed plan by the Uyghur American Association to assist these men in 
resettling in the United States. 


This is not a partisan issue. Conservatives and liberals, Republicans and Democrats, advocates of 
a strong president, a strong Congress, and a strong federal judiciary all believe that the system of 
checks and balances created by our country’.^ founders is required to preserv'e Americans’ 
freedoms, liberties, and our country’s security. When our government lacks a legal basis to 
detain people and there is no evidence that they pose a threat to the United States, they should be 
released promptly. Wc call on rhe U.S. government to promptly release these seventeen Uighurs. 
We encourage the Administration to act promptly to find homes for the remaining detainees who 
are also recognized as not being enemy combatants. 



130 


SIGNATORtES 


Stephen E. Abraham- Partner, Fink & Abraham LLP; Lieutenant Colonel, Military 
Intelligence, United State Army Reserve (Rcl.) 

Mickey Edwards, President y\spen Institute; Lecturer at tlie Woodrow Wilson School of Public 
and International Affairs, Princeton University; former Member of Congress (R-OK) and 
Chairman of the House Republican Policy Committee 

Richard A. Epstein — Janies Parker Hall Distinguished Seri-'icc Professor of Law, University of 
Chicago Law School; Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution 

Thomas B. Evans, Jr. — Chairman, The Evans Group, Ltd,; former U.S. Representative (R- 
DeL); former Co-Chairaian Republican National Committee 

David Keene Chairman, American Conservative Union 

William H. Taft, IV, Of Counsel, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson; fonner Legal 
Advisor, Department of State, George V\l. Bush Administration; Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
Reagan Administration 

Don Wallace, Jr. -Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Chairman. 
International Law Institute 

John W. Whitehead — President, The Rutherford Institute 

Lawrence B. Wilkerson — Visiting Pamela C. Harriman Professor of Government at the College 
of W'illiam and Mary; Professional Lecturer in the University Honors Program at the George 
Washington University; former Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell; Colonel, 

United Slates Array (Ret.) 

*Affiliations Listed for Identification Purposes Only 


O